

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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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JOHN KNOX AS STATESMAN.

It was unfortunate that the recent celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of John Knox should have taken place in the midst of a discussion as to the accuracy of the hitherto accepted date of that event. There is no longer much room for doubt that the challenge of Dr. Hay Fleming was well founded, and that the Reformer was born, not in 1505, but in 1515, and died at the age of fifty-seven. The commemoration, nevertheless, was highly successful, and revived the impression of Knox's great personality and his unique services. It called forth also some excellent additions to the literature of the subject, among which Professor Cowan's contribution to an American series of admirable monographs on the *Heroes of the Reformation* is one of the best. Mr. Andrew Lang's extraordinary outburst has affected no reputation but his own.

We propose in the present paper to consider Knox in one aspect only—that of statesman. That a man, who was simply parish minister of Edinburgh, and who never but for a few months in an emergency undertook any political function, should nevertheless be classed as a statesman, and one of the most capable and successful statesmen of his time, will seem strange to no one who really knows the history of Scotland during Queen Mary's reign.

Knox's political creed, which was nearly as definite as his theological creed, comes out casually, but emphatically, in many passages of his writings, as well as in his interviews with the Queen. The most compendious statement of it occurs in the sketch of a tract that was never written—a second and supplementary 'Blast' on female government. It consists of the following propositions:

'(I.) It is not birth only, nor propinquity of blood, that 'makes a King lawfully to reign above a people professing 'Christ Jesus and his eternal verity; but in his election must 'the ordinance which God hath established in the election of 'inferior judges be observed.

'(II.) No manifest idolater, nor transgressor of God's 'holy precepts, ought to be promoted to any public regiment '(rule), honour or dignity, in any realm, province, or city, 'that hath subjected itself to Christ Jesus and to his blessed 'Evangel.

'(III.) Neither can oath nor promise bind any such peo- 'ple to obey and maintain Tyrants, against God and against 'his truth known.

'(IV.) But if either rashly they have promoted any such 'wicked person, or yet ignorantly have chosen such a one 'as after declareth himself unworthy of regiment above the 'people of God—and such be all idolaters and cruel perse- 'cutors—most justly may the same men depose and punish 'him that unadvisedly before they did nominate, appoint 'and elect.'[1]

These propositions, expressed in the theological and somewhat archaic language of the period, will be better appreciated if we translate them into the secular tongue of our own day. If for 'a people professing Christ Jesus', and similar phrases, we read a Protestant people; for 'manifest idolaters and persecutors', and the like, members of the Church of Rome; and for 'Tyrants', Kings who set themselves above the laws, we get their meaning in modern terms. Political theories in the sixteenth century, and long

[1] Laing's *Knox,* IV, p. 539.

before it, generally arose out of religious questions, and Knox's, like the rest, bears the traces, if not of its origin, at least of its application. There is, however, nothing theological about these propositions in themselves; they are purely political.

The first asserts, in opposition to the legitimsit theory,—the theory of absolutism, and of the divine right of kings—then becoming common, that hereditary successions is not an absolute or invariable rule; that every sovereign at his accession requires, for his legitimation, the consent and recognition of his people, by formal or tacit election. It is hardly necessary to remind students of our great constitutional historians—Stubbs, Freeman, and others—that this is precisely the doctrine and practice of the English constitution (of which the Scottish is an offshoot) from the earliest times, under Saxon and under Norman kings. "The old English kings", says Freeman, "were anything but absolute rulers—the nation chose them and the nation could depose them—they could do no important act without the national assent".[2] Again: "Men never forgot that the king was what his name implied' (as derived from *Kin* and its cognates), "the representative, the impersonation, the offspring of the people. It was from the choice of the people that he received his authority to rule over them, a choice limited in all ordinary circumstances to the royal house, but which, within that house, was not tied down by a blind regard to any particular law of succession. Moreover, when the royal house failed to supply a fitting candidate, they could boldly fix their choice on the worthiest man of the whole people."[3] "Under the Norman Kings", says Stubbs, "the Crown is still elective; and the theory that, by the renunciation of homage—by a declaration that the rights conferred by consecration had been forfeited—the person so chosen could be set aside, was, owing to the existence of competition for the throne, kept prominently before the eyes of the people."[4]

[2] *Growth of the British Constitution,* p. 38.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 40.
[4] *Constitutional History,* I, p. 338.

The second proposition asserts that no Catholic should be admitted to rule over a Protestant people. This seems a new maxim. But it is quite in harmony with the old idea, which required that sovereign and subjects should be in the same relation to the Catholic Church, and to its head, the Pope. Knox might very well regard his proposition as simply the adaptation of the old idea to the new light. The Head of the Church, in Protestant eyes, was no longer at Rome; the Pope was His rival and enemy; a Catholic on the throne of a Protestant State would introduce a schism into its government, where unity was indispensable to its safety and efficiency. It should not be forgotten that, on grounds of experience, after a century and a half of troubles, Knox's maxim became, and still remains, the law that governs the succession to the throne of Great Britain.

It will help us to see the reasonableness of this demand, in Knox's day, if we recall the political machinery by which the government of Scotland (as of England) was then conducted, and the manner of its working. Constitutional government had not yet anywhere found the means of realising itself with efficiency. The executive power was in the hands of the sovereign, advised by a Privy Council, which in Scotland usually consisted of about a dozen nobles, with half a dozen officials. Every one of these, nobles and officials alike, owed his selection to the Crown, and could at any time be superseded by the same authority. The sovereign presided at the meetings of the Council, and could allow or disallow its advice at discretion. What are now called ministers were only favoured Councillors, to whom the sovereign gave a confidence which could at any time be withdrawn, and transferred to others.. However strongly supported by the public opinion of the nation, they had no means of coping with the royal will, however far it might stray into arbitrary or dangerous courses. The sovereign was in practice, though not in theory, absolute; he could be restrained only by physical force, or the fear of it. The power of the purse, that potent weapon of the Com-

mons of England, had no existence in Scotland; there was no general taxation to grant or refuse. These considerations must be carefully borne in mind when estimating the conduct of Knox, and of all who at any time opposed the proceedings of Queen Mary.

The third and fourth propositions, which are really one, assert the right of the nation to depose a tyrannical or persecuting sovereign. We have already quoted the definition of a tyrant as conceived by Knox and Buchanan—a sovereign who refuses to be governed and restrained in the exercise of his prerogative by the laws of his kingdom. He is what James VI., with unconscious humour, called 'a free King'—that is, a King who is free to do what he thinks right, untrammelled by law or precedent. And we have seen from the highest authorities how accordant Knox's propositions are with the doctrine and practice of the English constitution.

A single additional quotation from Knox's writings (out of many of like import) will complete the outline of his political creed. In his *History,*[5] we have the narrative of his interview with the Queen at Kinross, and the following is a part of the dialogue:

'And therefore', said Knox to Mary, 'it shall be profitable to your Majesty to consider what is the thing your Grace's subjects look to receive of your Majesty, and what it is ye ought to do unto them *by mutual contract.* They are bound to obey you, and that not but in God; ye are bound to keep laws unto them. Ye crave of them service; they crave of you protection and defence against wicked doers. Now, Madame, if ye shall deny your duty unto them, think ye to receive full obedience of them. I fear, Madame, ye shall not.'

The Mutual Contract between people and sovereign was the basis of Knox's political system, as of many later ones. It followed that loyalty—that equivocal term which has been so grossly abused, though it carries its real meaning

[5] Vol. II, p. 373.

on its face—is by no means a one-sided thing. It is mutual and reciprocal as between sovereign and subject, and is conditioned by the exemplary conformity of both, in letter and spirit, to the laws that govern both. And in the nature of things it must be proportionate, as between them; if there is failure of loyalty to the laws (or constitution) on the part of the sovereign, there will be corresponding diminution of loyalty to the sovereign on the part of the subject, and a schism in the body politic must ensue.

Such in outline is the political creed of Knox. Can it be said that there is anything unreasonable in it? Yet it fully explains, and if its truth be admitted, entirely justifies, in all essentials, the attitude and conduct of Knox towards the Queen, throughout her short and troubled reign, as we propose briefly to point out.

It would be interesting, did space permit, to inquire into its origin and history. Like Buchanan, who expounded it in more classic form in the *De Jure Regni,* he doubtless owed it in part to their common teacher, the Gallican Major, who was quite as pronounced a liberal as either of them[6]—perhaps in part to Boece and others like him—but most of all to a national tradition which went back to the Wars of Independence. It was really the implicit creed of Lowland Scots, derived from their Saxon ancestors; and it has persisted, with little variation, from that day to this. It has leaped to light, and proved its power, at every crisis of the national history. The whole Protestant party of Knox's time was actuated with it.

It would be no less interesting to compare these four propositions with the four questions put and answered in the celebrated *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos,* and with the other writings of the great Huguenot publicists, Hotman, Languet, and Duplessis-Mornay. We should see how the austere precept of Calvin and the first generation of Huguenots, in favour of passive obedience, passed in the second,

[6] See especially his *History of Greater Britain,* published by the Scot. Hist. Socy., 1892.

under the fiery trials of the Wars of Religion and the Bartholomew massacre, into a political doctrine hardly distinguishable from the Scottish liberalism of Knox—a doctrine less self-denying, but surely more manly, and perhaps not less godly, than the ascetic, and indeed slavish, precept which Calvin was so unwilling to relax.[7]

On these political principles Knox acted unflinchingly, from the day of his final landing in Scotland to the day of his death. It is his distinction that, alone among the Scottish statesmen of his day, he vividly realised the critical character of the contest with the Queen; the immense issues that hung upon it; and the fatal danger of compromise. In consequence, the history of her active reign is, in substance, the history of a prolonged duel between John Knox and Mary Stuart. Every other figure in it is subordinate.

It would be untrue to assert that he alone perceived, or suspected, the designs of the Queen. Neither Lethington nor Lord James could shut his eyes to them. They were, in fact, comparatively transparent, from her own frank avowals, made to Throckmorton before she set foot in Scotland. They had all been described in anticipation by Lethington, on the eve of her return, in one of those luminous despatches which he alone among contemporary statesmen could indite.[8] They were quite obviously dictated by her creed; by her connections with the leaders of the militant Catholic party, the Guises and Philip of Spain; and by her personal ambitions. By all these, she seemed plainly marked out as the chosen vessel of the Counter Reformation, the most valuable asset of the Catholic powers, the lever by which the Protestantism of England, Scotland, and France, might be made to roll in the dust. Mary, with her precocious intelligence and the tutoring of her uncles, was well aware of her value on the political chessboard of Europe, and she meant to make full proof of it in the service of her ambition. From the outset of her reign, she

[7] See the admirable work of Prof. Baird of New York, *The Rise of the Huguenots*, 1880.

[8] Keith, *App.* 92.

kept up a secret correspondence with the Pope and the Catholic powers, by which she was able from time to time to remind them—as in the letter to the Council of Trent[9]—that she was ready for any combination that would serve their purposes and her own.

Yet in face of these obvious dangers, all these Scottish statesmen—Lord James, Lethington, Morton—misled in part, no doubt, by high aims, which Mary was to be their instrument for securing—the Union of the Crowns and the honorable ending of the conflict of centuries—allowed themselves to be drawn into compromises which wrecked themselves, and would have wrecked the Reformation, both in Scotland and in England, but for the heroic firmness and the decisive influence of Knox. He opposed them at every step of their downward course, and in a few years brought them to his feet.

In illustration of this statement, we shall briefly consider his action at each successive crisis of the Queen's reign.

It is hardly necessary to go back to the time preceding Mary's arrival in Scotland, when Knox, along with the whole Protestant party, promoted the Arran-Elizabeth marriage scheme, as a natural and legitimate safeguard against the coercive power of France and the Guises. It is unlikely that Knox, at least, had any settled intention of superseding Mary on the Scottish throne. But, unquestionably, he meant to find in the alliance a lever by which they might exact from her, under a very obvious penalty, the conditions necessary for a genuinely Protestant administration; and only in the event of a definite refusal would he have consented to her deposition, just as in the similar case of the Queen Regent. When at length Elizabeth declined the suit, Knox, like the rest, was piqued, on national as well as on religious grounds; and at Arran's request, though probably not without misgivings, favoured Arran's suit to Mary herself, now a widow, and shorn of most of her power. Had Arran been a man of any capacity, and acceptable to the

[9] Labanoff.

Queen, the solution would have been a very satisfactory one. It would have secured a Protestant King, and Protestant heirs to the throne, with a minimum of friction. But Arran was weak, and Mary hated him; she had other and higher views, and a capacity for pursuing them unsuspected by any of those who were proposing to dispose of her hand. She was quietly maturing her own plans in consultation with her uncles. She meant to return to Scotland; to work with Lethington and Lord James, of whose scheme she was already apprised; and to take advantage of their influence with Elizabeth and Cecil to gain the English succession. This was the first part of her programme, and the foundation of all the rest. Philip of Spain was unwilling to marry his son to "a process". It was necessary, therefore, to finish the process—to secure her position at home—before she could hope to go further.

The first crisis of her active reign was coincident with her arrival in Scotland. When, in the spring of 1561, Lord James was preparing to carry out the commission entrusted to him by the Scottish nobility to invite Mary to return to Scotland, he had made up his mind to guarantee to her the private exercise of the Catholic rites. In accordance with the ideas of the time (as to which we shall have something to say presently), these had been universally prohibited under severe penalties by the legislation of the Parliament of 1560—a Parliament of whose legal competence Knox had not a shadow of doubt. He opposed the intention of Lord James, and warned him of the probable consequences. Strictly speaking the proposed guarantee was illegal, as no authority lower than that of Parliament itself could grant exemption from its own enactment. But Knox's objection was much more than legal or technical. He objected to it because it implied that the Queen was to remain an avowed Catholic after being received as the head of a Protestant State—a concession which he held, as we have seen, to be wrong in principle, and likely to prove impracticable and disastrous in result. Dangerous at any time, it seemed

doubly so in the actual circumstances. The religious revolution was not yet nearly completed. Only in principle had it been decided. The four Acts of the Parliament of 1560—approving the Confession of Faith, abolishing the Pope's jurisdiction and the old Heresy Laws, and prohibiting the saying or hearing of Mass—were no more than the first steps in it. There remained to be dealt with all those questions raised in the Book of Discipline, prepared by Knox and his colleagues at the Parliament's request, and now for some time under its consideration—the questions of the Church's patrimony, of the extent to which the new Church, still in its infancy, was to become the heir-at-law of the old one, of what was to be done with the surplus endowments, which Knox claimed for education and the poor, of the constitution and powers of the Reformed Church which were to be recognised and protected by the State. There was also the question of the alliance with England, which was vital to the safety of both realms and to which Mary and all her kindred were deadly enemies. To bring a Catholic sovereign, armed with the powers we have already described and with a guarantee for her Catholic faith, into the seat of sovereign authority and influence in order to carry out a Protestant revolution so imperfectly developed, and that in the face of enemies who would be her natural allies in thwarting it, seemed to Knox an act of rashness and folly.

It is true that Lord James and Lethington flattered themselves that the anomaly would be only temporary, that they had 'plenty of means' of bringing Mary round to the Protestant interest. Knox knew little as yet about Mary, but he knew much about her uncles, her tutors and her advisers, and he thoroughly distrusted these sanguine expectations. He was unwilling to allow issues of national, and even of European, importance to hang on hopes which might never be realised. The concession, once made, would be hard to revoke, should Mary persist, as was by no means unlikely, in her adherence to Rome. It was better that she should

face the requirements of the situation at the outset. If she found herself unable to accept them, it was open to her to remain in France, and to appoint a Regent to represent her, as she had done before. The Regent would, of course, have been Lord James, who had practically ruled Scotland since the death of Mary of Guise.

Knox probably hoped for this easy solution of the difficulty. The Queen was known to be passionately attached to France and to her uncles, and she had a position and revenues there to which Scotland could offer no equivalent. He must, however, have more or less pondered all the alternatives between which she would be compelled to choose, when confronted with the constitutional demand. These were (besides the one we have mentioned), (1) a latitudinarian acceptance of the situation, and an official conformity to the national establishment, like that of Henry IV of France in similar circumstances a little later; or (2) the renunciation of the crown, for which she could not in conscience pay the price demanded; or (3) an invasion of Scotland in force to secure the throne unconditionally. Even if threatened with the last of these alternatives, Knox would not have renounced his demand; and with the offered alliance of England, to be presently mentioned, Scotland could have stood firm without serious risk. Elizabeth was as anxious as Knox to 'stay' the return of Mary, at least until the Scottish Reformation should be so consolidated as to be out of danger at her hands.

The thought of this alternative seems to have become familiar to the imagination of Knox. It was probably to it that he referred in the well known saying, so constantly misquoted, that '*that* one Mass' (the Queen's) 'was more fearful to him than if ten thousand armed enemies were landed in any part of the kingdom, on purpose to suppress the whole religion'. It simply meant that he would have preferred to face an invasion, rather than voluntarily admit a Catholic sovereign.[10]

[10] The words are usually quoted as if he had said 'that (my) one

Lord James Stewart, in intention as faithful to the Reformation as Knox himself, had fallen in too readily with the scheme of Lethington. This able and versatile statesman, on the failure of the Arran-Elizabeth match, and the almost simultaneous death of Mary's husband, Francis II, in December 1560, had promptly propounded to Cecil and Elizabeth a new scheme. Piqued in his national pride by the English Queen's rejection of the Scottish overture, and relieved from his worst fears by the fall of Mary from the French throne, dragging down the Guises with her, he turned to a purely Scottish policy, independent of Elizabeth's, and by no means in harmony with it. The proposals of the English Queen at this moment deserve to be clearly stated, for they are not well known. We learn them from a later statement of Lethington to Quadra, the Spanish ambassador in London, a statement which seems to have hitherto been overlooked.[11] Elizabeth, while declining, for personal reasons, the hand of Arran, offered instead to renew the Treaty of Berwick, which would otherwise lapse within a year, on condition that the Scottish Estates should undertake, in virtue of their right to control Mary's marriage (secured by the Treaty of 1558), to require her to choose a British consort, Arran or another, in order to avert from both realms the danger of foreign and Catholic complications. It was a fair offer, and one that Knox would gladly have accepted. One cannot but wish that Knox had been at this juncture in Lethington's place as Secretary of State. The temptation to a compromise with Mary would have been averted, and the future of Scotland assured. The proposal was in fact simply to prolong the

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Mass was more fearful', etc. Knox never said anything so foolish. The context shows that the 'that' is demonstrative, and that the Mass he referred to was the Queen's. Many Masses were said, as he knew, then and for long afterwards, in quiet places; but these were the acts of transgressors, for which they alone were responsible. The peculiarity of the Queen's Mass was that it was sanctioned by the nation, which thus 'joined hands with idolatry', and became responsible for it, and for all its consequences. Knox, II. p. 276.

[11] *Calendar, Simancas,* I. p. 305.

existing alliance, which had delivered Scotland from the French occupation, and restored self government to its people. It is difficult to see why it was rejected, at least by Lord James. It may be assumed that Lethington, who was more devoted to the Union than to the Reformation, saw that, from his point of view, the proposal of Elizabeth was no sufficient substitute for the Arran marriage, the offspring of which, when Mary had been set aside, as he probably intended, would have inherited both crowns; that while it would safeguard the Scottish Reformation, it would do nothing to guarantee the Scottish succession to the English throne. He preferred therefore to turn to Mary as a more promising instrument for his purpose, to take advantage of her refusal to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh—a refusal really based on Catholic grounds—to support her in that refusal, till Elizabeth and the English Parliament should consent to recognize her right to the succession, as the next heir to the English crown.

This was the great scheme which, as Lethington boasted, was to 'salve all interests', those of England, of Scotland, of the Union, and of legitimacy, and to bring Mary over, by the brilliant prospect it held out to her, to the side of the Reformation. It was not a very honorable proceeding. Scotland had been delivered from the jaws of death by the Treaty which Scottish statesmen were now to join its enemy in refusing to ratify, until a price should be paid by the deliverer which might endanger her throne. It failed, as we know, at least so far as Mary was concerned, and it deserved to fail; and the clever strategist who conceived it, and pursued it for years, was caught in his own net. He thought to make use of Mary for ends which she would never willingly have fulfilled, and he himself was made the dupe of Mary for purposes to which he was entirely opposed. Had their joint efforts been successful, Mary intended to use the position to gain a higher and more immediate prize than any that he or Elizabeth could offer. She meant, as her correspondence shows, with the help of Eng-

lish and Scottish Catholics, backed by Spain and the Pope, to supersede Elizabeth, who in Catholic eyes was an illegitimate usurper, to add the British isles to the dominion of Philip, and to reign, as the wife of Philip's heir, over an Empire which would dominate two hemispheres. This was unquestionably the vision which floated before the eyes of Mary during the first years of her active reign. It was resumed after her fall, and was never in substance abandoned till the day of her death, of which indeed it was the cause.

Lord James, a large-hearted, magnanimous man, was misled by the natural bias of a Stewart; by his distaste for the religious coercion of a woman, and that woman his own sister; and by his sanguine hope that better influences would tell upon her when removed from the influence of her uncles. He really knew little of her, and, quite naturally, he underestimated the force and ability of this remarkable young woman of nineteen, as did they all, till it was too late to repair his error. Lord James obviously looked forward to something like a constitutional government of the modern type, in which the action of the Queen would be that of the ministers by whom she undertook to be guided. He did not know that Mary, like the Cardinal of Lorraine in France, and Granvelle in the Netherlands, scouted that form of government, called it a republic, in which ministers took the crown from the royal head, and put it on their own. This charge, afterwards put forward in her proclamations—assisted perhaps by the similar suggestion of her mother in 1559—is the root of all the idle stories of Moray's ambition to be King.

Knox appears to have been somewhat taken by surprise when, on Mary's arrival, he found that the concession had actually been made. The fact seems to have been kept secret even from most of the nobles. When therefore on the Queen's first Sunday in Edinburgh preparations for Mass in the Palace chapel became apparent, there was much excitement, quite naturally, as in those days the religious

question included every other interest of the national life. Romanism and Protestantism stood for two different ideals of civilization. The excitement was soothed by the finesse of Lethington, who assured a remonstrant deputation that the indulgence was only temporary; and by a royal proclamation, issued on the following day, which guaranteed the *status quo* in religion. The guarantee, however, was only provisional, till a Parliament could be assembled 'to take a final order', and it forbade any interference with the Queen's Catholic services. Both provisions were backed by the usual penalty of death to the transgressor.

Knox was thoroughly dissatisfied, but for the sake of peace he advised his brethren to await the issue of the ministerial experiment. If it should give them within reasonable time the assurance of a Protestant government, well and good. But if, as he greatly feared, it should prove only the beginning of an insidious attack on the Reformation settlement—the first step in a process of undermining it, and preparing its overthrow, it would then be their duty to stand upon their legal rights, and to insist on the enforcement of the law, even as against the Queen. It might not now be easy to obtain satisfaction, but their duty was to assert and to maintain the principle, leaving it to the ministers, who at the proper moment had pattered with the situation, to find out the way of rectifying their mistake. That course would, at all events, help to stay any further retrogression.

Knox's fears were abundantly fulfilled. Almost from the outset the Queen evaded the obligation of privacy in the exercise of her religious rites. She threw open the doors of the palace chapel to all comers, and courted the attendance of the nobles. She held pompous services which attracted attention, and soon made it plain to all concerned that a ready way to court favour lay through the royal chapel. She tried by artifice and evasion to secure in practice equal rights for the Catholic worship. Had she sincerely aimed at a genuine and equal toleration, she might have claimed our sympathy, however impracticable the at-

tempt must have proved. Toleration, in the modern sense, was then unknown anywhere, most of all under Catholic rulers. And we hardly need the evidence of Mary's secret letters to the Pope and the Catholic powers, in which she avowed and protested her real intentions, to assure us that it was a mere pretence—'a hypocritical pretense', says Philippson, who is by no means her enemy,—intended to pave the way for exclusive Catholicism. She starved the Protestant establishment by means of her profuse expenditure of the Thirds, the fund out of which the parish ministers got their meagre stipends only after her needs had been supplied. She seems, by and bye, to have issued written permits to individual Catholics to transgress the law—the first appearance, so far as we are aware, of that dispensing power which proved so fatal to her descendants. In short, by every means in her power, she laboured to promote a Catholic reaction, and she succeeded to a remarkable degree. It was only because, after all her triumphs over statesmen and courtiers and the inert masses of which all countries have their full share, she at every point found herself at last face to face with the solid phalanx of Knox and the party of the Reformed Church, undismayed and ready to renew the civil war rather than give up the rights they had won, that the back of her resolution was finally broken.

It will not be supposed that in thus stating the case from the contemporary point of view, we are homologating the principle of intolerance. Even if we admit, as we surely must, that, in the conditions of the sixteenth century, a genuine and equal toleration of both religions in any one State was impracticable, we are not therefore disloyal to the Christian ideal, to which, it is fair to remember, only a long and painful education, and a great change in the conditions of the problem, have enabled us to attain. The circumstances of the sixteenth century were very different from those of any succeeding century, most of all from our own. Should we find it easy to tolerate fellow-citizens who refused to tolerate us, to give equal powers and opportuni-

ties to those who claimed the right, and asserted the duty, of using them to suppress and exterminate us, as the pests of Christendom; and who were ready to join with foreign powers to carry out their threats? Yet this was the language and the temper of Rome all through the sixteenth century, which it acted on unflinchingly, wherever it had, or could gain, the power, and which it called on its adherents in all countries to imitate and exemplify.[12] And it had the zealous sympathy and coöperation of nearly all the great Catholic powers, especially of the great empire of Spain, then in the zenith of its power. The autos-de-fe in Spain, the fires in the Netherlands, the butcheries in France, and the brutal persecutions in nearly all Catholic countries, were the object lessons which Knox and his contemporaries had constantly before their eyes. Knox's continental residences had brought him into intimate relations with the Huguenots of France, and with the Protestant refugees of Geneva, drawn from nearly all the Catholic countries of Europe; and probably no European statesman had a better or truer appreciation of the methods and effects of Roman diplomacy. Moreover he and his party were not without personal experience of persecution. The cruel years of Cardinal Beaton's power in Scotland could not easily be forgotten. And it was little more than three years since his successor had dragged the aged Mylne to the stake at St. Andrews. Nor could they fail to remember their almost desperate struggle with the Queen Regent and the power of France and the Guises, which only the help of England had enabled them to overcome.

These were hardly the circumstances in which the theory and practice of toleration could be expected to flourish. No Protestant State was safe from the machinations of Rome, and of its international militia. Its Briarean arms were

[12] The publication, during the last half century, of large collections of State Papers and political correspondence relating to the sixteenth century, from the archives of our own and continental nations, has brought home to the historical student the deadly character of the conflict as it never has been before.

everywhere; and especially after the rise of the school of Loyola, it was only by hermetically excluding its emissaries, and by disarming the native elements on which they worked, that any Protestant State could count on reasonable peace and security. What Knox said of the concession to Mary—that her liberty would ere long prove their thraldom—applied with little reservation to the whole field of conflict. It is true that towards the end of the century a modified toleration was established in France by Henry IV in favor of the Huguenots; but it was successfully imposed only by using the despotic power of the crown to clip the claws of Rome. Its success after all was imperfect and temporary, and its end was a tragedy which has few parallels.

But apart altogether from apologetic considerations, it is only a truism to say that, in studying the history of past centuries, we are bound to deal with each period on the footing of its own standards of thought and action. Only on this basis can we judge equitably either individuals or communities, or even rightly understand them. The history of Scotland in the sixteenth century can only be fairly understood and appraised when read in connection with that of contemporary Europe; and it is because this condition is so often neglected that we have so many misleading and really unhistorical estimates of it. Historical perspective no less than comparative history is ignored, and the ideas of the present are applied without discrimination to the judgment of a past which is wholly unfamiliar to us, and which only long and sympathetic language so ofetn applied to the Hence the exaggerated language so often applied to the Scottish Reformation is really a kind of parochialism. The Acts of the Scottish Parliament of 1560, however repellant to us, were in line with the contemporary legislation of other Protestant States. That which prohibited the saying or hearing of Mass under the graduated penalties of confiscation of goods for the first offense, banishment for the second, and death for the third, was mainly a reproduction of the corresponding statute of the English Reformation,

the Act of Supremacy (Sec. 14), passed two years before. The same idea prevailed everywhere, due to the same general causes. In the German empire, a Catholic native of a Protestant State was compelled to remove into another of his own confession, and *vice versa*. In Geneva, the irreconcilable opponents of the Calvinistic Reformation were banished from the city. In France, the Huguenots after being hunted and burned till they could no longer be restrained from rising in rebellion, waged a civil war in which both parties held the same intolerant principles; and even l'Hospital and the *Politiques,* who, to their honour, tried to stay the fratricidal strife, regarded the toleration of more than one religion in the State only as a sad necessity, a *pis aller,* to avert the ruin and dismemberment of the kingdom.

Moreover, it is only fair to remember, (1) that Protestant intolerance in Scotland, severe as it looks, was a faint shadow of that of Catholic lands; (2) that it was mainly due to the dread of Rome, to the memory of its fires, and to the fear of their rekindling; and (3) that the penalties denounced by the Act were rarely enforced. There is no authenticated case of the infliction of the death penalty, and few traces of either of the others, apart from charges of treason. They were not intended for everyday use. The Act simply armed the executive with powers to be used at discretion as the state of public affairs might require. Its purpose was essentially defensive—to safeguard the State and all its members from the machinations of Rome in a time of storm and stress, when their very existence was threatened. And the spirit of the Evangel which the Reformation proclaimed profoundly modified the spirit of intolerance, as we see from many indications. The heart touched with the Evangel was in conflict with the head, and increasingly triumphed over it, with happy inconsistency.

Knox saw with sorrow and indignation, during the next two years the progress of reaction nursed by the Queen's proceedings, the increasing weakness of her Protestant min-

isters, and the sure approach of a crisis. In his correspondence with Cecil, he spoke warmly of the danger, which threatened Scotland first and England next. As to the Succession question, to which all else was being sacrificed, he urged that countenance should be given to Mary's claim only in exact proportion to her conformity to the Protestant interest in both realms. Cecil was entirely with him, for at heart he did not want Mary under any conditions; and Elizabeth, though she privately favored her candidature, was determined to keep her dependent during her own lifetime. The crisis came in 1563. The Parliament promised in the proclamation of August, 1561, which was to take a final order in religion, was long overdue. It could hardly any longer be evaded. The Queen's ministers required it for the confirmation of the forfeiture of Huntly and the rebels crushed at Corrichie in October, 1562. Knox and the zealous Protestants eagerly awaited it, expecting from it the tardy ratification of the Reformation settlement. The latter was what Mary dreaded, and wished to prevent. She gave her ministers to understand that the Parliament would only be summoned on condition that the religious question should be further postponed. They had, as we have seen, no means of forcing her hand without civil strife, and they were weak enough to give way. Knox and his party could not be so easily dealt with. It was necessary to put Protestant suspicion to sleep, or he and the Barons of 1560 might give trouble. They had recently been getting restive. Provoked by the Queen's favour to the Catholics, and fearing the triumph of reaction, the Barons of Kyle had been taking advantage of the powers confered on them by the Act of 1560, to enforce the law in their own local jurisdiction, by way of 'daunting the Papists'. The general adoption of the plan would have shattered the Queen's policy. Mary sent for Knox to Lochleven, where she was visiting, and asked him to put a stop to it. He declined, and reminded her, in the words we have already quoted, of the reciprocal duties of sovereign and subject, and the obligations of both to

the law. She was offended, and left him abruptly. But she soon thought better of it, and the brilliant idea occurred to her of disarming Knox and the Barons, and at the same time smoothing the path of the Parliament, by a shining demonstration of favor to the Protestants. The Archbishop of St. Andrews, the former primate of Scotland, the Abbot of Whithorn, son of a Lord Fleming, the parson of Sanguhar, a noble Crichton, were among the transgressors. Knox and the Barons hardly daring to touch such highborn personages, had only threatened them. The Queen was bolder. She summoned them all before the Court in Edinburgh, presided over by the Chief Justice Argyle, and sent them all to prison. The effect was marvellous. Who after that could doubt the Queen's good faith? The Parliament met within a day or two, and by common consent the religious question was postponed.

Knox was thunderstruck when he heard of the agreement. He suspected the theatrical character of the Queen's *coup,* and was indignant at the weakness that gave way before it. Hot words passed between him and the Queen's ministers. Without Moray's great influence the Queen's game could not have been so long played. In his anger, Knox broke off all relations with him. He discharged himself from 'all further intromission with his affairs.' It was a painful moment for both. Their friendship had been intimate, and of long standing. They had been closely linked all through the Reformation struggle, and neither could have dispensed with the help of the other. They were united by still deeper bonds, which both alike acknowledged, even amid differences and alienation. The keenness of Knox's disappointment, his conviction of the folly of Moray's course, and his apprehension as to the final issue of such repeated acts of weakness, found expression in a letter, in which anger, sorrow, and affection, are strangely mingled. 'I praise my God', so it ends, 'I this day leave you victor of your enemies, promoted to great honors, and in credit and authority with your sovereign. If so ye long continue, none

within the realms shall be more glad than I shall be. But if that after this ye shall decay, as I fear that ye shall, then call to mind by what means God exalted you, which was neither by bearing with impiety, neither yet by maintaining of pestilent Papists.' Never was forecast more promptly fulfilled. Insight is the mother of foresight.

Knox's anger found another outlet. While the Parliament sat, he had most of the nobles among his hearers in St. Giles. The Queen's marriage was on all their tongues, and strange rumors were in circulation as to Lethington's doings in England and France, where he had now for four months been negotiating. It was known that the hand of an Austrian Archduke had been formally offered to the Queen, and there seems also to have been some inkling of Lethington's dealings with the Spanish ambassador in London for the hand of Don Carlos. Here was another fatal danger in prospect. A Catholic king was to be brought in, a member of one of the great Catholic houses, to aggravate the anomalous situation already existing, and to strengthen the hold of the Catholic powers on Scotland. Could the Protestant nobility be relied on to prevent it (they had the right as we have said by the Treaty of 1558) after the weakness they had just displayed. Full of indignation and alarm, Knox could not refrain from 'pouring out the sororws of his heart' from the pulpit. It was his only available organ, and the question was a religious one of the last importance. In that strangely piercing strain to which he rose when deeply moved, he recalled the history of their marvellous deliverance from the yoke of France and Rome, the dangers they had shared and surmounted together, and the divine protection they had enjoyed. 'Shall this be the thankfulness ye shall render to your God'—this is the application—'when ye have it in your hands to establish it as ye please. The Queen, say ye, will not agree with us. Ask of her that which by God's Word ye may justly require, and if she will not agree with you in God, ye are not bound to agree with her in the Devil. . . . And now, my Lords, to put an end

to all, I hear of the Queen's marriage. Dukes, brothers to Emperors and Kings, all strive for the best game. But this, my Lords, will I say (note the day and bear witness after); Whensoever the nobility of Scotland consent that an infidel, and all papists are infidels,' (i. e. unfaithful), 'shall be head to your sovereign, ye do as far as in you lieth to banish Christ Jesus from this realm, ye bring God's vengeance on the country, a plague upon yourselves, and perchance ye shall do small comfort to your sovereign.'

The Queen, of course, soon heard of this outburst, and the scene which followed, the same evening, at the palace is well known. 'What have ye to do with my marriage, or what are ye within this commonwealth?' 'A subject born within the same, and albeit I be neither Earl, Lord, nor Baron within it, yet has God made me, however abject I be in your eyes, a profitable member within the same.' It was her last attempt to overbear Knox by personal influence, and it was the most dismal failure of all. His next appearance before her was on a charge of treason. She thought she had him at last in her power, but again she failed.

It need hardly be added that as soon as the Parliament was dissolved and the Queen's object had been served, the prison gates of the Archbishop were thrown open, and he and his friends released, in spite of the opposition of the Council.

Knox and Moray remained alienated, unwillingly on Moray's part, for more than eighteen months, till the development of the Queen's policy drove him, and most of the Protestant Lords, to toe the line which Knox had drawn from the first. At a Convention in June 1565 they formally adopted Knox's demand for the ratification of the statutes of 1560, and their universal enforcement, as the indispensable condition of a permanent and peaceful settlement, and of the approval of the Darnley marriage. But they were too late. Mary had now something like a party behind her; and by dint of superior energy and resource, and endless proclamations of her innocence of all designs against the

Protestant establishment—proclamations which it is hardly necessary to say were consciously false—she succeeded in paralysing their forces, and driving the leaders across the border into England.

This brings us to the third crisis of her reign. Mary had hoped against hope for the coveted marriage with Don Carlos. When it was at last found to be unattainable, she turned to Darnley, whom she had kept in reserve from the outset of her reign. He was the next heir after herself to Elizabeth's crown, and, after Don Carlos, the favorite candidate of the English Catholics for the hand of Mary, and the succession to Elizabeth. It was obviously expedient to join their claims, and thus unite the whole Catholic party in their interest. The match was entirely political in its inception, just as much as the Spanish one had been, though for a few brief months after Darnley's arrival in Scotland it appears to have been something more.

Moray and Lethington, since the end of 1564, had been practically superseded in the Queen's councils. They had failed to gain for her the English succession, and she had little further use for them. She was now bent on extorting it by force, and for that enterprise she knew that their help was not to be had. For a policy which aimed at overturning Elizabeth's throne by means of Elizabeth's own Catholic subjects, backed by Spain and the Pope, and at seating herself upon it, she required Catholic agents. Even Scottish Catholics were hardly to be trusted, for they had Protestant friends. Riccio, the Italian adventurer whom she had promoted from her choir to be her private Secretary for foreign correspondence, and who had now blossomed into a statesman and a prospective Lord Chancellor, became her chief adviser and her confidential minister. Knox might well have felt a certain grim satisfaction in the speedy fulfilment of his forecast. He was too generous to remain aloof from them in their distress, and he and Moray were fully reconciled. But the long-continued schism in the Protestant party had done irreparable mischief. Its polit-

ical cohesion had been lost, and could not all at once be recovered. The Kirk, focussed in the General Assembly, and led by Knox, alone remained compact and defiant. Knox did what he could by its means. But the Protestant nobles remained divided. A part of them favoured the Darnley marriage, blindly led by kinship and interest. The Queen made use of them to triumph over the rest, and the incipient insurrection, which could alone have extorted terms from her, ended in the exile of its leaders. But the heart of Scotland was with them, all the more that Elizabeth had betrayed and abandoned them; and when Mary adopted the resolution to ruin them forever, she provoked a decisive response. She had summoned the Parliament that was to decree their forfeiture, and to do something for the restoration of the Romish hierarchy. Had it sat its term and carried out the programme assigned to it by the Queen and her foreign minions, the ruin of the exiled Lords must have been followed by a Catholic revolution, perhaps in England as well as in Scotland, for the Queen's operations covered both. It was anticipated by a counter-revolution. Whatever was its precise origin, and whoever were the prime movers in it, the substance of the plan was the restoration of Protestant ascendency by the return of Moray and the exiled Lords, their investment with power under Darnley as a Protestant King, and the coercion or deposition of Mary. The execution of Riccio, as a traitorous conspirator, was a subordinate provision, to which no one but Darnley attached much importance. In himself he was utterly insignificant, and with the success of the revolution must in any case have disappeared. That he deserved death was the conviction of all, and the only question was as to the manner of it. The nobles desired it to be preceded by a more or less formal trial, for the sake of legality, but Darnley dictated their procedure, and was not sufficiently resisted. For the barbarous circumstances of his seizure and death, the King was almost wholly responsible, though Ruthven and Morton, and probably Lethington, who remained in the background, were not wholly blameless.

The Protestant revolution was foiled by the wiles of Mary, who succeeded in detaching Darnley from his allies. But so also was the Catholic revolution. The result was a drawn battle, in which neither party gained its end. But it was a lesson to the Queen, and opened her eyes, for the time at least, to the hopelessness of her undertaking. She was fain to abandon her aggressive policy, to make peace with Elizabeth, and to admit Moray and Argyll to a share of power, balanced by Bothwell and Huntly, who, though both Protestants, were her personal partisans.

It is not proved that Knox had any direct hand in this attempted revolution. Morton and Ruthven, driven in their turn into exile, denied that he had been taken into their counsels. It must have been a mere matter of expediency. They could have no doubt whatever of his sympathy and general approval. He remained their friend and advocate in their exile, and condemned those who had forsaken them. On the eve of Mary's return from Dunbar, he left Edinburgh, where his sympathies must have been notorious, and his liberty, if not his life, in constant danger. He doubtless judged that, after such extreme measures on both sides, the crisis was postponed rather than ended, and that peace was impossible till the battle was fought to a finish. He looked forward with unshaken faith and fortitude to the issue, which was nearer and more astounding than he imagined. He retired to Kyle and worked at his *History,* keeping a careful watch, and reappearing when required.

He had not long to wait for the final crisis. Mary became rapidly demoralised by the failure of all her high ambitions, especially by the last and worst of her frustrations, because it came from the man whom she had made the sharer of her throne. He was a permanent danger. While he lived she could attempt nothing with security. His murder followed, and three months later she married the murderer. The belief in her complicity in the crime was universal, at home and abroad, among friends and foes. Knox and the General Assembly, supported by the national voice, de-

manded her trial. They refused to recognize any distinction, in the matter of private crime, between sovereign and subject. Elizabeth by her intervention probably saved Mary from the fate of her grandson, only to become herself her executioner, after twenty years of unceasing troubles and alarms, on substantially similar grounds. The milder penalty of deposition was adopted. Knox officiated at the coronation of her infant son, who was handed over to Mar and Buchanan, to be trained as a Protestant and constitutional king. Moray became Regent; the Statutes of 1560 were reënacted; permanent provision was made for the Reformed Church. Knox's great constitutional battle was at last won, and he might have sung his *Nunc dimittis* had the sky been unclouded. But Mary still lived, though a prisoner in Lochleven, and more than half the nobles were in mutiny, not really on her behalf, though they made use of her name, and professed to desire her liberation. Then came her escape, the brief hour at Langside, and her flight into England, followed by endless intrigues for her restoration. The Regent's assassination, at the age of thirty-nine, came as a cruel blow to Knox's heart and to his cause. 'Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord', was the text of the sermon over his remains, with which he drew tears from the great assemblage in St. Giles, and gave his final testimony to the real character of 'the good Regent'. The civil confusion increased when that powerful hand was withdrawn. The Castle, in charge of his old friend, Kirkcaldy of Grange, now gone over to the enemy, became the stronghold of the mutineers, who filled the land with disorder, and with alarms of foreign intervention. Knox's friends compelled him to leave Edinburgh for St. Andrews, to get out of reach of the motley crew whom Grange entertained. But he returned to die at his post. Once again the old fire flashed out, when the news of the St. Bartholomew massacre reached the Scottish capital. He ended his 'long battle' on the day that proclaimed Morton Regent, the man who, whatever were his personal shortcomings, and they

are often exaggerated, closed the civil war, put an end to all attempts at Mary's intervention, and consolidated the peace and order of reformed Scotland, supported by the great body of public opinion which Knox had created.

The politics, as well as the religion, of Knox continued to form the main stream of Scottish life and history. The whole period from 1560 to 1688, with all the unspeakable oppressions and cruelties of its later years, was simply a prolonged battle for self government in Church and State, in opposition to the absolutism which Mary claimed and bequeathed to her descendants—a battle for the representative government which had found its natural expression in the Presbyterian organisation of the Church, and to which, with time and opportunity, it would have assimilated the State. It achieved a substantial triumph at the Revolution, on the way to further triumphs in more modern times. The spirit of Knox, with the modifications which the education of three centuries implies, is still the essential spirit of the Scottish people, as even recent events have helped to show, and lives in many who do not recognize the debt.

Glasgow, Scotland. E. Russell.

EZEKIEL AND THE MODERN DATING OF THE PENTATEUCH.*

The usefulness of Ezekiel for the higher critic of the Pentateuch centers in three things: the book, the man and the time.

1. The *book* of Ezekiel, with one exception the largest of the prophets, is undisputed as to either its genuineness or its integrity. Here is a great mass of literature, filling over 80 pages of our Hebrew Bibles, about which there is no critical "problem" beyond that afforded by the correction of its text. For the purposes of the higher criticism the whole book is a *datum*. The contrast between this condition of affairs in the case of Ezekiel, and the state of confusion and division in the case of almost every other book of the Old Testament, is sufficient in itself to point to Ezekiel as worthy of a special place in this difficult field.

2. The *author* of this book was a prophet, with a prophet's interest in the history of Israel's political, social and moral life. But Ezekiel was also a priest, with a priest's interest in the history of Israel's sanctuary, hierarchy and ceremonial. Now the two elements that combine to make the subject-matter of the Pentateuch are just these two phases of Hebrew religion: *viz.,* the record of God's dealings with the fathers of the nation, first, in founding, organizing and establishing this people of Israel as a political unit, as a social organism, and as a moral force in the world; and second, in instituting and regulating a certain system, in which the religious life of this people should express itself in outward, universal, obligatory observances. We should therefore expect that to be true of Ezekiel which

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examination abundantly verifies,—that for this exiled prophet-priest every phase of the system of traditions and laws embodied for us in the Pentateuch possessed the deepest interest.

3. The *time* when Ezekiel lived was the exile, that transitional period when the older Israel was being transmuted into the younger Judaism. It is to this period that the Graf-Wellhausen school of criticism refers the impulse that eventually produced the largest of the documents or groups of documents into which divisive criticism sunders the Pentateuch, the so-called Priests' Code (P). If the Priests' Code is of post-exilic origin, it is younger than Ezekiel. If it is of pre-exilic origin, it is prior to Ezekiel. If it is of Mosaic origin, even then the first logical step in the argument to prove this, is to establish its priority to Ezekiel,—then to the earlier literature. For if it be not pre-exilic, it cannot be Mosaic. Whatever, therefore, be the view maintained by any critic of the Priests' Code, it is clear that the book which should possess for him the primary place of interest and investigation is the book of Ezekiel.

Such a book, written by such a man at such a time, affords the most favorable opportunity for putting to the objective test of facts, an hypothesis which asserts that this largest constituent element of the Pentateuch, the Priests' Code, was written subsequently to Ezekiel's day. It is to this test that attention is specifically directed.

In investigations that are to determine the priority of Ezekiel or of the Priests' Code, the same caution must be observed as every problem of literary resemblance requires for its solution. In any given instance, after the preliminary question has been answered, Is this a genuine case of literary relationship, or is the resemblance accidental? there remain the further questions, (1) Does the resemblance point to identity of authorship or to literary dependence? and (2) If to the latter, which document is dependent on the other? The answer to this last question is always one

of peculiar delicacy, though even here there are degrees of difficulty, and excessive distrust of this line of argument is as much to be deplored as are undue haste and confidence.

The history of criticism affecting the relation of these two productions is worthy of note for two reasons: first, because it exhibits every variety of opinion on the subject defended by some critic; and second, because it marks the successive steps in a progression from views least favorable, toward those most favorable, to the traditional date and authorship of the Priests' Code.

The resemblances between Ezekiel and the Priests' Code are so striking, numerous and pervasive, that after Graf had suggested a late origin for P, the first opinion to find defenders was the identification-theory. Several critics, including Graf himself, maintained Ezekiel's authorship of the Priests's Code. This is of course the easiest and most natural explanation of the many points of contact between them, and it is not strange that it should have found adherents. The difficulty with it, however, is so obvious, that we are not surprised to find that after Klostermann thirty years ago had once pointed out the inexplicable differences between Ezekiel and the author of P, the identification-theory was quite abandoned. This same critic, whose independent reasoning thus turned the tide, was also the first to set forth clearly the characteristics of that group of chapters in Leviticus (xvii-xxvi), which since his time has been called the "Law of Holiness" (H). It is in this section of the Priests's Code that its resemblance to Ezekiel culminates, and it is therefore natural to find the discussion of their mutual relationship thenceforth taking the form of comparisons between Ezekiel on the one hand and this "Holiness-Code" on the other. Wellhausen and Kuenen, approaching the subject from the standpoint of the Pentateuch, and Smend, approaching it from the standpoint of Ezekiel, argued the priority of Ezekiel to the Law of Holiness, and *à fortiori* to P in general; while Horst analyzed

the Law of Holiness into a code and its redactor, identifying the latter with Ezekiel.

Though critics like Delitzsch, Dillmann, Klostermann and others steadily maintained the priority of P to Ezekiel, the school that followed the lead of Wellhausen have during the past twenty-five years regarded the reverse order as proved from those general historical considerations that lie at the basis of their reconstructed history of Israel. Their attitude towards literary difficulties arising from a comparison of Ezekiel with the supposedly earliest stratum of P, the Holiness-Code, may be illustrated by a remark of Kuenen. The author of H, he says, "follows the older tradition", in a matter where Ezekiel is clearly the more highly developed and therefore on his principles should be the later. This apparently innocent remark, that H "follows the older tradition", is worthy of note, because its real significance is the surrender of comparison with the prophets as a sure method of dating the law.

The work of Klostermann and Horst bore fruit at last in the confession of Baentsch (1893), then an adherent of the Wellhausen school, that the detailed comparison of H with Ezekiel requires the priority of H in its characteristic nucleus.[1] Only its minute analysis into a bewildering array of codes and redactions permits Baentsch to preserve for H as a finished product that dependence on Ezekiel which is a cardinal doctrine of the adherents of Wellhausen. It remained only for Paton (1896) to restate the arguments of Klostermann in the light of Baentsch's analysis of H, to prove the fallacy of Baentsch's reasoning wherever he made Ezekiel earlier than H.[2] In this verdict Paton has been

[1] B. Baentsch, *Das Heiligkeitsgesetz,* Erfurt 1893. Baentsch in his recent work, *Altorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus* (Tübingen 1906) has definitely broken with the Wellhausen school.

[2] Article in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review,* 1896, pp. 98-115, entitled "The Holiness-Code and Ezekiel". Dr. Driver, in his *Introduction,* p. 147, footnote, refers to this as "the excellent article of L. B. Paton".

followed by Driver and such others as are open to conviction by the arguments of literary criticism.

The present state of opinion, therefore, regarding the literary relation between Ezekiel and the Law of Holiness is that there is no identity of authorship or redaction, that there is genuine literary dependence, and that this dependence is on the part of Ezekiel, not of the author or authors of H. So far as it goes, this historical movement of criticism is, as already remarked, favorable to the traditional date and authorship of P. But the only part of P concerned is that earliest stratum called the Law of Holiness. Clearly there is no sign here of a reversal of opinion regarding the rest of the Priests' Code. Its earliest stratum may indeed be earlier than Ezekiel; H, instead of Ezekiel, may represent the earliest stage in that evolutionary movement that led from the Deuteronomic Code to the finished Priests' Code. But in all this there is nothing to prove that the later strata of P are earlier than Ezekiel.

It would be apart from the present purpose to enlarge this historical sketch by a review of the discussions regarding the extent of the Holiness-Code, and the kindred subject, the extent of the earliest strata of P. It is sufficient to remark that considerable sections of P outside of Lev. xvii-xxvi have been sundered out of the Priests' Code as a whole, and either connected with H (Wurster, Cornill, Wildeboer), or put in a group apart, as isolated (or perhaps related) fragments of pre-exilic laws (Baentsch, Oxford Hexateuch). The climax is reached when, both from antecedent probability and especially from the consideration of Exodus vi. 6-8, Driver concludes that this early stratum of P "was prefaced by a short historical introduction, setting forth its origin and scope".

The particular bearing of these admissions upon the comparison of Ezekiel with the Priests' Code in general appears, when Driver shows the consequence of the admissions to be the complete dissolution of the entity represented by the symbol P. "There are other parts", he writes, "as well as

those including the Law of Holiness, which, when examined closely, seem to consist of *strata,* exhibiting side by side the usage of different periods. The stereotyped terminology may (to a certain extent) be the characteristic, not of an individual, but of the priestly style generally." "The phraseology of P, it is natural to suppose", he continues, "is one which had gradually formed; hence it contains elements which are no doubt ancient side by side with those which were introduced later. The priests of each successive generation would adopt, as a matter of course, the technical formulæ, and other stereotyped expressions, which they learnt from their seniors, new terms, when they were introduced, being accommodated to the old moulds. Hence, no doubt", concludes Dr. Driver, "the similarity of Ezekiel's style to P, even when a definite law is not quoted by him: although, from the greater variety of subjects which he deals with as a prophet, the vocabulary of P is not sufficient for him, he still frequently uses expressions belonging to the priestly terminology, with which he was familiar."[3]

If these modified views are those with which we have to deal, as the later, more cautious and apologetic representative of Wellhausenism, it is plain that, in order to test the hypothesis by the book of Ezekiel, it will not be sufficient to compare P and Ezekiel along broad and general lines merely. This too is useful. For it serves to strengthen the impression already made by Driver's words last quoted,— the impression of Ezekiel as an individual standing near the end of a long series of literary development, and dependent upon what is prior to him for what he has in common with the series. But this is not enough. All is in flux. If it is possible to get down to details, to fix upon definite passages or usages, and ask, In this representative detail, and this, and this, is Ezekiel the dependent mind or the creative?

[3] Driver, *Introduction,* pp. 151, 154, 156f. In the *Oxford Hexateuch* the analysis is effected, within the limits of the symbol P, into four strata. Mr. Harford, the author of these analytical tables, remarks, p. 427, "It is both safe and sufficient to follow the lines implied by the symbols . . . P^h P^t P^g P^s".

then there is something visible, tangible, concrete, on which to build an edifice of solid opinion concerning this elusive question of the Priests' Code.

If there can be found in Ezekiel a point of contact with some portion of the Priests' Code alleged to belong to its later strata; if this point of contact is of a representative nature, that is, differs in no respect from the thousand other points of contact between Ezekiel and the various Pentateuchal documents; and if it appears clearly that here also Ezekiel is the dependent,—there follows as the inevitable result a conviction that this Priests' Code too is pre-exilic; that in spite of all Wellhausen's arguments from the supposed course of evolution in Israel, and in spite of all Driver's chemical reagents of "strata", "schools", and "stereotyped formulae," the Priests' Code is the product of an earlier age than Ezekiel. It is to three such tests in detail, specific yet representative of the many similar points of contact from which these have been selected, that attention is now directed.

I. When a land is threatened by a prophet with the utmost visitation of divine wrath, there is in the situation itself a resemblance to the deluge that would make an allusion thereto quite natural. Ezekiel more than once addresses himself to the land of Israel, and once when he does so he expressly mentions Noah (xiv. 14, 20). It should therefore be no cause of surprise when, in chapter vii, in his most elaborate address to the land of Israel, we find verbal affinity with the deluge-story. Although the text of this seventh chapter affords some perplexities, there is no textual critic whose proposed emendations, however radical, remove from it these unmistakable literary relationships with the narrative of the flood. Thus, the "violence" mentioned in ver. 11 is echoed in ver. 23 in the parallelism, "For the land is full of judgment for blood, and the city is full of violence";[4] and in ver. 17 of the following chapter,

[4] In quoting the Old Testament the text of the Revised Version is used; departures from it are always in the interest of greater literalness.

"For they have filled the land with violence"; and in ver. 9 of the next chapter, "And the land is full of violence".[5] To this corresponds the reason assigned for the deluge, Gen. vi. 13, "For the earth is full of violence".[6] But in this same verse in Genesis, that effect for which this moral fact is assigned as the cause, is worded thus: "The end of all flesh has come before me." When now we turn back to Ezekiel vii and find the prophet's message to the land beginning (ver. 2) with these words, "An end: the end is come upon the four corners of the land.[7] Now is the end upon thee", and reiterating in ver. 6, where the prophet makes a fresh beginning, "An end is come, the end is come", these two convictions are forced upon us: first, that a mere chance resemblance of the two passages is an untenable position; and second, that it is Ezekiel, not the author of the flood-narrative, who is the dependent mind.

We have here, in fact, a situation similar to that which Paton has so well exhibited in the mutual relationship of Ezekiel xx and Leviticus xviii. 1-5. In Ezek. xx it is evident that the prophet has in his own mind, and presupposes as present in his hearer's minds, those succinct injunctions regarding Egyptian and Canaanitish forms of idolatry which are recorded in Lev. xviii. 1-5 and are assigned by the documentary analysis to H. Out of this brief hortatory section of H, less than 50 words in length, Ezekiel makes an extended homily of over 700 words. In the case of Ezek. vii compared with the deluge-story we have, not indeed a homily on a Pentateuchal text, but the kindred phenomenon (already recognized and formulated by critics of Ezekiel) of *the recurrent emergence of a favorite borrowed phrase first seized and cherished because of its appeal to a true sense of analogy.*

What now is the document to which these expressions

[5] So Baer's text, instead of דמים "blood" in the common editions.

[6] The English reader should note that "land" and "earth" render the same Hebrew word, so that the verbal correspondence is complete.

[7] Note the change from אדמה in ver. 2a to ארץ in ver. 2b.

in the deluge-story are assigned, when that story is divided between J and P? On the basis of the Wellhausen hypothesis we should confidently expect to find that J was the author. But in fact Gen. vi. 13, "The end of all flesh has come before me, for the earth is filled with violence," is unanimously assigned to P. But, to what stratum of P? we must ask at once, in the face of that dissolution of the symbol P which, as we have seen, is the latest phase of Pentateuchal criticism.

The Genesis-narratives of priestly origin are for the Wellhausen school an integral part of the Priests' Code as a whole. Graf, the first to put the legislation of P after the exile, left these P-portions of Genesis, where earlier criticism had placed them, in the pre-exilic period. But after Kuenen had demonstrated that P-history and P-laws belong together and cannot be thus separated, Graf himself was convinced, and his followers have ever since maintained this view as a necessary corollary of their principles of legal evolution. Nor do they place the historical narratives among the earliest strata of P. Beyond the slight concession of Driver, noted above, that in the light of Ex. vi. 6-8 the earliest stratum of P may have "been prefaced by a short historical introduction", nothing has developed in the way of a movement in this direction.[8] Even Driver's words mean little in this regard, and on the contrary direct assertions of a late origin for the P of Genesis (Wellhausen's Q) are everywhere to be found.

Our conviction that the P-narrative of the flood is prior to Ezekiel, once gained, is deepened by observing that the hypothesis of an underlying sense of analogy in Ezekiel

[8] Compare the naïve remark of Carpenter, *Composition of the Hexateuch*, p. 273: "It seems safer to confine P^h [= H] to a collection of laws and exhortations in the wilderness independent of any lengthy historical recital." This "safe" verdict concludes a discussion of the bounds of H, in the course of which it is granted that if the usual criteria for detecting H are permitted to determine its bounds, "it must have contained historical as well as legislative matter on an extensive scale".

between the contemporary situation in sinful Israel and the moral conditions at the time of the flood accounts for (1) turns of thought otherwise obscure, and (2) the recurrence of expressions prominent in the flood-narrative.

(1) To the first of these two categories belongs that little clause in chap. vii, consisting of the last three words of ver. 11, which has furnished so much difficulty for commentators of Ezekiel. Smend, Cornill, Bertholet, Kraetzschmar and Jahn, all give up the attempt to interpret these words יְלֹא נֹהַ בָּהֶם which appear in our English Version as "Neither shall there be eminency among them", (margin, "wailing for them"). Yet they become the most natural expression in the world, if we suppose that Ezekiel had in his mind this underlying sense of analogy with the deluge-period, and remarked (compare xiv. 14, 20) that "there is no Noah among them", that is, among this "multitude" of "proud" and "violent" sinners in Israel, whose "time is come" and whose "day draweth near." Nothing could better express the completeness with which the impending doom is to sweep away "all the multitude thereof", without even one exception. And this too, whether we accept the reading נֹחַ preserved in eight Hebrew MSS and in the Syriac Version, or whether we prefer the reading נֹהַ vouched for by all other authorities. For in the latter case the play upon the name Noah would be striking, no matter which of the several interpretations of this obscure word we adopt; and on this view the reading of the name Noah would have arisen through an all-too-literal abandonment of Ezekiel's paronomasia.

If any further evidence were desired to show Ezekiel's underlying analogical thought, it might be found in a comparison of the next two verses, the 12th and 13th, with what Christ says when he, like Ezekiel, compares the coming of Jehovah's day with the coming of the deluge. (Luke xvii. 26-29). "And as it came to pass in the days of Noah, even so shall it be also in the days of the Son of man. They ate, they drank, they married, they were given in marriage, until

the day that Noah entered into the ark, and the flood came, and destroyed them all. Likewise even as it came to pass in the days of Lot; they ate, they drank, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded; but in the day that Lot went out from Sodom it rained fire and brimstone from heaven, and destroyed them all." So Ezekiel says: "The time is come, the day draweth near: let not the buyer rejoice, nor the seller mourn: for wrath is upon all the multitude thereof. For the seller shall not return to that which is sold, although they be yet alive: for the vision is touching the whole multitude thereof, none shall return".[9] (Ezek. vii. 12, 13).

(2) The second of those two classes of phenomena in Ezekiel, for which the hypothesis of an underlying feeling of analogy between his own times and the days of Noah best accounts, is the constant recurrence in Ezekiel of expressions prominent in the flood-narrative. There are about fifteen such expressions, several of them occuring from two to ten times, and with few exceptions these are expressions that in the story of the flood occur in P.[10] Some of these deserve mention.

In the third and thirty-third chapters, in Ezekiel's familiar allegory of the watchman, Jehovah says of the man who perishes unwarned, "His blood will I require at the watchman's hand." It is not hard to choose between the alternatives afforded here. Did Ezekiel twice make use, in his repeated allegory, of a divine constitution embodied in the deluge-story, Gen. ix. 5 (P), "Your blood, even your lives, will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it; and at the hand of man, even at the hand of every man's brother, will I require the life of man"? Or did some later

[9] Margin, "it shall not turn back".

[10] One of the J-expressions is ריח ניחח "sweet savour", but as Gen. viii. is the only place where it is assigned to J, and as it occurs 38 times in P, it is of no value for the present discussion. Another word is טרף "fresh", of foliage; this occurs only in Gen. viii. and Ezek. xvii. A third phrase is "cover one's nakedness", which besides Gen. ix. and Ezek. xvi. occurs only in Hos. ii.

author, in composing the Genesis-narrative, formulate his law of divine inquisition for shed blood in the very language of Ezekiel's allegory? Here again the natural choice is rendered more certain from the fact that the immediate context of this verse in Genesis furnishes other material for Ezekiel's repertoire of favorite phrases. The following verse, Gen. ix. 6, has the participial phrase "shedder of blood", which we find four times in Ezekiel[11] and nowhere else in the Old Testament.[12] And in the two preceding verses, (vv. 3, 4), Jehovah assigns food to man with the use of the phrase לְאָכְלָה "for food", that occurs ten times in Ezekiel, who is particularly fond of this idea of the assignment of something or other as food to man or beast, exactly in the tone and language of the creation- and flood-narratives of P.

Again, in the theophany of Ezekiel's opening chapter, the divine glory is compared to the rainbow in these words, "Like the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain." (Ezek. i. 28). This is the only reference in the Old Testament to the rainbow, except that in Gen. ix. 14 (P). Now whether or not the rainbow-episode was an integral part of the deluge-story in its common Semitic form, it remains true (1) that the rainbow-episode in the Hebrew narrative belongs to P only; (2) that the rainbow is introduced in P as the center of the story, and in Ezekiel only as an object of comparison; and (3) that the wording of the two passages is identical not only in the name of the bow הַקֶּשֶׁת בֶּעָנָן: "the bow in the cloud," but even in the expression acompanying this name,—in Genesis, "it shall be seen", "shall appear", נראתה, in Ezekiel a noun from the same verb, "the appearance of", מראה. If it is natural to believe that these two passages, the only ones referring to the rainbow, and so similar in diction, are not independent of each other, it is equally natural to believe that Ezekiel, for the purposes of his comparison, used language familiar to

[11] Ezek. xvi. 38, xviii. 10, xxii. 3, xxiii. 45.

[12] Not even Prov. vi. 17.

him from the deluge-story, and it is more than equally difficult to believe that conversely P in framing his rainbow-episode was influenced in his wording of it by the reminiscence of this almost chance comparison in Ezekiel's theophany.

References to various orders and classes of animal life, which P in the creation- and flood-narratives has in common with Ezekiel, might be explained upon Driver's principle of inherited priestly functions and terminology, such for example as "creeping thing" רמשׂ, "after its kind" למינה, "to swarm" שׁרץ. But is it reasonable to explain in this manner such remarkable collocations of words as these?—"every fowl of every wing" כל צפור כל כנף, which occurs thrice in Ezekiel[13] and but once besides in the Old Testament,[14] *viz.* in Gen. vii. 14 (P); "the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the heaven, and the beasts of the field, and all creeping things that creep upon the earth, and all the men that are upon the face of the earth" (Ezek. xxxviii. 20), a catalogue too familiar in the creation- and flood-narratives to need detailed comparison. Here again the question is worth weighing: is it more reasonable to explain this apparent literary dependence by assuming that the author of P worded his catalogues of the animal kingdom under the influence of Ezekiel's description of Jehovah's "shaking" of the land by means of God's army; or by assuming that, when Ezekiel wanted to particularize, in his word-painting of this great vision, he should consciously or unconsciously dip his brush in the familiar pigments of the creation-story and the deluge-story? Between these alternatives it seems not hard to choose, quite apart from the general psychological consideration that Ezekiel is admittedly the quoter *par excellence* among all the Old Testament prophets.

Before leaving this first detail of our comparison it seems desirable to make these two observations. (1) The priority of P is to be regarded as proved by Ezekiel's use of Gen.

[13] Ezek. xvii. 23, xxxix. 4, 17.

[14] Deut. iv. 17 and Ps. cxlviii. 10 lack the כל between the two nouns.

vi. 13 in his seventh chapter, and this proof, if valid, as confirmed by each added consideration and cumulatively confirmed by all taken collectively. And (2), the same kind and degree of correspondences with P in the Psalms are uniformly held by critics of this Wellhausen school to prove the lateness of the Psalm, *i. e.*, the priority of P. Witness, for example, the eighth Psalm, with its echoes of the creation-narrative.

II. The second of the details selected for this test of literary priority is to be found in the great theophanies of Ezekiel. The inaugural vision of chapters i-iii is repeated in chap. x in identical diction and phraseology. However obscure may be the meaning of portions of this detailed imagery, one thing is clear above all else, that the prophet is laboring to clothe in words the deepest impression made on his soul by the theophany. If Jehovah appeared to Isaiah supremely as the Holy One, and to Jeremiah supremely as the Almighty One, He awoke in Ezekiel supremely the sense of His glory. We feel as we read his record that he is seeking to emphasize in every possible way the indescribable glory of the divine Person who has appeared to him.

Now in his conscious or unconscious search for phrases, for the literary form in which to mold his description, there is no point of attachment to previous experience in Israel more natural than that supreme theophany, when Jehovah appeared at Sinai, at the founding of the nation which now to Ezekiel he seemed to have cast off. There too, as here, it was the overpowering glory of God that was most dwelt upon by its narrators. Hence it is no surprise to find in Ezekiel's description the same phenomena as are found in the JE-account of the divine apparition at Sinai. So *e. g.*, "the torches" הלפדים Ezek. i. 13, Ex. xx. 18 (E), the "lightning" ברק Ezek. i. 13, Ex. xix. 16 (E), the "sapphire" ספיר Ezek. i. 26, Ex. xxiv. 10 (J), and the word translated "work" מעשה Ezek. i. 16, Ex. xxiv. 10 (J).

There is nothing surprising in all this, and it is acceptable to all parties.

But in referring to this theophany in chap. viii, ver. 4, and again in chap. ix, ver. 3, and three times besides, Ezekiel uses a phrase which takes up elements of diction from both halves of Exodus, chap. xxiv. That chapter is always divided between J and P, the first eleven verses being assigned to J, and vv. 12-17 to P. In the 10th verse (the same in which the "sapphire" is mentioned), which belongs to the J-document, we read, "They saw the God of Israel". And in the 17th verse, which belongs to P, we read, "And the appearance of the glory of Jehovah was like devouring fire", etc.[15] Now Ezekiel's standing phrase, whenever he wishes to refer succinctly to the whole divine apparition already so lengthily described, is "the glory of the God of Israel". And in chap. viii, ver. 4, we have this phrase associated with the same word "appearance" מראה, which occurs in conjunction with "the glory of Jehovah" in Ex. xxiv. 17 (P). "The glory of the God of Israel, like the appearance which I saw," etc.—this entire phrase of Ezekiel is therefore made up of elements from the J-portion of Ex. xxiv enclosed between elements from the P-portion of the same chapter.[16] As surely as the admitted priority of J vouches for Ezekiel's dependence in this phrase-building on the Sinai-narratives, so surely does it draw with it the conclusion that these Sinai-narratives, as known to Ezekiel, already embodied material assigned to P.

Of this portion of the Priests' Code it is sufficient to say what has already been said in the case of the foregoing test, that it is in no way exceptional, and that it has never been put forward, in the way in which other parts of P in Exodus have been, as a part of an earlier stratum of P.

[15] Similarly, ver. 16 (P).

[16] The phrase "God of Israel", though it occurs numberless times in the Old Testament, is used as a supplementary title to some divine name preceding it, except in these passages in Exodus and Ezekiel, and twenty-five times besides. But in none of these other twenty-five occurrences is it connected in any way with the thought of a theophany.

III. We pass now to a third representative detail, to continue this literary test. One of the symbolic actions required of Ezekiel in the inauguration of his prophetic ministry to Israel (chap. iv), is that he should lie first upon one side, then upon the other, a fixed number of days, thus symbolically to "bear the iniquity" of the "house of Israel" and of the "house of Judah" respectively. Let it be noted at the outset that there is uncertainty with respect to two matters in this passage: first, the text, where the true number of days on the left side for the house of Israel is disputed; and second, the interpretation, where there is diversity of opinion as to the significance of these numbers. These uncertainties, however, do not affect in the slightest degree the following argument. For, whatever be the prophet's intention in the selection of the symbolical numbers, this at least is universally acknowledged, that the principle of selection was that formally stated in the 6th verse, יוֹם לַשָּׁנָה יוֹם לַשָּׁנָה a day for its year a day for its year, or as in our version, "each day for a year".

There is but one other place in the Old Testament where this principle, so often applied in the symbolism of the Bible, is thus expressly stated. This is Num. xiv. 34, in the narrative of the spying of the land of Canaan while Israel was in the wilderness of Paran. There we read that Jehovah punished Israel, with the exception of the two believing spies, by condemning the nation to wander in the wilderness forty years. And the choice of this number is thus explained: "After the number of days in which ye spied out the land, even forty days, a day for its year a day for its year, shall ye bear your iniquities, even forty years." This verse belongs to the document P by common consent. When now we turn back to Ezekiel, we find that the resemblance of his language to this verse in Numbers is not confined to the phrase above mentioned, but extends to every element of the verse. If P has, "After the number of the days in which ye spied out the land", Ezekiel has, "According to the number of the days that thou shalt lie upon it" (ver. 4),

and again, "According to the number of days" (ver. 5). If P has, "Forty days, a day for its year a day for its year", Ezekiel has word for word the same (ver. 6), and in the same order. And finally, if P has, "Shall ye bear your iniquities", Ezekiel has, "Thou shalt bear the iniquity of the house of Judah" (ver. 6).

Here there is obviously no room to question literary dependence of the most pronounced kind. This is admitted by all parties. Smend, for example, includes these passages in his list of the points of contact between P and Ezekiel. The sole question, therefore, is, which document is dependent on the other?

We have here an apparent case of inconsistency among the adherents of the school of Wellhausen. Pentateuchal criticism is for once either lost sight of, or ignored, when the critic becomes the commentator. In the two latest commentaries on Ezekiel by followers of Graf and Wellhausen, those of Bertholet (1897) and Kraetzschmar (1900), it is naïvely allowed that Num. xiv. 34 exerted an influence upon Ezekiel in this passage. Bertholet (p. 25) says: "It is also possible that Ezekiel had in mind an analogy with the forty-year punishment of the wilderness, Num. xiv. 34." And Kraetzschmar (p. 48), in explaining how Ezekiel came to fix upon forty years as the duration of Judah's punishment, remarks that this number "has its analogies in the forty years of the wandering in the wilderness, Num. xiv. 34, and in the forty days of Ezekiel's journey through the wilderness to the mount of God, 1 Ki. xix. 8"; by the collocation of these two examples Kraetzschmar clearly leaves the impression that the former, as well as the latter, is prior to Ezekiel and thus could influence his mind.

But after all the matter of real concern is not what this or that man thinks about the relative priority of Num. xiv. 34 and Ezek. iv. 4-6, but rather what these two passages themselves testify to us of their mutual relationship. And here there are two points of view for our comparison, ac-

cording as we approach it from the side of contents or from that of form.

From the former point of view, the comparison of contents, these alternatives emerge: which is the more natural, that the author of the P-narrative of the wanderings should fix upon forty days for the spying of the land, and then connect this period symbolically with the traditional[17] forty years of the wanderings,—all in imitation of Ezekiel's symbolic action of lying on his side forty days to bear the iniquity of the house of Judah, a day for a year; or that Ezekiel should, as Ewald long ago pointed out, have constructed his whole symbolic action of a penal "bearing of iniquity" for Judah during forty days, out of the suggestive material afforded him in this well-known wilderness episode, the penal character of which was brought out in just this verse in connection with an arithmetical symbolism?

Our immediate judgment in favor of the latter alternative is the more confirmed, the more closely we examine the consequences of adopting the one or the other. For if we were to adopt the former, that is, the view that Ezekiel here was prior to P, it would involve us in the absurdity of attributing to P not merely invention of historical facts—this is an essential part of the Wellhausen conception of P—and not merely a dependence on Ezekiel wholly uncalled-for under the circumstances of this case, but this invention and this slavish dependence without any assignable motive. Who will attempt the psychological riddle of such an author? And again, if we adopt the latter of the two alternatives presented above, and allow Num. xiv. 34 the priority, we at once find confirmation of our judgment in two ways: first, by observing, what no one disputes, that for Ezekiel and his hearers the wilderness-period of their nation's history held the foremost place of interest, owing to a real

[17] Compare Num. xiv. 33 (JE according to Driver, Kautzsch, Strack, etc., P according to Oxf. Hex.); Amos v. 25 (though Marti excinds "forty years" he allows that Amos knew this traditional number).

analogy in the situation of the exiles;[18] and second, by noting that, as might be expected, Ezekiel elsewhere makes use of expressions common to him and to the story in Numbers. For example, in Num. xiii. 32 Canaan is described by the spies as a land that is a "devourer of her inhabitants"; and in Ezek. xxxvi. 13 we find the prophet addressing the same land as a "devourer of men".[19] And the divine designation of the murmuring Israelites in the incident of Num. xvii (P) as בְּנֵי מָרִי "children of rebellion" is echoed in Ezekiel's favorite phrase for Israel, בֵּית מְרִי "house of rebellion", which he uses twelve times.

When now we approach the comparison of these two passages, Num. xiv. 34 and Ezek. iv. 4-6, from the formal side, we observe the same phenomenon in this case as in the case of the deluge-narrative: that what in P is said once, and compactly, is in Ezekiel, (1) so divided as that elements of it appear in three consecutive verses (vv. 4-6); (2) repeated, *e. g.*, "number of days" twice, "bear the iniquity of" thrice; (3) varied, *e. g.*, "according to the number of days" is in ver. 4 מִכְסַּר הַיָּמִים without the preposition and with the article, in ver. 5 לְמִכְסַּר יָמִים with the preposition and without the article, and the passive idea of "bearing" iniquity is parallelled by the active notion of "putting" iniquity on one for him to bear, while even this modification is expressed now by the verb שׂוּם (ver. 4) and now by the verb נָתַן (vv. 5, 6). But these phenomena, division, repetition and variation are the recognized characteristics of the quoter, whilst simplicity and compactness are marks of the original mind.

Whether, therefore, we compare Num. xiv. 34 and Ezek. iv. 4-6 with respect to form or to contents, the same conclusion is necessary, that P is earlier than Ezekiel. Here then we have a third section of P, in no way exceptional, and never suggested by any critic as belonging to the earlier

[18] See especially Klostermann, in *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1897, "Beiträge zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Pentateuchs", 7, pp. 353-383.

[19] Note the participial form in each case, and contrast Lev. xxvi. 38, which besides is not said of Canaan.

strata of that hypothetical document, which proves itself, upon comparison with Ezekiel, to be pre-exilic.

Comparison of these three tests reveals the interesting fact that they are representative in a large way, being drawn, the first from the earliest, the second from the middle, and the third from the latest portion of the P-narrative of the Pentateuch.

If query be raised, why all three should be from the historical, and none from the bulky legal sections of the Priests' Code, it is sufficient to remind the inquirer that Dr. Driver's modified statement of the Wellhausen view of P, as given in his own words in the introduction to this investigation, challenges our right to use any word, phrase, institution or idea concerned with priesthood, sanctuary and ritual, to prove that P was pre-exilic. But these of course are just the subjects that make up the legal portions of the Priests' Code. Hence in the selection of representative tests from the mass of available material, one of the prevailing principles has been to choose points of contact as far as possible removed from Ezekiel's priestly functions and interests. And surely, references to his inaugural vision as a prophet, the description of a symbolic action performed in his prophetic character, and a prophetic address to the land of Israel, are three parts of his book which would be adjudged by all to be as free as possible from infection with distinctively priestly ideas or phraseology.

It should also be remarked that the student who is interested in this subject of the points of contact between Ezekiel and the Priests' Code will find, first, that there is considerable material ready for investigation along the same lines as those here followed; and second, that he will not be perplexed by irreconcilable results, for wherever a clear case of literary affinity is discerned and there are sufficient criteria to determine relative priority, the result will always be the same. Instead of finding that new tests contradict those here discussed, he will discover that each new test will

add fresh weight to the conviction we have here attained, that the Priests' Code is pre-exilic in its alleged later strata as well as in its earlier ones.

In the light of these results, many may find the question shaping itself in their minds, what can be said in answer to all this? Is there any way to escape the conclusion while not denying the incontrovertible facts?

There is one way to admit these facts and still believe in the Wellhausen dictum that P is later than Ezekiel. As it is not merely a theoretical way of escape, but has actually been resorted to by the latest commentator on Ezekiel, G. Jahn (1905), it will be best to let him state it in his own words. "Expressions from the Priests' Code and the Law of Holiness . . . are interpolated [into the text of Ezekiel], in order to make these writings appear prior to Ezekiel. This work of the Sopherim, like so many other forgeries, succeeded so well that to the present day commentators, both orthodox and liberal, such as Hengstenberg, Dillmann, Vatke, Nöldeke, conclude from these expressions that Ezekiel was acquainted with P. . . . The fact that P was interpolated in Ezekiel and Ezekiel thus appeared younger, was probably a leading motive for the admission of Ezekiel into the canon, that is, as a bulwark for P."[20]

It is unnecessary to make any comments upon this assertion, beyond the simple remark that it admits the validity of our result: Ezekiel, as it stands, proves the priority of P. No one could be better satisfied to see this line of reasoning urged, than the critic who believes in the antiquity of the Priests' Code, for it gives the finishing touch to his own arguments by furnishing a gratuitous *reductio ad absurdum* of the contrary opinion.

In conclusion there is something to be said of the state of the question as our argument leaves it.

On the one hand it is clear that nothing is decided as between the views of such representative scholars as Dillmann and Green. To determine whether P is Mosaic, or

[20] *Ezechiel,* preface, p. ix.

merely pre-exilic with a very ancient nucleus, other witnesses than Ezekiel have to be called and other lines of reasoning pursued.

And on the other hand it is equally clear that the great step from Wellhausen's position to the result we have reached *has already been taken,* when (to use Kuenen's symbol) a P^1 has been sundered out of the Priests' Code in general and assigned, even in part, to the pre-exilic age. This earliest stratum, P^1, of undetermined size, starting with the little $\pm H^1$ of Baentsch, growing under Horst's treatment into the code of H, expanding in Paton into all H, and looming up in Driver and others as a vague but comprehensive bulk, proves in the event to be fatal to that concise, attractive theory of Wellhausen, which had at least the merit of self-consistency and knew where to draw its own sharp lines. Kuenen allowed room for strata in P but never consented to put even his P^1, his earliest stratum, before Ezekiel. He apparently saw well the ultimate outcome of such an admission. How he got over the difficulties of comparison with Ezekiel, we have already seen in our introductory section. What we have done is in fact, in the light of the historical movement there traced, simply to take the next step, the step logically demanded; and this too by an extension of the same method which determined the earlier steps, the method of detailed literary comparison. It is still possible, of course, for a critic to sunder out of P as a whole this section or that, and to say of it, this is post-exilic, it belongs to a late supplemental stratum of P. But in doing so, the burden of proof will rest on him who asserts, not on him who denies, this exceptional lateness of (shall we say?) a golden altar, or a day of atonement.

Though little of the great mass contained in the Priests' Code can, from the nature of the case, receive direct confirmation from Ezekiel; though, on Jahn's interpolation-theory, the Scribes did their work so badly that but a small proportion of the laws and stories of P find the "bulwark" of their antiquity in Ezekiel; still, the discovery that when-

ever the test of comparison can be fairly applied, the Priests' Code stands the test, produces the conviction in every candid mind that it does not just happen so in these chance cases, but that by and large, from Genesis to Numbers, the Priests' Code finds its confirmation as a pre-exilic document from the way it stands comparison with the points of contact in the book of Ezekiel.

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THE IDEA OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.*

I. The name "Dogmatics" as used to designate a special theological discipline is of comparatively recent date. Its use was determined by the differentiation of the several theological disciplines, and especially by the distinction erected between Dogmatics and Ethics. It has been current, therefore, only since the middle of the 17th century, and widely only since the first half of the 18th century. In order to distinguish this department of theology from the other theological disciplines, such adjectives as didactic, systematic, and theoretic had been used. In 1659 L. Reinhart employed the name *Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae* to discriminate it from the historical and exegetical disciplines and also from Christian ethics. And he was followed by a number of other theologians.[1] It is now customary to use the term Systematic Theology to embrace both Dogmatics and Ethics. The name 'Dogmatics' lay ready at hand, since the Christian truths were called dogmas, and the distinction between Dogmatics and Ethics had already arisen. We shall not have time to enter into the merits of this distinction and its treatment. Recently there has been some reaction from too sharp a separation of these two disciplines.[2] Nevertheless it represents a well understood dis-

* Inaugural address delivered before the Board of Directors in Miller Chapel, December 17, 1907, on induction into the Assistant Professorship of Didactic and Polemic Theology in Princeton Theological Seminary.

[1] Compare Köstlin, Art. "Dogmatik", Herzog[2] IV., p. 736, and Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek,* 1895, p. 3.

[2] The practice of separating the treatment of Dogmatics and Ethics was taken up into modern theology. The distinctions between them made by Schleiermacher, F. Nitzsch, and Kaftan have recently been subjected to a searching criticism by H. H. Wendt, who calls his recent book *System der christlichen Lehre,* in order to include dogmatics and ethics under a closer treatment. Cf. Wendt, *Sys. d. chr. Lehre,* Teil I., 1906, pp. 15ff.

tinction, and the term Dogmatics may be taken to denote what man must believe concerning God, and Ethics the duty which God requires of man.

The term "Dogmatic Theology", however, is preferable to the single term "Dogmatics", since the latter term describes this science from a more or less formal standpoint, whereas the term "Theology" gives it a distinct place in the total organism of the sciences by defining it from the point of view of its content or subject matter. By adding to this the adjective "Dogmatic", we bring out also certain fundamental characteristics of the science in question from the formal point of view.

In order to understand what we mean by defining this part of theology as dogmatic, it is necessary to determine what is meant by the term dogma.[3] The term is derived from *δοκεῖν*, meaning not merely that something seems true, but that one is fully determined upon it or is fully persuaded of its truth so that it has absolute authority and compels the trust of such a one. It denotes, therefore, something fixed, determined, authoritative, and publicly recognized as binding. Thus in the LXX the term *δόγμα* is used to translate the Hebrew words כְּתָב, טַעַם, אֲשֶׁר דָּת and denotes a royal decree. For example, in Esth. iv. 8, though omitted in the earliest MSS., it is found in א $^{c\,a}$ inf. mg. translating the Hebrew text, and denoting a royal decree.[4] And in the margin of א$^{c\,a}$ at Esth. ix. 1 it has the same significance and translates the same Hebrew word. Also in Dan. vi. 12 in the Chigi text, the term occurs to denote the laws of the Medes and Persians; in which sense it also appears in the Greek version of Daniel attributed to Theodotion in vi. 8, 12, 15. And again it is

[3] On the meaning of the term dogma *vid.* Bavinck *op. cit.* I., pp. 1-6. Köstlin *op. cit.*, Lobstein; *Einleit. in die ev. Dogmatik,* 1897, pp. 7-24. W. Schmidt, *Christliche Dogmatik,* I., pp. 1-19.

[4] Esth. iv. 8 א$^{c\,a}$ inf. mg. *τὸ ἀντίγραφον γράμμα τὸ τοῦ δόγματος.* א A.B. om. *γρ. τὸ τ. δ.* Esth. ix. 1 א$^{c\,a}$ mg. has *τὸ δογ. αὐτοῦ ποιῆσαι,* א A. B. om. Cf. also Dan. LXX. vi. 12; Dan. Theod. ii. 13; iii. 10, 12; vi. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 26.

used to denote a royal edict or decree in the Theodotion version of Daniel at iii. 10, 12; iv. 3; vi. 9, 10, 13, 26. In the New Testament the word occurs five times. In Lk. ii. 1 it denotes the royal edict of the emperor, and also in Acts xvii. 7. It is used also for Apostolic ordinances or commands in Acts xvi. 4, and for the Mosaic ordinances twice in Paul's Epistles—Col. ii. 14, and Eph. ii. 15. In every case it denotes something fixed and authorative.

This general meaning is found also in the use of the term in the writings of the ancient philosophers.[5] There the word is used of both metaphysical and ethical first principles and fundamental truths. Plato in his Republic speaks of fundamental principles or dogmas of right and good in which we were brought up, using the word dogma for these principles. In the Latin writers the word "decretum" was used for the Greek word δόγμα. In Seneca, for example, the word "decreta" is used to denote fundamental principles both ethical and metaphysical, and the section of philosophy which treats of these is considered the dogmatic, *i. e.* principial, part of philosophy, underlying the hortatory part. These principles Seneca regarded as fixed. In Seneca it is,

[5] Plato, *Repub.* Lib. vii. 538. ἔστι που ἡμῖν δόγματα ἐκ παίδων περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι. πειθαρχοῦντές τε καὶ τιμῶντες αὐτά. The Latin writers transl. δόγμα by "decretum". Seneca in *Epp.* 94 and 95 shows that fundamental principles (decreta) underlie particular precepts—*vid. Ep.* 95, Op. 4. "Sed ut, omisso principio, rem ipsam aggrediar. Beata, inquiunt, vita constat ex actionibus rectis: ad actiones rectus praecepta perducunt: ergo ad beatam vitam praecepta sufficiunt. Non semper ad actiones rectus praecepta perducunt, etc. . . . Si honesta, inquit, actio ex praeceptis venit, ad beatam vitam praecepta abunde sunt: atqui est illud: ergo et hoc. His respondemus, Actiones honestas ex *decretis* (italics mine) fieri, non tantum praeceptis". "Praetera nulla ars contemplativa sine decretis suis est, quae Graeci vocant δόγματα κ. τ. λ." Also Cicero *Academ.* lib. ii. c. 9, Tauchnitz ed. viii. p. 37. "Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? Quae neque de se ipsa dubitare debet, neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant δόγματα: quorum nullum sine sceleri prodi poterit. . . . Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum esse, sapientique satis non sit, non esse falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat: quod movere nulla ratio queat."

as Schmidt remarks, the question of the *a priori* defended against extreme empiricism.

In this way the word also came to be used for propositions which set forth fundamental religious truth resting on a divine revelation. Thus Josephus, writing against Apion, calls the contents of the sacred books of the Jews, dogmas of God.[6] In this sense also it is found in the Patristic literature, denoting authoritative truth of God. Thus Ignatius in his Epistle to the Magnesians speaks of the dogmas of the Lord and the Apostles, exhorting his readers to be established in them.[7] The word is used also of the fixed and fundamental Christian truths. Thus Clement of Alexandria speaks of the orthodox doctrine of the Apostles as a dogma in accordance with the Gospel.[8] Origen uses the term to denote fundamental Christian doctrine in distinction from philosophical speculation,[9] and fixed divine truth over against all human opinion.[10]

The use of the word shows that whether the term dogma was used for political decrees, philosophical first principles, or Christian doctrine, the idea which underlies all uses is that of *authority*. A dogma is a thesis or proposition which has absolute authority. That the use of the term in the New Testament is political is not significant, and Lobstein is incorrect in inferring from this that the reason the patristic writers applied the term to Christian doctrine was because of their adoption of the philosophical usage when they were transforming Christianity into a philosophy, the idea of authority being thus transferred to the doctrine.[11] The facts, on the contrary, show that the word denoted authority, and that the Fathers of the Church chose

[6] Josephus, *cont. Apion.* lib. i. § 8, Niese ed. v. 9— "δῆλον δ' ἐστὶν ἔργῳ πῶς ἡμεῖς πρόσιμεν τοῖς ἰδίοις γράμμασι· τοσούτου γὰρ αἰῶνος ἤδη παρωχηκότος οὔτε ἀφελεῖν αὐτῶν οὐτε μεταθεῖναι τε τόλμηκεν, πᾶσι δὲ σύμφυτόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἐκ πρώτης γενέσεως Ἰουδαίοις τὸ νομίζειν αὐτὰ θεοῦ δόγματα." κ. τ. λ.

[7] Ignatius, *ad Magnes.* c. 13, Migne, v. 672.

[8] Clement Alex. *Strom.* vii. Dindorf ed. iii. p. 343.

[9] Origen, *contra Celsum* i. 7, Migne xi. 668, also iii. 39 Migne xi. 971.

[10] Origen, *Commentary on Mt.,* Migne xiii. 1036.

[11] Lobstein, *op. cit.* pp. 21-24.

it for this reason to characterize the fundamental Christian doctrine, because they recognized that the Apostles claimed for it an absolute authority, although the word dogma was not used in that sense by them. Whence this authority is derived, the term of course does not say. In the case of philosophical dogmas the source of the authority is the rational or self-evidencing character of the truth itself; in political decrees it is the government; and in theological dogmas, it is ultimately the divine revelation or the witness of God. Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that the theologian of the ancient Church never conceived of that Church as one among many schools of truth, nor did he think that Christian doctrine had right to recognition only in the Church. On the contrary, he recognized the absolute character of Christian truth as resting on the authority of the divine revelation, and so he spoke of the Christian doctrines as "dogmas of God". And when he defined them as "ecclesiastical", he did not mean that the Church gave them their authority. That was a later, and what Schmidt calls a "degenerative", conception.[12]

A doctrinal proposition, then, had authority in the Church because resting on a divine revelation. This is true even of the Romish position, for upon their view it would have to be added that the dogma was authoritative because the Church was the infallible bearer of the divine revelation.[13] In accordance with this it appears that Schleiermacher[14] and Rothe[15] overemphasized the element of recognition by the Church, in their conception of dogma. It was the divine revelation in the Scripture which gave to dogma its authoritative character. This was regarded as fundamental, and though the element of public recognition enters into the idea, doctrines are not dogmas so much because of this as because of their basis in the divine revelation. Accordingly a dogma does not rest upon any mere personal authority; nor is the

[12] Cf. Schmidt *op. cit.* p. 14; compare also Köstlin *op. cit.* p. 435.
[13] Cf. Bavinck *op. cit.* I. p. 4.
[14] Schleiermacher, *Christliche Sitte,* Werke, I Abtheil. xii. p. 5.
[15] Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik,* 1890, p. 10.

idea of public recognition the most essential element in the conception. Furthermore, certain distinctions sometimes claimed to have been inherent in the idea, are foreign to it. Thus the distinction given in a single sentence of Basil, according to which dogma is a secret doctrine or one not openly proclaimed, has probably been made too much of, for Basil was speaking of certain Church practices or mysteries.[16] Neither was a distinction made between dogma as a human conception of a divine doctrine and the divine doctrine itself, for it has been satisfactorily shown by Köstlin that the single statement of Marcellus of Ancyra to the effect that the name dogma relates to a human opinion, is quite contrary to the general usage, which saw in the doctrine as formulated by the Church, the truth of God. In fact, Lobstein acknowledges that, though there are a few passages in the Patristic literature which discriminate a human form in dogma as distinct from its divine content, these are the exceptions, and most of the Fathers used the term for revealed truths without distinguishing their human form as dogma.[17]

There is, however, also in the idea of dogma the element of social recognition or acceptance within a definite sphere. A doctrine might rest upon a Scripture basis and yet not be a dogma. Hence Bavinck makes a distinction between what he calls dogma *quoad se* and dogma *quoad nos*.[18] The former is a doctrine which rests upon the witness of God apart from its recognition in the Church. But this is not yet a dogma in the complete sense. For one thing, it must be stated in a logical or scientific form which it may not have in Scripture. Then again in order to avoid the danger of identifying the private opinion of a theologian with the truth of God, it is necessary to know Scripture truth as it has reached recognition in the Church under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. This is also necessary because

[16] Basil, *De Spiritu Sanct. ad. Amphil.* c. 27. Cf. also on this point Schmidt *op. cit.* pp. 9ff.; also Köstlin *op. cit.* p. 435.

[17] Cf. Lobstein, *op. cit.* p. 13.

[18] Cf. Bavinck, *op. cit.* I. p. 5.

God in all His fulness as revealed cannot be fully grasped by any individual or group of individuals. Accordingly the subject of theological knowledge must be, as Dr. Kuyper has so richly shown, regenerate humanity under the guidance and illumination of the Holy Spirit.[19] From this standpoint the Confession as the expression of the faith of the Christian Church is seen to be of the greatest importance for the dogmatician. But the theologian cannot limit himself to the Church's Confession. Her life is richer than can be comprised in a confessional statement. The whole history of doctrine must be contributory to the task of Dogmatics, and whether it be a doctrine of a theologian or a confessional dogma, in either case it must never be taken in a merely historical sense, but must be appropriated by the theologian, and set forth as his own belief and as absolutely valid truth. It is because dogmatics is a normative and not a merely historical discipline, that it presupposes the personal persuasion or belief of the dogmatician. Accordingly he must take his standpoint within the Christian Church and be fully persuaded of the truth of the Christian revelation. It may further be said that only from this standpoint and the experience involved in it, can Christian doctrine be understood. But it is a fatal exaggeration of this idea when the claim to the absolute validity of Christian doctrine is limited to this sphere and not maintained in relation to all scientific and philosophic thought. If this is not maintained, the absolutely objective validity of the Christian dogma cannot be maintained. It is also from this point of view, *i. e.* that Dogmatics is a normative science, that it becomes clear that the dogmatician must take his standpoint within the Confession of a single Church. For since he is not dealing with a comparative study of religions, it will not suffice to set forth the main characteristics of Christianity in which all Churches agree. Since he aims to set forth Christian doctrine as absolutely valid truth and in its entirety, he must stand upon the Confession which he be-

[19] Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*, E. T. 1898 pp. 297ff.

lieves sets forth the essential principle of Christianity in its purity. It is from this standpoint that we believe that the theologian should stand within the Reformed Theology as the purest expression of the essential religious principle of dependence on God in its theological and soteriological applications.

The main idea which emerges from this brief discussion is that of authority. Accordingly in qualifying theology by the adjective dogmatic, what we mean to affirm is that it is a normative science and not a historical one. This is being recognized by those whose idea of the nature of authority differs from the older or evangelical Protestant conception, as for example Kaftan and E. Mayer.[20] The aim of Dogmatic Theology is to set forth not what men have believed concerning God, but what they must believe if they would reach the truth. It is not a merely historical or critical treatment of dogmas which have been held by the Church. The importance of these we have seen, and also its ground, but any such treatment is not Dogmatics. Accordingly the majority of theologians are rejecting the view of Rothe, who, having thus limited the idea of Dogmatics, was naturally led to supplement it by a speculative theological system which claimed to set forth the final truth. On the contrary, Dogmatics must claim to set forth in scientific form absolutely valid truth, and to embrace the entirety of Christian doctrine. Hence from a formal point of view the definition of Köstlin is fairly adequate.[21] He defines Dogmatics as the "scientific exposition of the religious truth which is valid or fixed for the community, as known and recognized by it as springing from divine revelation". This, however, is too formal a definition, since it might embrace all views of authority, according as it conceived of the nature of the divine revelation. The Protestant doctrine held that authority was

[20] Kaftan, *Dogmatik* 3 u. 4 Aufl. 1901, § 1. § 10, and especially "Zur Dogmatik" Arts. in *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche,* 1903. E. Mayer "Die Aufgabe der Dogmatik", in *Theol. Abhandlungen f. H. Holtzmann* 1902 pp. 183ff.

[21] Cf. Köstlin, *op. cit.* p. 435.

external, and rested it on a supernatural revelation which was conceived as including the direct intrusion of God into the sphere of second causes, and as including the communication of truth directly by God to man. In other words, the revelation was regarded as supernatural not merely in its ultimate source in God, but in the mode of its communication. This idea so far from being conceived as inconsistent with the material principle of the Protestant Reformation, was always thought of as equally primary and essential. Indeed, the receptive attitude of Protestant piety involved in the reception of Justification by Faith, went together with the dependent attitude over against the principle of external authority in religious knowledge involved in this idea of revelation. This, moreover, was the Scripture doctrine of revelation, as is being recognized by the new school of comparative religions more fully than it was by the Ritschlians, since the attitude of the former to the authority of Scripture is freer.[22] The justification, therefore, of this position is a question of the evidences for the trustworthiness of Christ and the Apostles as teachers, which question resolves itself into the evidences for Christianity as a supernatural religion, which takes us beyond the limits of our subject.

The inner reason, however, for this view of revelation and authority can be seen when we take up the idea of Dogmatic Theology not merely from the formal standpoint, but from the standpoint of its content or subject-matter. This is brought out by calling this science "Theology". By thus defining it we mean that it is the science of God. In this way, and in no other, can it have a distinct place in the organism of the sciences. The distinguishing point in the definition of any science is found in its subject-matter, *i. e.* in the object with which it is concerned, rather than in its method. Only, therefore, by defining this discipline as the science of God, can it have a distinct place as a separate

[22] Cf. F. Doerr, "Religionsgeschichtliche Methode u. Bibelautorität" *Prot. Monatshefte,* VII Jahrg. H. 10. 1903, pp. 361-393.

science and as the highest of all sciences. If, on the other hand, we define it as the science of religion or the science of faith, it loses its place as a distinct science. If the terms religion and faith be taken in a subjective sense, it becomes a part of anthropology or religious psychology. If these terms be taken in an objective sense, and theology be defined as the science of the Christian religion or faith, then theology is still a branch of anthropology, and, if a special supernatural revelation be denied, becomes either a science of comparative religion or a philosophy of religion. If, on the other hand, a special revelation be admitted and theology be defined as the science of this revelation or of the Christian faith in this sense, even this is not adequate, since in the science of theology this revelation is not regarded from the standpoint of the light which it throws on religion, but the Christian religion is rather regarded as a revelation of the nature of God. Hence the only adequate definition of theology is that it is the science of God, and in defining it as dogmatic we distinguish it from historical disciplines as a normative science.

This also determines the way by which the theologian must obtain his knowledge. If Theology is the science of God, the knowledge of God can be had only by revelation. Man cannot investigate God; consequently the methods of observation and experiment as used in all other sciences are not possible in theology. God is a personal Spirit, and hence we can know Him only as He chooses to reveal Himself to us. This is true to a large extent of all personal life. The only way by which we can know finite persons is through their opening their inner life to us. When, further, we bear in mind the fact that God is an infinite Spirit and that we are finite, it is obvious that we can know God only as He reveals Himself. This is true apart from the effects of sin upon the knowledge of God. Apart from the noëtic effects of sin, revelation is inner in the religious nature of man apprehending God as revealed in man and nature. Hence apart from sin the authority of religious

knowledge would be an inner one. But sin has darkened the mind, and Scripture, history, and experience show that this effect must be counteracted. This involves a change in the method of revelation and consequently a change in the nature of authority. The nature of this change must be determined by the idea of natural or general revelation and the effect of sin upon it. The idea of revelation involves two factors—God revealing or as revealed in the mind of man and in nature, and the religious nature of man which apprehends this revelation. It is to be carefully noted that this twofold character belongs to the idea of revelation itself. Hence we cannot conceive of the matter as if we had two factors in the science of theology, which is the science of God revealed, viz., God as revealed and the apprehension of this revelation by the theologian. The revelation to be apprehended is itself twofold, involving God as revealed and the apprehension of this by man. And thus the effect of sin is twofold, defacing the image of God and clouding our apprehension of it. Consequently in special revelation we must have not only God's supernatural redemptive and revealing acts culminating in the Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ, and thus restoring the divine image; we must have also an external and supernatural word-revelation to give us the authoritative and restored interpretation and apprehension of the supernatural fact-revelation, and this also must be in the same supernatural manner, involving the principle of external authority in religious knowledge. And all this is necessary in addition to the spiritual illumination of the theologian and the Church, *i. e.* of the subjects of theological science. Hence while this last mentioned illumination is necessary, it will not do to conceive of special revelation as simply the inner apprehension either of supernatural acts, as Rothe conceived it, or of the fact of Christ, as the Ritschlian conceives it. In this way it becomes an inner revelation subject to all the laws of psychic development and to the noëtic effects of sin which have not thus been corrected in their totality.

The inner authority and revelation is thus impossible for sinful man.

This same thing can be seen also from a slightly different angle. Dogmatic Theology intends to be Christian Theology, *i. e.* its very core is in a soteriological and historical religion, in a revelation in historic facts and an historic interpretation of these facts. If, then, Theology is to remain a normative science and not become a merely historical discipline, it must rest upon the presupposition that Christianity is not the product of an inner revelation which would make it simply the crowning product of human religious thought, but of a revelation supernatural in mode and distinct in kind from other religions. And finally, since Theology is the science of the object of Christian knowledge and faith, *i. e.* of God as revealed, and not of that knowledge or faith itself; if there is to be any science of Theology in this sense, revelation must be conceived of as the communication of truth by God to man in a supernatural manner, and consequently as involving the principle of external authority. And we shall see that if this idea of revelation and authority be changed to the inner or experimental view, the idea of Dogmatics must also be changed, and becomes the science of faith or the knowledge involved in faith.[23]

It is necessary at this point to discriminate the Protestant view of authority from that of the Roman Catholic Church, since they are identified by the Ritschlian theologians. We have seen that there is an element of public recognition involved in the conception of dogma. This was exaggerated by the Romish Church. The principle of authority is extended by them from the divine revelation to the human apprehension of it, and it is assumed that God would not have given to men an authoritative revelation without also having given an authoritative apprehension of it. This is found in the Church which, being infallible, excludes error and puts man in the possession of absolute truth. To believe, therefore, is to accept implicitly what the Church

[23] Cf. the ideas of Kaftan and Mayer *op. cit.*

teaches. That this involves an extension of the principle of authority for which there is no warrant, we have not space to indicate. We must, however, point out in a word that it is essentially different from the Protestant view. The Protestant recognizes the place of the Christian Church in the sense that he regards her and not the individual as the subject of theological science. He does not, however, make the Church's apprehension of revelation the subject-matter of Theology. If he did, Theology must either become a historical science, or else must extend the principle of authority in a way for which there is no warrant.

We have sought to show that Dogmatic Theology is a normative science; that this its normative character involves the principle of external authority in religious knowledge; and that this latter depends upon and is determined by the nature of revelation which is supernatural in its mode, and consists in the communication of truth by God in a supernatural manner. The possibility and fact of such a revelation are questions for the Evidences of Christianity. The reason for the necessity of such a revelation, however, lies, as we have attempted to indicate, in the noëtic effects of sin, which necessitate a revelation supernatural in the above sense and as a consequence involve an external authority in religious knowledge.

II. There is now prevalent a new conception of dogma and of the science of Dogmatics in the Ritschlian school; and a denial of the possibility of a normative science of Dogmatics in the newer school of comparative religions.

Ritschlianism was a protest against rationalism and mysticism. The abandonment of the authority of Scripture had led to the undervaluation of the entire historic element in Christianity; so that both its historic facts and its doctrines were regarded simply as the husk of rational truth or the product of Christian feeling. In this way Christian Theology had become a philosophy of religion; or in a mystical reaction from this, the demand for an undogmatic Christianity threatened not only Christianity, which is not the

product of religious sentiment, but even the entire intellectual content of religion.[24] A protest against this neglect of the historical and dogmatic element in Christianity, has come from the members of the Ritschlian school. Thus Harnack and Herrmann have sought to defend the importance of the historic element in Christianity against Lessing and Kant,[25] and Kaftan in reply to Dreyer, and also Lobstein, have shown that dogma is essential to Christianity and that what is needed is a new dogma.[26]

This conception of dogma can be understood only in the light of the fundamental motives and principles of this school. The underlying motive of Ritschlianism is an apologetic one, viz., to find a ground of certitude in Christianity which shall be independent of the results of historical criticism and of metaphysics, and so to state the content of the Christian faith that it too shall be independent in both these respects.[27] In order to realize this, emphasis is laid on the revelation of God in the historic Christ. This revelation is held to be independent in both the above respects by means of the well-known sharp distinction between religious and

[24] Cf. the treatment of Christianity in Kant's, *Relig. innerhalb d. Grenzen d. bl. Vernunft,* and Fichte's, *Anweisung zum selig. Leben;* also the construction of Christianity in the philosophical works of E. Caird and T. H. Green; also the distinction between the Christian principle and Christ in the "liberal theology" *vid.* Biedermann, *Chr. Dogm.* II. § 815. For the mystical tendency cf. Dreyer, *Undogmatisches Christentum,* and the treatment of Christian dogma by the late Prof. Sabatier in his various works, especially the lecture on the "Vitality of Christian Dogma" in the *Esquisse d'une Phil. de la Relig. etc.* 1897.

[25] Harnack, *Das Christentum u. die Geschichte* 1896; Hermann, *Warum bedarf unser Glaube geschichtl. Thatsachen* 1884.

[26] Kaftan, *Glaube u. Dogma*[2] 1889; Lobstein, *op. cit.*

[27] It is true that both Hermann in his writings, and the late Prof. Reischle—"Der Streit über die Begründung des Glaubens auf dem geschichtl. Christus" in the *Zeitschr. f. T. u. K.* 1897—make a distinction between the ground and the content of faith, and are seeking an independent ground. Nevertheless, this ground once determined becomes a norm for the determination of the content of faith. Hence the effort to keep this content also independent of historical criticism and metaphysics becomes manifest. For a criticism of the Ritschlian position on this point *vid.* Kähler, *Der sogenannte historische Jesus u. d. geschl. bibl. Christus*[2] 1896.

theoretic knowledge. The idea is that the historic Christ remains after historical criticism has done its work, and after a metaphysical dogma of Greek origin has been eliminated. But since this criticism is largely determined by an anti-supernaturalistic bias, the supposed independence of its results turns out to be a surrender of all that is difficult to defend against a criticism determined by naturalistic presuppositions. And since the idea of theology without metaphysics does not mean simply a theology which shall be free from a speculative reconstruction from a standpoint outside of the Christian revelation, but a theology without any metaphysical elements, *i. e.,* a dogma without any element which transcends and is not determined by religious experience, the new dogma vibrates between naturalism and phenomenalism, *i. e.* when not admittedly naturalistic it becomes phenomenalistic. It expresses itself, they say, in religious knowledge which springs from faith, and not in metaphysical propositions.

Not only is the nature and content of this new dogma thus quite different from that of the older Protestantism; the idea of revelation and consequently of the authority of the new dogma and of the science of Dogmatics is also fundamentally different from the older view. In order to understand this conception of dogma, we must set forth briefly how the Ritschlians conceive of the development of the old dogma and its contrast with the new. These theologians trace in the development of Christian doctrine a continuous approximation of Christianity to philosophical knowledge. It is held that under the influence of the Hellenic spirit, theology sought to transform religious truth into an objective and impersonal creed. Thus in conceiving the science of the Christian faith as an objective science of revealed things, the fatal error was committed of transferring to the religious sphere the method of metaphysical speculation. Moreover, the formation of the Catholic Church involved fatal consequences for the conception of Christian dogma. In order to defend Christianity against

error, the Church expressed her tradition in rules of faith, fixed the Canon of inspired books, and realized externally her unity in the episcopate, claiming for it unity, catholicity and apostolicity. In this lay the germs of the idea of infallibility and of a dogma to which attaches an external authority. Nevertheless, it is held, the Reformation principles are in direct contradiction to this idea of dogma. The religious principle of Protestantism and the old idea of dogma are opposed to one another. To show this they point us to the Protestant ideas of faith, of the Church, and of religious authority.[28] Faith according to the Protestant idea is not mere assent to truth on the basis of testimony external to consciousness. It is a personal conviction, an experiential trust by which we experience pardon and life. Hence there is a contradiction, we are told, between the Protestant view of faith and the idea that it terminates on truths supposed to be communicated by a supernatural revelation and possessing an external authority. Thus a divorce is made between faith and the religious life which involves a contradiction of the principle of Protestantism. Moreover, according to Protestantism the Church is not an organism of supernatural powers or the repository of infallible religious truths. Hence the notion of infallible dogma is appropriate only to the Roman Catholic conception, and in transferring the notion of authority from the Church to the Scripture, the Protestant theologians only adopted a Romish idea foreign to the genius of Protestantism. Hence we must change the old idea of authority, and instead of regarding Scripture as an external authority, containing a supernaturally communicated revelation, authority becomes inward, residing in the Gospel of Jesus with its compelling power. There is also held to be a contradiction between the traditional conception of dogma and the truly Protestant idea of authority. Hence the new dogma must be in harmony with

[28] Cf. Lobstein *op. cit.* ch. ii.; Hermann, "Christlich-protestantische Dogmatik," in *Kultur der Gegenwart,* Teil I Abt. IV Lief. 3. 1906. pp. 583-632; also "Die Lage u. d. Aufgabe der ev. Dogm.", *Zeitschr. f. T. u. K.,* H. I, 1907, pp. 1-30.

these Protestant principles. It must express in a scientific or logical form the religious faith of the Christian community, and especially its content is found in the sphere of religious faith. It must seek to interpret the Protestant faith, and while it does not find its norm in modern thought but in the Gospel, it must, to use Lobstein's language, "correspond to the spiritual temper of our Christian consciousness". Accordingly its authority will not be attached to or derived from its intellectual form, but resides in its religious content, which is the Gospel.

This being the nature of the new dogma, the idea and task of Dogmatics is changed. The change is of course determined by the change in the idea of revelation. This is no longer conceived as the supernatural communication of truth about God and the objects of faith; revelation is the product of the religious life of man, or is the effect of Christ upon the religious life. Hence the task of Dogmatics is not to set forth doctrines which rest upon the authority of Scripture, but to give doctrinally formulated expression to the Christian faith, or to the revelation in Christ, or to the appropriation of that revelation, according as the subjective or objective tendency predominates in the individual theologian. That which is common to all is the rejection of the view that dogmatics is a science which has to do with the objects of Christian faith as with immediately given objects of knowledge, and the conception of dogmatics as the science of the Christian faith or the knowledge which springs from such faith.[29] Some define it as the science of faith or of the Christian faith.[30] To this general class

[29] Cf. especially Mayer, *op. cit.* pp. 185, 186; also Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 3 u. 4 Aufl. p. 98.

[30] Lipsius: "Christian dogmatics is the scientific exposition of the Christian faith," *Lehrb. d. ev. prot. Dogmatik* 1893, p. 1. Lobstein: Dogmatics or *Glaubenslehre* is "the systematic exposition of evangelical faith (ev. Heilsglaubens)," *op. cit.* p. 59. *F. A. B. Nitzsch:* it is "the scientific exposition and defense of the evangelical faith or consciousness in the forms of thought and expression of the present age (die evangelisch-christliche Dogmatik ist die wissenschaftliche Darlegung und Vertheidigung des evang. christl. Glaubens- order Bewusst-

belong the definitions of R. A. Lipsius (a member of the liberal school showing Ritschlian influence), Lobstein, F. A. B. Nitzsch (a theologian of speculative tendency but with marked Ritschlian characteristics), and Haering, in his recently published *Dogmatik*. Others define it as the science of the knowledge which results from or is involved in faith.[31] This is the view of Kaftan and of Wendt in his newly published *System der christl. Lehre*. Others, as, for example, Mayer, conceive of the task of Dogmatics as twofold, first to state the nature of Christian faith (subjectively), and second, to set forth the doctrines which are involved in this faith.[32]

In attempting a critical estimate of this idea of Dogmatics, it is necessary to go back to the fundamental ideas of this school. The assertion that the evangelical Protestant conception of faith is inconsistent with the principle of external authority has a certain amount of plausibility, which is no doubt enhanced by the too intellectualistic idea of faith in the works of some of the Reformers. It is true that faith is an attitude of personal trust springing from the heart. It

seinhaltes in den Denk- und Ausdrucksformen des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters), *Dogmatik*, 1892, p. 1. Haering defines Dogmatics as "the science of the Christian faith" (die Wissenschaft des christl. Glaubens, dessen zusammenhängende Darstellung die Glaubenslehre sein will), *Der christliche Glaube* (*Dogmatik*), 1906, p. 145.

[31] Kaftan, although he defines Dogmatics as "the Science of the Christian truth which is believed and confessed on the basis of the divine revelation" (*Dogm.* p. 1), nevertheless in describing the task of Dogmatics, says that its chief task is to set forth the knowledge involved in the faith called forth by revelation—p. 92. (Die eigentliche Hauptaufgabe der ev. Dogmatik besteht darin, die Erkenntniss darzulegen, die sich dem Glauben aus der Aneignung der von der Schrift bezeugten Gottesoffenbahrung ergiebt). Wendt, *System der christl. Lehre*, I, 1906, p. 1, says that it is his purpose to unfold systematically the religious ideas which in their entirety make up the religious view and doctrine of Christianity,—by which he means, as his subsequent treatment shows, to set forth a knowledge involved in the Christian faith, his idea being similar to that of Kaftan. For a concise survey of the recent literature, cf. Titius, "Zur Dogmatik d. Gegenwart", *Theol. Rundschau*, 1907, pp. 365-379.

[32] Cf. E. Mayer *op. cit.* pp. 191. ff.

is also to be admitted that true faith in a certain sense implicates a certain doctrinal system. It is also true that spiritual truth must be spiritually discerned. All this was recognized by the theologians of the Reformation. But it does not at all follow that there is a contradiction between the psychological nature of faith and the principle of external authority. Nor does it follow from the fact that saving faith implicates a system of doctrine, that such a system can be deduced from the Christian consciousness under the control, in some way, of Scripture. This latter point need not detain us. The individually conditioned character of Christian experience, and the fact that regeneration does not remove all at once the noëtic effects of sin, make it evident that such an attempt must be unsuccessful. Nor would these theologians deny this. It is necessary, however, to show that faith may be an inner act of heart trust and at the same time its content of knowledge be received upon the basis of external testimony.

Because psychologically faith is an inner act of trust, it does not follow that either its ground or its content must be exclusively internal. Faith is grounded conviction. When it terminates upon the Person of the Saviour, it is personal trust. But the grounds of this trust may be external, and its knowledge-content enriched upon the basis of external testimony without the psychological character of faith being thereby affected. Plausible as it may sound, this contention of the Ritschlian school is not in accordance with the fact of the matter. When this is seen, their whole method of setting aside the Protestant doctrine of the rule of faith by simply identifying it with that of Roman Catholicism, loses its force. Moreover, according to the Ritschlian position, faith, whether taken in a subjective sense or conceived as an objective body of truth, is not grounded in a manner adequate to give to Dogmatics its normative character. Considered subjectively the act of faith is the act of a rational man who has innumerable experiences and theoretic opinions. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary

that the Christian believer and the Christian theologian have some clear idea of the relation which the content of his faith sustains to the rest of his experiences.[33] Still further, from the objective standpoint the sharp distinction between religious and theoretic knowledge, or rather the sharp separation of their respective spheres, gives an inadequate apologetic basis for the normative character of the science of Christian Dogmatics. At least it must be said that this is the logical tendency of the position, and though attempts have been made, notably by Kaftan, Wobbermin, and Wendt, to make good this defect, it cannot be said that they have been successful, because of their adherence to the Kantian separation between the theoretic and the practical reason.[34] Reason is one, and no reasonable certitude can be attained when the unity of its entire content is destroyed. Accordingly Kügelgen seems to have followed the logic of the situation in renouncing the scientific character of Dogmatics and the right of apologetics.[35]

The usual result has been, not an independence of philosophy, but a surrender to naturalistic modes of thought. This result is fatal to a normative science of Christian Dogmatics. We have left no supernatural Christ in any strictly metaphysical sense of the term. At least this is the logic of the fundamental ideas of the school, and even the Ritschlian theologians of the right wing fall short of a really divine Christ.[36] This being so, Christ can have brought no supernatural revelation in any strict sense of the term. Traub,[37] for example, admits that any idea of

[33] Cf. Lasson, *Zur Theorie des christlichen Dogmas*, 1897 p. 37.

[34] Cf. Kaftan, *Wahrheit des Christentums;* Wobbermin, *Der christl. Gottesglaube;* Wendt, *Der Erfahrungsbeweis f. die Wahrheit des Christentums.*

[35] Kügelgen, "Aufgaben u. Grenzen d. luth. Dogm." *Hefte zur Chr. Welt,* No. 41, p. 23; compare Wendland's remarks on Kügelgen—"Das wissenchaftliche u. apologet. Recht d. prot. Dogmatik", *Pr. Monatsh.* IV Jahrg. H. 4, pp. 138-143.

[36] Vid. the uncertain and vague treatment of the question of Christ's pre-existence and relation to God by Haering, *op. cit.* pp. 443-453.

[37] Traub, Arts. "Aus d. dogmat. Arbeit d. Gegenwart," *Zeitschr. f. Th. u. K.* 1906, p. 476.

a revelation supernatural in its mode or in any causal sense must be abandoned and revelation be conceived as supernatural only from the standpoint of its spiritual content.[38] But Bousset is quite right in his criticism of this claim, for if there can be no revelation directly supernatural in its mode of occurrence, then the judgment by which one singles out the Christian revelation from the standpoint of its content is a purely subjective one; and in the light of a philosophy which denies the supernatural in any real sense, any claim that Christianity is more than the highest development of human religious thought is not to be allowed. Accordingly the Ritschlian claim as regards the absolute and final character of Christianity cannot be sustained. If God has not entered directly or immediately into the sphere of finite psychic events to communicate truth, then the Christian revelation is only the highest development thus far of human religious thought. In denying what he calls the old or mechanical supernaturalism, the Ritschlian cannot make good his claim that Christianity is the absolute and final religion, and members of the new school of comparative religions, notably Troeltsch and Bousset, have shown this clearly. This, of course, is disastrous for Christian Dogmatics as a normative science.

Not only is this theology not able to maintain the finality of Christianity and consequently of Christian doctrine. Another disastrous consequence for a normative Christian Dogmatics is its failure to establish an objective norm for its doctrinal statement, or for the determination of what is Christian. This question is simply that of authority. This idea, we have seen, is admittedly changed to a purely inner authority. But it involves a self-deception to suppose that the Gospel of Christ is the norm as well as the source of Dogmatics, as Wendt seems to do.[39] It is becoming more and more universally acknowledged that the Christ of a metaphysical dogma is the Christ not only of the Apostles but of

[38] Bousset, *Das Wesen der Religion,* 1903 pp. 257 ff.
[39] Wendt, *Syst. d. chr. Lehre,* I. 1906, pp. 44-54.

the Synoptists as we have them. It is evident, therefore, that there must be lurking behind this claim to find in "the Gospel of Christ" the norm of Christian dogma, some *a priori* norm to determine what constitutes this Gospel of Christ. Accordingly the usual position of theologians of this school as regards the source and norm of dogmatics is as follows: They all recognize in Schleiermacher the impulse to what they deem a more adequate view of this science. They criticise him, however, for finding the source of dogmatics in individual Christian experience. They find this source in what they call the Gospel or the revelation of Christ in the Scripture. But the norm of what is Christian is determined by their conception of authority which is admittedly inner or subjective, and is found in the Gospel as approving itself to Christian experience. Thus in each case the Scripture is after all really subordinated to Christian experience, and the normative character of Dogmatics in any objective sense rendered impossible.

This can be best seen by a very brief examination of the three most recent comprehensive treatises on Dogmatics which have come from this school—those of Kaftan, Haering, and Wendt, since they belong to the "right wing" and lay much stress upon Scripture. Thus Kaftan calls the Scripture the principle of knowledge in Dogmatics, and criticises Schleiermacher, Hofmann, and Frank for giving simply subjective reflections upon the Christian consciousness instead of normative doctrines.[40] Faith involves or is a knowledge of objective realities, and this faith-knowledge springs from revelation, and this revelation is recorded in Scripture. This sounds objective enough. In reality, however, Kaftan's position is not so far removed from that of Frank. Frank says that it is the chief task of systematic theology to set forth in their essence and relations the totality of the realities which have been certified to the Christian in

[40] Kaftan. *Dogmatik,* pp. 1-60; vid. especially Arts. "Zur Dogm." in *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. K.* 1903. Compare also Schian, "Der Begriff Erfahrung in d. ev. Dogm., *Pr. Monatsh.* Jahrg. II. H. 10 pp. 378-389.

the appropriate way.[41] In other words, Frank seeks to set forth the knowledge obtained through Christian experience. In the same way Kaftan, although he affirms that the Scripture is the sole principle of knowledge for Dogmatics, nevertheless affirms that the appropriation and evaluation of the content of Scripture is to be determined by faith, and that in dogmatics it is faith which mediates between Scripture and the dogmatic propositions. The real difference between Kaftan and Frank is after all one of relative emphasis on Scripture and Christian experience, the real norm being Christian experience. The same thing is true of Haering.[42] He affirms that the revelation of God in Christ is the norm of Christian truth; that this revelation is in the Scripture which is in a certain sense authoritative. The nature of this normative character of Scripture is determined by the idea of revelation which is after all conceived as the inner consciousness awakened by Christ. Consequently Haering holds that the authority of Scripture extends only to matters of faith, and to them only in so far as it approves itself to faith. Thus the revelation in Christ is not the norm for Christian doctrine, but out of the contact with Christ there springs what Haering terms an inner appreciation of the Gospel which becomes confessedly the final norm for determining the Christian elements in Scripture. Precisely the same thing is true of Wendt, as we have seen.[43] Thus the final norm of Christian truth in each case is Christian experience, and the result is a subjectivity which is frankly admitted and called a "subjectivity of life" by Haering, but which is none the less destructive of the normative character of Christian dogmatics. In fact Herrmann, a member of this school, has shown in an article published this year as well as in another last year, that these faith-doctrines spring from personal experience, are individually conditioned, and that it involves a self-deception to

[41] Frank, *Syst d. christl. Wahrheit,* § 1.

[42] Haering, *Der christl. Glaube* (*Dogmatik*), 1906, pp. 145ff., 159ff., 172-179.

[43] Wendt, *op. cit.* pp. 44—54.

suppose that any normative doctrines can be drawn from Scripture, since those doctrines are the product of personal faith, and so individually conditioned.[44] Herrmann concludes that there can be no systematic statement of doctrine and no normative doctrines.

This again involves another serious consequence for Dogmatics. Not only is its norm found in Christian experience; this also becomes its subject-matter instead of God. It is true that God can be known only as He is revealed to faith. But the question is how God is revealed. Of course a theologian of the right wing of this school, such as Kaftan for example, emphasizes the fact that this faith-knowledge has to do with objects. Nevertheless the position logically results in conceiving of Dogmatics as the science of faith, thus doing away with its right to exist as a science distinct from religious psychology, a part of anthropology. For we have seen that Herrmann has shown the individually conditioned character of this faith-knowledge or faith-thought of Kaftan, and concludes that in so far as Dogmatics will claim any universality or normative validity for itself, it must cease to be the science of this so called faith-knowledge (Glaubenserkenntniss), and become the science of faith itself, whose chief task is, to use the language of Herrmann, "the comprehension of faith."[45] Dogmatics thus ceases to be a science distinct from certain branches of anthropology.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that if the principle of external authority in religious knowledge be abandoned, a normative science of dogmatic theology becomes impossible. It can not even continue within the meagre limits assigned to it by Herrmann. The logic of the situation must cut deeper still, as can be seen from the position of the school which follows the method of comparative religions.

[44] Herrmann, "Christl.-prot. Dogm.", *Kultur d. Gegenwart* I. Teil. Abt. 4. Lief. 3 pp. 583-630. Also "Die Lage u. Aufgabe d. ev. Dogm." part II "Die Aufgabe.", *Zeitschr. f. T. u. K.* Mai. u. Sept. 1907.

[45] Herrmann, *Vid.* Art. cited in *Kultur der Gegenwart* p. 620.

III. This school of theologians has followed the logic of abandoning the principle of external authority, and has shown the untenability of the Ritschlian claim as regards the absoluteness of Christianity, the special character of Christian revelation, and the normative character of Christian Dogmatics. Troeltsch is the representative of this school who has devoted most attention to the questions of theological prolegomena. In a series of articles in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* beginning in 1893 and covering about ten years, he has set forth his views over against the Ritschlians, especially Kaftan. In three works he has recently summed up and stated his views in opposition to the older Proetstant apologetics and to that of the Ritschlian school, with a clearness and force which leave nothing to be desired.[46]

One of the chief merits of Troeltsch is that he sets in clear light the only alternative left if the metaphysical supernaturalism of the older evangelical theology be abandoned. The Ritschlian separation of Christianity and Christian theology from metaphysics and from history he regards as impossible.[47] The problem of the relation of science and philosophy to religion, no longer has to do with a compromise between two separate quantities, but with the subsumption of a developing inner religious life under the categories and method of all scientific and historical method. All compromise methods of dealing with science and religion must be abandoned. By the Ritschlian separation between them, "science" was limited to the world of nature, and all that was done was to cut off its old head of natural theology, while faith proceeded to a practical judgment, not adequately grounded, that Christianity is the absolute religion resting on a special revelation, and out of connection

[46] Troeltsch, "Ueber historische u. dogmat. Meth. d. Theol.," in *Theolgische Arbeiten aus dem Rheinischen wissensch. Prediger-Verein*, N. F. H. 4, 1900, pp. 87-108. *Die wissenschaftl. Lage u. ihre Anforderungen an die Theol.*, 1900. *Die Absolutheit des Christentums u. die Religionsgeschichte*, 1902.

[47] Cf. *Wissenschaftl. Lage u. s. w.* pp. 44ff.

with the rest of history. In this way no real advance is made over the position of the older apologetic. Indeed, according to Troeltsch, the Ritschlian is worse off since he has no metaphysics or natural theology, which would strengthen his position against attack, and no strict doctrine of authority which could justify the claims made for Christianity. In this respect Troeltsch finds the old Protestant doctrine much more consequent, because it rested its claim as to the absolute character of Christianity and the supernatural revelation which grounded this claim, upon a supernaturalistic metaphysics without which, Troeltsch says, the claims as to the finality of Christianity and the supernatural character of its revelation are like a knife without a handle and without a blade.[48] It is only upon the basis of such a metaphysical supernaturalism as contrasted with the Ritschlian idea of the supernatural character of Christianity, that it can be separated from other religions. In giving up the idea that God has revealed Himself in a directly supernatural manner, and in reducing the idea of the supernatural character of Christianity to its superior content merely, the Ritschlian is prohibited from assigning to Christianity a distinct place and from separating it from other religions. From this point of view all human religion has its roots in religious intuition or a divine revelation,[49] and the philosophy of religion will discover a similar religious consciousness in all.[50] Hence to separate Christianity or Christ from history is but a remainder of the dogmatic method. Theology must follow the method of the history of religions which is simply the particular application of scientific historical method in general. This method makes use of three principles—the use of historical criticism, analogy, and the correlation and mutual dependence of all historical phenomena, including those in the psychic sphere.[51] Instead of a supposed independence of

[48] *Ueber hist. u. dog. Methode u. s. w.* p. 99.
[49] *Ibid,* p. 96.
[50] *Wissenschaftl. Lage u. s. w.* p. 37.
[51] *Hist. u. dogmat. Meth. u. s. w.* p. 89.

historical criticism, we have the frank adoption of a criticism absolutely determined by an avowedly naturalistic philosophy. This criticism operates by analogy which lays it down as a canon that all past history is to be judged as to its truth or probability by its analogy with our present experience; while the principle of correlation, being also determined by naturalism, says that all historical phenomena form one continuous and unbroken stream to the exclusion of everything absolute or supernatural.[52] The scientific situation is expressed simply in the demand for the universal application of this method, which consequently must be applied to theology, and in its application makes three demands.[53] First, that Christianity be studied in its genetic connection with other religions. In this way a criterion will be obtained which will enable us to put all religions in an ascending scale with Christianity at the top. Secondly, that this historical and psychological study of religions advance from the comparison of religions to a philosophy of religion which will take a definite stand in regard to ultimate theological ideas. It is with these ideas that the real task of theology begins. It must show that religious faith is grounded in reality and that a divine revelation constitutes the kernel of all religions. Thirdly, that theology must state Christian faith thus determined in the light of modern science. In this way the old dogmas which were determined by the scientific culture of their age, are done away, and instead of an authoritative Dogmatics we have a religious metaphysic predetermined by the naturalism which lurked behind the rules of method. It is only a foregone conclusion, therefore, that the absoluteness of Christianity, supernatural revelation, and the deity of Christ must be abandoned, as is frankly done by Troeltsch.[54]

[52] *Ibid.* p. 94.

[53] *Wissenschaftl. Lage. u. s. w.* pp. 47-56.

[54] In his earlier writings Troeltsch held that Christianity was the absolute religion in the sense of being the highest development of religious life. He has abandoned this position, and in his essay, *Die Absolutheit des Christentums u. die Rcligionsgeschichte*, 1902, he seeks to show that the term absolute is full of inner contradictions, and

The consequences of this upon the idea and task of Dogmatics are not difficult to see, although they have not been stated at length by Troeltsch. In the place of a normative Dogmatics must be placed a naturalistic evolutionary philosophy of religion. This will give us the fundamental religious ideas. Then it can be pointed out that they find their purest embodiment in Christianity, and out of this point of view and study of religion will grow a "simple exposition of the Christian faith."[55] The results also upon the content of Christian Dogmatics are equally plain. Bousset has drawn them for us most vividly and frankly.[56] Everything is in continuous progress and evolution. The idea of salvation in the Scripture and the Church, the dogma of the deity of Christ, the doctrine of the Trinity, the notion of satisfaction and sacrifice,—all are antiquated. What remains? The simple Gospel of Jesus, Bousset replies. But even this is not to be simply taken from Jesus; it must be translated into the language and symbols of modern culture. Thus we are told that the belief of Jesus in the heavenly Father is retained, but that we are to translate it into our modern notions about God. In a word, in the place of the Gospel of Jesus we are to have the Gospel of naturalistic evolution.

This conception of the method and task of theology has performed the service of making perfectly plain the issue, and the presuppositions of the science of Dogmatic Theology; and upon this issue the possibility of this science depends. It will not suffice to attempt to refute these theologians by simply pointing out their inconsistencies. Some of the things

springs from the Hegelian attempt to find the complete realization of the Absolute Idea in Christianity. This Troeltsch regards as impossible, since all history is relative, and hence the kernel can never be separated from the husk. Bousset (*Wesen d. Relig.* p. 237ff.) says that the future of Christianity is the future of religion, since the history of religion shows the "absolute superiority" of Christianity. But by this Bousset means simply with Troeltsch that Christianity is the highest point of the religious development of humanity.

[55] Troeltsch, Art. "Geschichte u. Metaphysik," *Zeitschr. für Theol. u. K.* 1898, p. 67.

[56] Bousset, *op. cit.* pp 258 ff, 261 ff.

which the Ritschlians have called inconsistencies are not really such. Thus Troeltsch knows perfectly well that his method of "evolutionary Idealism" is no mere historical method, but involves a faith in teleology. The norms, however, by which he judges this religious evolution are obtained from the comparative study of religion and thus claim to be more objective than those of the Ritschlians. Other objections, which are well grounded, have come from the Ritschlian camp, but they have not fully met the issue. Thus the late Prof. Reischle indicated the limits of this method, and also its dangers—among others, its tendency to haste in transmuting mere analogies into genetic and causal derivations, its overemphasis of the forms of religious life over against their content.[57] Moreover, he is perfectly justified in pointing out that a theology which departs so far from that of Christ can scarcely be called Christian. Nevertheless when he affirms that, allowing for the legitimate application of this so-called historical method, there still remains for Dogmatics the task of setting forth the eternal norms of Christian truth, he has simply reiterated the very point at issue. The possibility of such normative Christian truth depends upon the question of supernatural revelation. Has God intruded directly into the sphere of human life and thought in a supernatural manner? Has He spoken to man supernaturally and authoritatively by Prophets, Apostles, and by His Son? Or is revelation simply the product of the search after God by the human mind, to be called a divine revelation because God is revealed in all human thought, and because religion is not an illusion? This is the precise issue, and only upon the reality of a supernatural revelation in this highest sense is a science of Christian Dogmatics possible.

And not only is the issue here. Here also lies the real inconsistency of Troeltsch's procedure. The naturalistic metaphysic is made to appear as if it were not an *a priori* philosophy, but rather the result of the study of

[57] Reischle, *Theologie und Religionsgeschichte*, 1904, pp. 26ff.

comparative religion; whereas all along this naturalism was contained in the fundamental rules of method so that it was a foregone conclusion that it would again be read out of a so-called historical study which it had determined from the start. Why is it a fundamental postulate of historical science that the supernatural is excluded as impossible? Why is it assumed that all the theological sciences are historical disciplines? Why is it assumed that present experience is the absolute norm by which to judge of all the past experience of the human race? These are just the questions at issue, and they should not be assumed. In other words, this method which when applied is to yield as a result the naturalistic evolutionary idealism, is itself the product of an *a priori* metaphysical assumption. Troeltsch really acknowledges this, for he says that just as the dogmatic method proceeds upon a metaphysical basis, so the historical method springs from the metaphysical assumption of the "interconnection of the activities of the human spirit", by which he means simply to express the impossibility of supernatural revelation.[58] It is one thing for a scientific method to rest upon a metaphysical basis; it is quite a different thing for it to spring from an unwarranted *a priori* metaphysical assumption. Unless an absolutely naturalistic philosophy be true—and it cannot be true upon a truly theistic basis—the theology of this school is without adequate foundation.

Moreover, while we must agree with this school, as over against the Ritschlian rejection of natural theology, that the Christian revelation must find not only its starting point, but even the possibility of its being apprehended, in its organic relation to this natural theology due to man's religious nature which has been preserved by common grace, we believe that it is fundamentally wrong in supposing that there is a gradual evolution from lower forms of religion to Christianity. The lower forms of religion and religious knowledge do not represent a lesser degree of faith or knowledge merely, but are a degeneration wrought by sin in the natural knowledge of God. Dr. Kuyper has shown that

[58] Cf. *Historische u. dogm. Methode* p. 99.

the Christian religion and Paganism do not stand related to one another as higher and lower forms of the same development, but that while the Christian religion is a correcting of the effects of sin and hence a positive supplement and correction of natural theology, Paganism represents the development of natural theology in a negative direction.[59]

Thus the vital question for Christian Dogmatics is whether a supernatural revelation is possible, and whether in Christianity and the Bible we have such a revelation. If these questions cannot be answered affirmatively, the principle of external authority must be given up, and we are left with a religious philosophy in place of the science of Dogmatic Theology.[60] Consequently Dogmatics presupposes and rests upon Apologetics, both philosophical and historical, and this latter science must give to the dogmatician the existence and knowability of God; the possibility of the directly supernatural mode of the divine activity; the supernatural character of the Christian revelation; and the Bible as the authoritative record of that revelation.

Princeton. C. Wistar Hodge.

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[59] Kuyper, *op. cit.* p. 302.

[60] It should be noted, however, that the converse is also true, *i. e.*, that if a supernatural revelation be admitted, it will not be possible to maintain that the principle of authority is internal. Hence the attempt of Th. Kaftan (*Moderne Theol. des alten Glaubens*[2] 1906) to hold fast to supernatural revelation and at the same time conceive of the principle of authority as internal, is a mediating attempt which is not tenable. In the first place, we have seen how and why the correction of the noëtic effects of sin by supernatural revelation carries with it the principle of external authority; and in the second place, the form and content of Scripture revelation are inseparable, so that it is not possible for one who admits supernatural revelation in both facts and words to distinguish between the form and content, the human and divine, as Th. Kaftan does. Thus, the "old faith" of which there is to be a "modern theology" involves, as Kaftan himself states this faith, the "old theology". That Christ is the divine Son of God, the only mediator between God and man; that He rose from the dead and ever liveth; that we have His salvation through the work of the Holy Spirit,—what is all this but the "old theology"? For a criticism of Th. Kaftan and also of Grützmacher's "Moderne positive Theol." as set forth in the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschr.* 1904, *vid.* Bousset, *Theol. Rundschau,* 1906, pp. 287-302, 327-340; 1907, pp. 1-18.

HEATHEN WONDER-BIRTHS AND THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.

The desire for a nexus, a common basis of unity in phenomena apparently diverse, constitutes one of the leading characteristics of the modern educated mind. This passion for unity dominates not only philosophy and physical science but also historic investigation. The evolutionary formula of Spencer, the idealistic dialectic of Hegel, the various monisms, materialistic, spiritual, ethical, of Haeckel, Fiske, Strong and Ballard; the religious definitions of Schleiermacher, Kant, Fichte, Ritschl, are all indications of this predominant trend. It is the same intellectual passion, that has, in large measure, furnished the impulse for the recent unexampled development of the comparative study of religions.

The search for hidden analogies, the bringing together of far-sundered conceptions, the exposition of underlying and unexpected unities, the exhibition of the unity of human nature and the continuity of human thought amid all divergencies—in a word, the discovery and interpretation of the common psychological basis of all religious faiths has clothed a complicated and difficult study with abundant interest and fascination. Almost the first fruits of this comparatively new study have revealed this impulse and motive. Indeed before the facts have been fairly collated from various parts of the vast field, sweeping generalizations such as that involved in the Pan-Babylonian propaganda, applied first to the Old and more recently to the New Testament, show unmistakably the general movement in the current of contemporary thought. It is always wearisome as well as unpopular to stem such a tide, but it is surely not out of place to urge that a grave peril to exact thinking lurks in

"an overdone principle of identity". Careful discrimination of differences is just as necessary to substantial progress in the attainment of truth, as enthusiastic emphasis upon points of similarity.

The indiscriminate huddling together under the same categories of things which are fundamentally different may facilitate the building of hastily constructed theories but such theories are sure to come to grief upon the facts. Much recent work in comparative religion and mythology will have to be done over again because it is vitiated by the uncritical identification of statements and beliefs which in origin, history and significance are as wide asunder as the poles. Prof. Sayce in the preface to his Gifford lectures says:

"There are two facts which, I am bound to add, have been forced upon me by a study of the old religions of civilized humanity. On the one hand, they testify to the continuity of religious thought, . . . But on the other hand, between Judaism and the coarsely polytheistic religion of Babylonia, as also between Christianity and the old Egyptian faith, in spite of its high morality and spiritual insight—there lies an impassable gulf. And for the existence of this gulf I can find only one explanation, unfashionable and antiquated though it be. In the language of a former generation, it marks the dividing line between revelation and unrevealed religion."

This statement is doubly significant. It is significant as the utterance of mature conviction on the part of an able and deeply thoughtful student of a great subject. It is even more significant as indicating the status of present opinion on this subject. So long as he is emphasizing the continuity of human thought, Prof. Sayce feels himself on a traveled highway and in a goodly company, but when he feels constrained to point out "dividing lines" and "gulfs" between various systems and is compelled in candor to state his conviction as to the explanation of these differences, he is at once conscious of being alone in an unfashionable and anti-

quated by-path of opinion; he becomes the contemporary of a "former generation". Such being the case, it is high time that attention should be called in detail to the manifold and undeniable facts, which justify an opinion that can be called unfashionable and antiquated only because contemporary thought has become bewildered and has lost its way in the mazes of conjecture.

Having made the statement,[1] in the face of many assertions to the contrary, that ancient heathenism presents no true analogy to the New Testament account of the Virgin Birth of Christ, it is now proposed to exhibit, somewhat in detail, the induction upon which this statement rests. Incidentally the discussion will serve to illustrate the confusion into which, under the unchecked leadership of the passion for unity, and study of comparative religion and mythology is apt to lead. It is, of course, impossible within the limits of a single article to pass in review every such analogous instance but it is hoped that no important fact has been overlooked.

In the former treatment of this subject, attention was called[2] to the curious amalgamation made by Canon Cheyne of two contradictory uses of the word "virgin". It is only by means of this unconscious logomachy that he is able to establish any connection whatever between the "virgin" goddesses of the Babylonian mythology and the Virgin Mother of our Lord. The connection between these two conceptions is a disjunctive conjunction in a sense unknown to the grammarians. But this confusion of thought and terminology is no more flagrant than many another perpetrated in the name of Comparative Religion or Mythology: as, for example, the identification of a local and limited deity, for a time predominant over other deities of the pantheon, either conquered or absorbed, with the one God of an ethical monotheism; the confusion of the artificial ethnic triads which slip into each other with the facility of

[1] *Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ*, p. 188.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 187.

a conjuror's rings, with the Christian immanent Trinity; the identification of ethnic sacrificial systems, the root principle of which is the purchase by propitiation of venal favors, with the ethical sacrificial order of the Hebrews to which the pure heart and holy motive of the worshippers gave its only significance and value—all these are conspicuous examples of false identification and failure in careful discrimination. Another and in our judgment no more defensible case, is found in the alleged ethnic analogies to our Lord's miraculous birth. The unqualified thesis that both the fact as stated in the New Testament and the method of its statement are unique and solitary, we hold to be sane and justifiable at the bar of sound reason.

In order that our study of this subject may be thorough, we must begin it on the low level of popular folk-lore and with stories some of which are far from attractive. While broadening the induction by including facts which he does not give, we shall address ourselves particularly to the theoretical considerations urged by Mr. Sidney Hartland, in his laborious study of the *Legend of Perseus*. Since this writer has adopted an attitude positively polemic to the Christian belief in Christ's miraculous birth and as his conclusions are fairly representative of the mythological school in general we may properly subject his theories and arguments to careful analysis and criticism.

Mr. Hartland acknowledges that the problem of Christ's birth lies fairly outside his natural province, for "it is a question of apologetics, not of folk-lore" (Vol. I, p. 103f.). Nevertheless he has evidently found it impossible to maintain this judicial attitude, for in his third volume (p. 188) he says:

"If these legends be universal, if they must be rejected in every instance but one as the product of an inevitable tendency of the human imagination, then why not in the one case also? Assuredly that one case can be regarded as exceptional only if it stand upon historical evidence totally different from the others and of inevitable cogency. But,

can any one who sits down (as it is the duty of at least every educated man to do) calmly and, so far as he can, with scrupulous impartiality to weigh the evidence, say that the testimony of ecclesiastical tradition or even of our Gospels is different in kind or of a greater cogency than that which we reject, without hesitation, in the case of Sakyamuni or Alexander the Great."

This argument, like every other argument from analogy depends for its cogency upon the accuracy of the parallel. If the parallel be broken in any essential particulars, the argument becomes invalid. For in order to establish his conclusion it is necessary for Mr. Hartland to make clear that the central and formative idea in all the stories, including that of the New Testament, is the same. Unless all the stories are laid, so to speak, on the same keel, there can be no genuine analogy. Accidental resemblances in minor details do not constitute an analogy which indicates organic connection or justifies a common classification. We hold and hope to show that Mr. Hartland's argument breaks down at this point.

Again, in order to validate his conclusion, it is necessary that Mr. Hartland should exhibit a close approximation in the theoretical background, the theological and cosmogenic ideas which are embodied in the folk-lore stories, to those embodied in the narratives of the New Testament. Here, too, we feel that Mr. Hartland's discussion is singularly lacking. In short, our thesis is that judgments, such as Mr. Hartland and others of the mythological school advocate, have been arrived at by the constant and fatal confusion of things essentially different and can be held only while this continues.

Our justification for this statement must begin with an examination of Mr. Hartland's idea of evidence. In the statement quoted above, it is said that the Virgin Birth of Christ "can be regarded as exceptional only if it stand upon historical evidence totally different from the others and of inevitable cogency". This distinctly implies that, in order to

be totally different from that alleged in other instances, the evidence for the miraculous birth of Christ must be of "inevitable cogency". Of course, this alternative does not hold. The evidence in this case may be totally different without being of inevitable cogency. The evidence for any historical fact is rarely of inevitable cogency. Indeed, we do not often find such evidence outside the sphere of pure mathematics or of experimental demonstrations of the physical sciences. Most of us are well content to find a clear preponderance of evidence in favor of any given conclusion. In the case of our Lord's birth, the evidence is of exactly this nature; it consists of such a clear preponderance in its favor. But that it is of such inevitable cogency that every man, whatever his predilections, would be convinced by it, is not claimed and ought not to be expected by any reasonable man.

Mr. Hartland is, however, not very fortunate in his choice of concrete instances to support his position on the question of evidence. We gladly accept his challenge to show that the evidence for Christ's miraculous birth is totally different from that which may be adduced for Sakyamuni or Alexander the Great. Let it be noted, first, that Mr. Hartland is allowed to make his own *ex parte* statement as to the evidence in the case of Christ. The reader of his book is, of course, aware that his conclusion rests for one of its pillars on an extreme and exceedingly precarious theory of the origin of the Synoptic Gospels; that it ignores absolutely the question of written sources used in the composition of those Gospels and the probable relationship of the Infancy narrative to those sources; that the water-marks of age in the Infancy documents are not so much as mentioned; that these documents are made as late as the latest possible date for the completed Gospels—in short, that the Christian side of the argument has been stated not by a judge holding the scales level but by an advocate and special pleader. Even so, for purposes of comparison and argument, we accept his statement of the case. We have documentary

evidence for the exceptional birth of Christ promulgated by men who were acquainted with those who knew the personal disciples of Jesus and received their beliefs from them. The line of connection between the records and the events is at any rate definitely discernible. Let us now turn to the other side. What have we there? In the case of Alexander we have, for once, historical evidence which comes very near to being of "inevitable cogency" that Alexander was not supernaturally born. The testimony of history on this point is absolutely conclusive. Alexander's so-called supernatural birth was a fiction confined to Egypt and the origin of this fiction is not uncertain. In his own country Alexander was known as the son of Philip of Macedon and his wife, the beautiful Epirote, Olympias. Had not the documentary and other evidence been conclusive on this point, there might easily have been an unheaval in that kingdom. In the course of the great military expedition which made him master of the world, Alexander entered Egypt. After laying the foundation of the city which was to bear his name, he marched through the country even to the distant temple of Amon which stood in an oasis of the Libyan Desert. Egypt made no resistence to his march and when the temple was reached, the conqueror was met by an obsequious priest, quick to recognize the necessities of the case, who, then and there, greeted Alexander as the son of Amon, and therefore the rightful ruler of the kingdoms of the Pharoahs. The grave comparison of this episode with the birth of Christ is absurd if not grotesque.

The case of Sakyamuni or Gotama is scarcely better. No one knows within two hundred years when Gotama was born, lived or died. The oldest parts of the oldest extant documents of Buddhism passed through a century or more of oral transmission before they were committed to writing. These oldest documents contain sayings attributed to Gotama but no biographical material. The documents of primitive Buddhism do not allege a miraculous birth at all. As we shall see, the first appearance of the story delineates a

dream of his mother's which hinted at or symbolized a miraculous origin. The birth stories, inasmuch as they imply the existence of a soul and metempsychosis, are in contradiction to primitive Buddhism, which denies soul and affirms that each Buddha embodies simply the Karma (doing, deeds, perhaps character) of his predecessors. The birth stories clearly represent a much later growth. Whatever in them approximates the Christian belief about Christ's birth (and the approximation is by no means close) made its appearance in Chinese documents probably not earlier than 250 A. D. We shall examine these stories more closely later but enough has been said to meet Mr. Hartland's challenge to a comparison of evidences.

In all the realm of reasoning, no term should be used with greater care than the word "supernatural". Carelessly used it covers more sins of thought than the mantle of charity. Mr. Hartland's argument is vitiated by his total failure to discriminate various uses of the word "supernatural". Throughout his work the "incident"—namely, the so-called supernatural birth is treated as cognate and parallel in all instances. A supernatural birth is a supernatural birth and there is nothing more to be said concerning it. But altogether apart from its bearing upon the question of Christ's birth, such a method has unfortunate results even in the legitimate field of folk-lore study. These stories cannot properly be understood or interpreted apart from a careful consideration of the mode and quality of the "supernatural" involved in each. When it comes to a comparative study upon which important issues depend the consequences of such a treatment are absolutely disastrous.

One may disbelieve altogether in the possibility of the supernatural in the realm of physical fact but he will scarcely contend that the degree of reasonableness, in alleged instances of supernatural operation, does not differ in different cases. For example, the resurrection of Lazarus at the word of Christ spoken in reliance upon the power of an unseen and Almighty God and the revival of two men slain

by a spell through the magic touch of the "slackdan druidach" in the Scottish tale are not the same. One may reject the one as he does the other, but it is clear that the two do not stand on an equal footing in the court of reason. One may conceivably accept the one and reject the other on purely rational grounds. In the same way, the birth of Adonis by the bursting of the myrrh tree into which his mother had been changed and the birth of Christ by the creative power of an unseen and Holy God are not cognate instances. One may reject the alleged birth of Adonis and accept that of Christ on grounds of evidence. Granted that all these instances involve the supernatural, the mode and operation of the supernatural, the cosmological and theological postulates, the ethical and spiritual implications of the contrasted narratives put them in classes far apart. Merely for purposes of study, they must be considered separately. Any one who thinks that an argument which is sufficient to erase the Adonis birth story from consideration is therefore cogent against the Gospel story is simply deceiving himself, not advancing the cause of truth.

Another serious confusion of thought in this work is a failure to maintain the distinction which Mr. Hartland himself establishes between Märchen (stories told for amusement merely) and Sagas (stories believed in as representing real events). It is, of course, a difficult distinction to maintain as the two classes of stories shade into each other; but in an argument so important this distinction should be kept constantly in mind and the question should be raised in connection with every specific instance. It is illogical to draw conclusions on equal terms from the fantastic creations of the story-telling imagination, limited only by the necessity of retaining the interest of hearers, and serious attempts to interpret actual events, however imperfectly understood. Mr. Hartland seems to have recognized this distinction only to forget it — and this to such an extent

that at times he calls the same story Märchen and Saga (p. 123).

It will now be seen that if our positions are well taken, Mr. Hartland's theoretical conclusions are imperiled by serious confusions of thought which enter into the very substance of the argument. By way of illustrating what we consider to be the fundamental weakness of the whole contention of this school, we cite the following. The sixth chapter of the first volume is one of the most interesting of the entire work, as it describes the actual customs which are based upon the same ideas as have in turn contributed to the making of the stories. It is interesting in another respect, in that the theoretical consideration urged at the beginning of the chapter are contradicted, according to his own showing, by every instance cited save one. He argues that the spells, incantations, and drugs used by savages for the purpose of inducing pregnancy are looked upon as capable of bringing about this result without actual physical generation. In point of fact, in every instance physical generation is a component and necessary element of the ritual (pp. 149, 178, etc.). The one instance which, according to his statement, is an apparent exception is given in his own words:

"The mandrakes or love-apples, for which Rachel bargained with Leah, were believed to be possessed of power to put an end to barrenness and this, it appears by the record in Genesis, quite independently of sexual intercourse, for Rachel gave up her husband in exchange for them."

This we take to be a most remarkable bit of Scriptural exegesis. We wonder what version of Genesis Mr. Hartland had before him. It ought not to be necessary even to state the facts. There was no bargain between Rachel and Leah, and Rachel never had any of the mandrakes. She asked for a share of them and was curtly refused, whereupon she said, bitterly: "Therefore shall he lie with thee, to-night, for thy son's mandrakes." She never gave

up her husband. Moreover, the author or editor of the passage evidently took no stock in the mandrake superstition, for he attributes the children of Leah and Rachel to God, and it is expressly stated in the case of Leah and as clearly implied in the case of Rachel, that Jacob was the father of his children (as he definitely calls them) in the normal way. This instance in itself would shake our confidence in Mr. Hartland's power of discrimination; but it is only one of many. He confuses things entirely different when he says (Vol. I., p. 134):

"The Middle Ages, which believed that Anti-Christ, in rivalry with Christ, would declare himself born of a virgin, would have seen nothing impossible in the kind of birth claimed for Saoshyant."

It is not too much to say that this statement is untrue. The belief in a false claimant to the prerogatives and distinctions of Christ and the belief in the actual posthumous birth of a physical son to Zaratust have nothing in common, and belief in the one would not have the slightest tendency to predispose to belief in the other.

Our next step is to examine with some care the instances collected by Mr. Hartland and others in support of their theories. Mr. Hartland tells rather more than a hundred stories which he holds to be cognate with the classical Legend of Perseus. In examining these stories and many others, especially from the classics, in which supernatural births are found, we are impressed first of all with the materialistic basis of the entire cycle of tales. With a few merely apparent exceptions, in every instance which he brings forward, from Scotland to South Africa and from Mexico to India, some material substance produces the so-called supernatural result.[3] In the original classical form of the story, it was a magical shower of gold poured into the maiden's bosom, and through endless variations this same

[3] Vol. I, pp. 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 31, 40, 50, 73, 75, 76, 82, 88, 89, 92, etc., etc.

original feature persists. The scales of the king of fishes, the bones of dead men, a magic seed, a dragon's heart, an impregnated leaf, the ashes of a saint, etc. With monotonous iteration, the magic substance appears and reappears in story after story of this unique collection. The next most noticeable feature of the stories is that in the vast majority of instances there appears some lineal connection between the substance which causes the birth and the creature which is the result of it.[4] There is a quasi-parenthood attributed to the magical substance and a dim and distorted recognition of heredity in the characteristics of the offspring. Graveyard bones cause the birth of a spotted child; a mango seed results in a monkey-like child, etc. Again, abnormal conception results in an abnormal birth and some visible abnormality in the being thus born.[5] The period of gestation is unnaturally long or short, and the individual has stars in his forehead or strange marks on his body, walks or talks at birth, grows to maturity at once or attains gigantic size or assumes a monstrous form. The so-called life-token, to the consideration of which Mr. Hartland devotes a section of his book, is striking evidence of this peculiar feature of the stories. Concerning it Mr. Hartland says: "It is frequently a consequence of the supernatural birth; it is then inseparably connected with the hero whose well-being it indicates; it is not dependent on his will, but is, in fact, part of himself" (Vol. I., p. 271). It is safe to say that the normal birth of a person exhibiting the ordinary characteristics of humanity is unknown in these narratives.

Another outstanding characteristic of the stories is that in the vast majority of instances the subject of the supernatural experience is a married woman. In cases where she is not married, some explanation of her condition—some element of surprise—is always present (pp. 78, 116-117, etc.). Another amazing fact is that in many instances

[4] Vol. I, pp. 56-7; 75-6; 77: 86, 87; 88-9, etc.

[5] Vol. I, pp. 22, 27, 31, 40, 48, 50, 74, 82, 98, 104, 106, 122, 130, 131; also *S. B. E.*, Vol. V, p. 396.

the so-called supernatural birth is absent altogether or is present in a form so grotesque that it does not deserve to be called a birth at all.[6] There is nó real birth; the being is hatched from an egg or found in a receptacle or taken from a hiding place or extracted from some part of a man's body.

The inferences to be drawn from these facts are unmistakable:

1. Since births from unmarried women enter into so small a proportion of the stories, it is evident that such births cannot represent any constant or universal element in this type of human thought. There is no definite and ascertainable law involved in the few sporadic cases of births from unwedded women. The general tendency of thought manifested in the stories is definitely in the opposite direction. If, then, stories of "virgin-births" occur, it is purely by accident and not because there is in a virgin-birth anything peculiarly characteristic of and satisfying to the human imagination.

2. We infer from the frequent absence and radical transformations of the birth idea, that the "supernatural" birth feature, inasmuch as it is detachable from the narratives, is not always or even usually the major item in the minds either of the narrators or of the hearers of the stories. It is secondary and incidental, rather than vital and essential. We shall have to look elsewhere for the features which represent a fixed and constant law of the human imagination.

We have now to consider the two most striking features of these stories: first, the significance of the material object or substance which is supposedly endowed with the power to produce pregnancy; and secondly, the connection between the object thus endowed and the being which is the result of its operation. A glance at the original Perseus story, of which these tales are supposed to be variants, will

[6] Pp. 58, 65, 68, 99, 115, 145, 165, 75, 81, 123.

furnish valuable suggestions toward the answers to both our inquiries.

According to the classical story, Perseus was the son of Jupiter and Danaë, daughter of Acrisius, to whom the god obtained access by changing himself into a shower of gold and pouring himself through the roof of the tower in which her father had imprisoned her. The gold was the temporary existence-form of a quasi-human being possessed of human parts and passions and having the power to change himself into any form which he desired to assume. The shower of gold was but one of many such changes which he made for like purposes. He was in no sense a spiritual being. He sought the presence of Danaë under the sexual impulse and her child was physically begotten. The equivalent of the magic shower of gold appears in all the tales of the cycle and always means the same thing. The phallic object or substance is always the existence-form or abode or physical instrument of some being looked upon as possessed, like Jupiter, of the procreative power. Physical generation is always implied in the story. This whole system of inter-related tales belongs to the stage of crassest materialistic polytheism. The bearing of this central fact upon our theme is apparent. These stories, inasmuch as they postulate physical contact and imply personal quasi-human agency, which, though often veiled, is none the less real, are at the farthest possible remove from the idea of a virgin-birth. The use of the term partheno-genesis to describe the impregnation of a woman (whether married or not) by physical means is simply a misuse of terms. A careful search of the classical birth-stories exhibits no case where physical generation under some form or other does not play a leading part. Except in nature myths, where the generation spoken of is causal and idealistic, the birth tales are tainted with phallicism. And if this be true of the Greek and Roman stories, how much more is it true of the semi-savages among whom such folk-tales originated. The materialistic basis of these stories is exhibited by the ideas

and customs of the same level of society to-day. It is to be remembered that, as known to us, these stories are usually far removed from their fountain head and that, in the course of time, they have been toned down. But when we come close to them their real significance is revealed. We have the authority of the late Dr. Curtiss,[7] of Chicago, who made careful personal investigations in the East, for affirming that ignorant Moslems and Christians to-day believe that God is possessed of a complete male organism. Even the women are heard to swear by God's phallus and show by their behavior that they understand the meaning of their coarse and blasphemous expression. It is also unquestonably true that people of this same low level of morals and intelligence ascribe sexual distinctions and procreative power to supposedly disembodied spirits. Dead husbands are supposed to be able to beget children. Barren women have been seen to rush up to the bodies of newly executed men in order to come into contact with the departing spirit. In connection with the sacred shrines, springs and rivers, the idea is the same. The local spirits of such places are looked upon as holding actual physical relations with the women who seek their aid and the children who are born after visits to such places are considered theirs. It is quite noticeable that only married women resort to these places. But the low physical level of their ideas is clearly exhibited in a song translated by Dr. Curtiss, which the Arab women sing when they resort to one of these shrines. The song is addressed to the presiding genius of the place:[8]

"Oh, Abu Rabah:
To thee come the white ones,
To thee come the fair ones:
With thee is the generation,
With us the conception."

One can easily imagine that alleged cases of birth, owing to these shrines, might be found among unmarried women,

[7] *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, pp. 113-119.
[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

for nothing could be simpler, in a society so ignorant and debased, than for a girl who had fallen to attribute her condition to one of these beings, but whether the statement would be accepted even by her own people at its face value is, perhaps, questionable.

Dr. Curtiss calls attention to the significant fact that when the magic shrine of St. George, to which phallic power is ascribed, is mentioned, many natives shrug their shoulders and whereas, formerly, Moslems permitted their wives to visit it, they have latterly forbidden it. The story which Josephus (*Ant.* XVIII. iii. 14) tells of the Temple of Isis at Jerusalem and the ravishing of the matron Paulina, which has unnumbered parallels in ancient history, points in the same direction. Shrines and so-called sacred places to which phallic power is attributed lie in the realm of the fraudulent and the unclean.

In the same legend, we find another item of importance for this investigation. Jupiter was metamorphosed into a shower of gold without loss of individuality or power. He was the father of Perseus. Mr. Hartland says of the Perseus story and its variations in general: "At the root of these stories lies the belief in transformation. Flowers, fruit and other vegetables, eggs, fishes, spiders, worms and even stones are all capable of becoming human beings. They only await absorption in the shape of food or in some other appropriate manner into the body of a woman to enable the metamorphosis to take place."[9] This statement should be broadened to include those cases where there is no real birth from a woman, and the ultimate, underlying fact of the whole subject lies before us.[10] This fact explains the necessary physical contact and the connection between the substance touched and the birth resulting from it. And the explanation dissolves Mr. Hartland's contention into the thinnest mist. For if "transformation" lies at the root of these tales, then the so-called "incident"—namely, the super-

[9] Vol. I, p. 207. Cf. Curtiss, p. 106.

[10] Pp. 113, 120, 124, 182, 207, 208, etc.

natural birth—ceases at once to be a major and becomes a minor point. In all cases of metamorphosis, the mode of birth is a matter of absolute indifference. It matters not whether the starting point is from a married or an unmarried woman, from man or woman or egg or clot of blood or animal, so long as the change is accomplished. The emphasis is not upon birth or the mode of it, but upon change of form, showing that these birth-tales have no great interest in the births and none whatever in them by and for themselves. They do not even insist upon birth of any kind as necessary to metamorphosis, and, most important of all, they do not recognize the agency of the father as incompatible with a supernatural birth. They reveal no universal mental tendency toward the creation of wonder-births, and there would have been no wonder-birth stories apart from the idea of metamorphosis. But even as it is, the birth is a minor, secondary, ancillary, detachable element in stories told for another purpose and with a different interest.

A summary of the instances and a fair review of the evidence lead to the following conclusions:

1. These stories belong to people mentally on the level of believing that all forms of being are interchangeable;—to whom nature has no fixed and orderly processes, so that anything may become anything else.

2. The stories come from people who are imprisoned in the grossest materialism, so much so that purely spiritual existence in disembodied form, even of gods and departed souls, is inconceivable.

3. They belong, as Mr. Hartland admits, to a social status in which sexual promiscuity prevails, in which religious worship is tainted with phallicism, and in which parenthood, especially on the father's side, is a very vague and uncertain thing (pp. 180ff.).

4. A virgin-birth in anything approaching the New Testament sense is absolutely undreamed of in the whole cycle of these tales. A brief glance at the abysmal differences between these stories and the New Testament narra-

tive of the Infancy may well complete our survey of them.

The very first cosmogenic lesson taught the Hebrews was that every living thing, from the simplest to the most complex, brought forth "after its kind". There is nowhere in the Canonical Scriptures a single statement to show that the Hebrews believed in metamorphosis in the sense of these stories. If their remote ancestors had ever believed in it, they had left it far behind before the dawn of history. They had reached, also, at the beginning of recorded history, the stage of the developed family with the father at the head of the household. The savage promiscuity reflected in these birth narratives they looked upon with abhorrence. Fatherhood was not only recognized, but prized, and the emphasis laid in the Old Testament upon consecrated motherhood in the bringing into the world of a holy seed does not preclude a proportionate honor being paid to devout and faithful fatherhood. But the core of the matter is that all these determining features of Old Testament life are found most clearly in the Infancy narratives of the New Testament. Normal, sober ideas of birth, infancy and childhood as an orderly procedure and natural growth, the unity and sacredness of the family, and the rights and authority of fatherhood, the spirituality of God and the beauty of purity, trust and devotion, undimmed by any least taint of heathen grossness, mark and distinguish both the narratives. Not only is the central statement of Christ's conception different from these wonder birth, but the details, the social atmosphere and the spirit of the New Testament narratives are as high as heaven above them.

Leaving these rather unsavory folk-lore tales with no little relief, we turn next to the great religious systems of the ancient world, beginning with Zoroastrianism. We have, of course, no measurably authentic contemporary documents in the case. The dates for the life of Zaratust vary nearly a millenium, and even Professor Jackson holds that his real historic existence is a matter of probability rather than of certainty. But, waiving the question of dates and consider-

ing the documents just as we have them in the sacred books, what do they tell of the birth of their hero? The narratives with which we are now concerned touch upon two episodes: the birth of Zaratust himself and the promised or prophesied birth of his posthumous children.

The whole cycle of events, in which these wonderful births are episodes, begins with the creator Ahura-Mazda and ends with Zaratust's son or Saoshyant, who is to be the restorer of tll things. From Ahura-Mazda to Saoshyant, throughout an unbroken succession of leaders and rulers, there is one common element, the so-called "divine glory". Created by Ahura-Mazda, this substance or qualtiy was started on its way to meet the material germ of Zaratust. The "heavenly glory" is an idealization or materialization (one hardly knows which to call it) of royal power. It is described as "most conquering, highly working, that possesses health, wisdom and happiness, and is more powerful to destroy than all other creatures".[11] It is also said that it "could not be taken by force",—that is, that it descends in the line of royal legitimacy. It has been well said that this book (Tash) in which the progress of the glory is described "would serve as a short history of the Iranian monarchy". In the Dinkard[12] we find an account of the creation of the heavenly glory by Ahura-Mazda and its transmission through endless light to the light of the sun, then to the moon, then to the stars and then to a self-feeding fire in the house of Zaratust's grandfather Zois. It then became blended with his mother at her birth and shone through her with visible splendor. This glory makes Duktaub so beautiful that it rouses the ire of the demons, who threaten with destruction the village where she lives. These threats frighten the villagers and even her father, so that she is banished from home and takes refuge with her intended husband. Soon after she is married. Then follows an account of the magical eating of the horn-plant which

[11] *Th.* xix. 25-90.

[12] Bk. VII, Chap. ii. *S. B. E.* Vol. xlvii, pp. 17ff.

contains the fravasi (or spirit) of Zaratust by his father. After this, the two parents find a vegetable growth which contains the material substance of Zaratust. Cows are led upon this vegetation and are thereupon found in milk though unimpregnated. The parents drink of this milk and the elements are ready for the creation of Zaratust. Then follows an explicit and detailed statement of the coming together of the parents, who embrace twice with desire for a man child, but are hindered by jealous demons. The third time they succeed and Zaratust is conceived, Now, obviously, all this narrative is purely theoretical and dogmatic—an attempt to account for the presence in Zaratust of the three elements of personality according to the Zoroastrian psychology. It is most noticeable, however, that in spite of continuous miracle over ages of time up to and including his conception, birth and infancy, there is no hint of the idea that Zaratust was or could have been conceived without the concurrence of both parents in physical generation. A marvel of another kind meets us in the prophesied birth of Zaratust's posthumous son Saoshyant. In the *Bundahis* (Cap. xxii. 8-9) it is written thus:

"This too one knows that three sons of Zaratust, namely, Hûshêdai, Hushîdaimâh, and Soshyans were from Hvôv; as it says that Zaratust went near unto Hvôv three times, and each time the seed went to the ground; the angel Nêryôsang received the brilliance and strength of that seed, delivered it with care to the angel Anahid and in time will blend it with a mother."

The ambiguity of this truly remarkable statement is evident at once. If Hvôv was the mother of these children at all it could have been in this sense only—that she furnished the ovum which was impregnated by the seed of Zaratust. The children were not born for years, perhaps for centuries, and another mother was needed to complete the process. The part belonging to this second mother is correspondingly obscure—the only supposition that approaches reasonable-

ness is that she brings to maturity the impregnated seed. All this is grotesque enough and as incomprehensible as it is grotesque. But, whatever ambiguity may be attached to the motherhood involved in this strange coöperative scheme, there can be no question as to the actual physical fatherhood of Zaratust. Thus far nothing in the remotest degree akin to a virgin birth is discoverable. The continuation of the prophesy, however, raises the question anew. It is said[13] that "a maid bathing in the Lake Kasava will conceive by it and bring forth the victorious Saoshyant (Soshyos), who will come from the region of the dawn to free the world from death and decay, from corruption and rottenness, etc.". This is the basis of the so-called "virgin-birth" of Saoshyant. The grotesqueness of this wonder which is to take place in some far-off age and some dimly defined locality, we can lay aside and address ourselves to the question, "Does the statement imply a virgin-birth? It certainly does not, even if it is taken to mean that the maiden is to be unmarried at the time when the conception takes place, for she conceives by the actual transmitted material seed (in at least the enduring essence, the strength or brilliance of it) of Zaratust. Zaratust is looked upon as a being whose generative powers were as exceptional as his other faculties. The maiden's impregnation was due to an act of physical generation miraculously extended through time and space. The whole process was looked upon as continuous and physical.

But what reason is there for supposing that the birth of Saoshyant was to be any more miraculous or miraculous in any way different from that of Zaratust himself? The element in the seed of the prophet which is spoken of as the "brightness" is evidently that same "heavenly glory" which has been transmitted through so many ages and its transmission to the mother of Saoshyant and her conception by it no more implies that this is to take place without her marriage and without the coöperation of a father than in the case of Duktaub, Zaratust's own mother. At any rate, there

[13] *Th.* xix, 89ff. *S. B. E.* Vol. IV, p. lxxix.

is no suggestion of a virgin-birth in any legitimate use of the term. The emphasis in this myth is upon fatherhood, magnified, exaggerated, grotesquely miraculous, and yet fatherhood in the physical sense.

The close analogy between the Zoroastrian theory of transmitted "heavenly glory" and the Egyptian theory of transmitted "heavenly ichor" in the veins of the Pharaohs is evident upon the mere statement of them. Both are at once political and theological, and the theological element is scarcely able to keep pace with the political. Attention has already been called to the political element in the alleged miraculous birth of Amenhotep III. Tracing that story back to its origin brings into clearer relief this factor of the theory. In the Westcar papyrus dating from 700 to 1000 years later than the events to which it refers, we find a folk tale which gives a popular account of the supposed origin of the Fifth Dynasty. According to this story a certain magician told King Khufu of the Fourth Dynasty that three children soon to be born, by the wife of one of the priests of Re were begotten by Re himself and should become kings of Egypt. The names given to those children were the names of the first three kings of the Fifth Dynasty. This story indicates that a religious revolution, in which the worship of Re becomes the state religion, and a political revolution, in which a new dynasty gains the throne, took place simultaneously. It indicates further that this two-fold revolution was due to the successful scheming of the priests of Re. The story is the theoretical justification of a new dynasty and the expression of a new political theory. These priests contended that instead of being the son of Horus in the ideal sense, every Pharoah must be the bodily son of Re, who should become incarnate in order to beget him. Professor Breasted well calls this a "state fiction".[14] In its strict meaning, each king was the offspring in the physical sense of the incarnate sun-god and a human mother. In Professor Breasted's opinion, "it is probable that this interpretation was

[14] *Hist. of Egypt*, p. 122ff. Cf. *An. Rec. of Egypt*, Vol. II, pp. 187-212.

pressed at first only by kings whose claims to the throne through their mortal parents was questionable.[15] It is interesting to note that this fiction was consistently maintained throughout the history of Egypt and that the pictures representing it became stereotyped and conventional, so that they are repeated in identical form in the case of Hatshetsup at Der-el-Bahir and of Amenhotep III at Luxor. Later when Alexander journeyed to the Oasis of Amon and was formally greeted as Son of Amon, he was taking the only path to a regular and legitimate occupancy of the throne of Egypt.[16] The supernatural origin of the Pharoahs, even accepting the story at its face value, implies nothing at all like a virgin-birth. The king is the bodily son of Re. In no recorded instance, is he supposed to be the offspring of an unmarried woman, and the proof is positive and unbroken that the agency of the human father is always implied. The sun-god becomes incarnate in the person of the reigning monarch and in his person begets the next in line. The underlying notion seems to be that the divine element in the king must be renewed in each generation.

As has already been stated, in the case of Gotama we have no contemporary documents, and, according to the usual judgment of scholars, nothing on the subject of Gotama's birth earlier than the Christian era. There is, to be sure, some clash of authorities on this point. Rhys Davids and Fausböee hold that neither the Pitakas nor the ancient monuments mention Buddha's miraculous birth. Edmunds (*Buddhist and Christian Gospels*) claims that monument 89 contains a representation of the famous birth-story in its earliest form; namely, Gotama's mother dreaming of the descent of the white elephant. Granting the contested points and allowing what might be denied, that Maha-vasta antedates slightly the Christian era, it is at least certain that the developed birth-story of the Jakatas and, later still, of the Lalita Vistara, belong to a period well this side of the

[15] *An. Rec. of Egypt,* Vol. II, sec. 187.
[16] *An. Rec. of Egypt,* Vol. II, sec. 189.

beginning of the Christian era. Even here we have no virgin-birth. In the Lalita Vistara, a late document of Northern Buddhism, we find the statement that the mother of Buddha abstained from intercourse for thirty-two months before the advent of Buddha. Edmunds claims that this implies a birth without physical generation (p. 21). But does it? As we have seen, one recurrent feature of the birth stories in general is abnormal periods of gestation, extending all the way from a few moments to several years. The earlier stories fix the period of a Buddha at exactly ten months. A variation in this particular, under the influence of a general spirit of exaggeration which characterizes the later documents, is by no means improbable. According to Edmunds the germ of this later exaggeration is to be found in two statements of primitive Buddhism:

1. Abstinence during gestation.

2. The gandarva mythology, according to which "every human being is born by that conjunction of a spirit called a gandarva with the parents at that time of conception" (p. 22). This last sentence of Mr. Edmunds we take to be a misstatement of the doctrine, as we shall attempt to show when we come to the alleged parallel with Luke. Rightly understood, the doctrine of the gandarva has no bearing upon the later development. Professor Davids holds that the germ of this later modification is the statement of the Wonders and Marvels that the mother of Bodisat has no lustful thoughts toward men. Accepting either view, increasing asceticism is responsible for whatever developments Buddhism has made toward the denial or depreciation of physical generation in the production of a Buddha. Even so, that development stopped a long way this side of a virgin-birth.

The Buddhist birth-stories afford much interesting material for the student of this subject.[17] We note, first of all, that the birth-stories begin before his birth and in the

[17] The quotations and condensations which follow are taken from Rhys-Davids' *Buddhist Birth-Stories.*

remote celestial regions from which he comes. Upon hearing from angels that a new era is to dawn upon the earth and an omniscient Buddha to appear, the deities of the ten thousand world-systems assemble together and going to the living being who is to become Buddha they beseech him to do so. They tell him that now is the time for his Buddhahood. The great being reflects upon five important questions, (1) the time of his advent; (2) the continent and country for his appearance; (3) the tribe in which he should be born; (4) the mother who should bear him; (5) the time when her life should be complete. The most significant of these questions, historically speaking, is the third. In Gotama's own teaching (if we have it), his message to the people was: "Tell them that the poor and lowly, the rich and high, are all one, and that all castes unite in this religion as unite the rivers in the sea."[18] In the birth-stories, we come upon the fatal contradiction that of all the Buddhas, past, present and to come, no Buddha can be born in a low caste. In point of fact, as Oldenberg points out,[19] Buddhism inherited from Brahmanism a strong aristocratic tendency. Gotama's first converts were the "rich youth of Benares". The birth-stories state the meditations of the future Buddha thus:

"The Buddhas are not born in Vaisya caste, nor the Sudra caste; but either in the Brahman or in the Kshatirya caste, whichever then is held in highest repute. The Kshatirya caste is now predominant, I must be born in it and Suddhona the chief shall be my father."

We pause here to point out two striking contrasts with Christianity: (1) The Infancy narratives say nothing of Christ's preëxistence and in those passages of the New Testament in which it is taught nothing is said of His thoughts in the preëxistent state. (2) Though Christ was of the house of David He was born in the humblest cir-

[18] Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 309.
[19] *Buddha*, p. 151.

cumstances. More vital to our present purpose is the fact that Buddha chose his father with the greatest care. Evidently the father was just as essential to proper Buddhahood as the mother. In this, the birth-stories are perfectly consistent, for in every instance but one of the twenty-four or five Buddhas whose life stories are given, both parents are mentioned by name. The one omission is evidently due to haste.

Upon deciding these five points the Bodisat graciously yields to the entreaties of the deities and dismisses them. Thereupon, attended by the angels of joy, he entered the grove of gladness in the city of Delight, from whence he departed to become incarnate. It was at the time of the midsummer festival. Suddhona's wife, Mahā Māyā, after bathing in perfumed water and distributing a vast amount of money in gifts (contrast May's doves), puts on her most gorgeous robes, and, entering the beautiful chamber of the palace, lay down on her royal couch. She fell asleep and dreamed.[20] "The four archangels, the guardians of the world, lifting her up on her couch, carried her to the Himalaya mountains, and placing her under the great Lala-tree, seven leagues high, on the Crimson Plain, sixty yojanas broad, they stood respectfully aside." She was next bathed in the sacred lake, perfumed, dressed in heavenly garments and decked with flowers. "Not far from there is the Silver Hill, within which is a golden mansion; in it they spread a heavenly couch, with its head toward the east. Then the future Buddha, who had become a superb white elephant and was wandering in the Golden Hill, approached her from the north. Holding in his silvery trunk a white lotus flower, and uttering a far-away cry, he entered the golden mansion, and thrice doing obeisance to his mother's couch, he gently struck her right side and seemed to enter her womb. Thus was he conceived at the end of the summer festival."[21]

[20] It is to be noticed that the transformation of this dream into an actual experience is late and non-canonical.

[21] *B. B. S.*, pp. 62ff.

The proof that this dream was purely symbolic and that Gotama was begotten in the ordinary way is to be found in what follows. The next day after this dream the Maha related it to her husband, and neither of them understood what it meant. The rajah then summoned sixty-four eminent Brahmans and, after feasting them royally, told his wife's dream and asked for an interpretation of it. This was their answer: "Be not anxious, O King! Your wife has conceived and the fruit of her womb will be a man-child; it will not be a woman-child. You (still addressing the rajah) will have a son. And he, if he adopts a householder's life, will become a king." Combining this statement with the deliberate choice of Suddhona as his father attributed to the Buddha, we have evidence unmistakable that the dream was regarded as nothing more than a symbol of the supernatural involved in the conception which took place under ordinary conditions. But the story does not end there. A succession of physical marvels at once took place, involving a general cosmic convulsion. In the book of *Wonders and Marvels,* certain general statements are made as to the coming of various Buddhas which exhibits very clearly the psychology of the birth-stories.

"Anando, the future Buddha, is mindful and conscious when he vanishes from Tusita and descends into his mother's womb."[22]

"Where the future Buddha vanishes there appears a splendor, limitless and eminent, transcending the angelic might of the angels," etc.

"Anando, when the future Buddha is descending into his mother's womb (that is, during gestation), she is pure from sexuality," etc.

Especial attention should be called to certain other items condensed from the full statements. When the Buddha is in process, his mother has no sickness at all, but is happy with her body free from pain and sees the future Buddha

[22] *Decease,* Bk. III. 15. Cf. Edmunds, *Op. cit.,* pp. 54, 60.

transparently in the womb in full possession of his limbs and faculties. Seven days after his birth the mother dies; ten months is the regular period of gestation; the mother brings forth standing; after his birth he is received first by princes, does not touch the earth, is miraculously clean; a miraculous warm shower greets his birth; he walks at birth, and with bull-like speech proclaims: "I am the chief in the world."

Reviewing the birth-stories as a whole, certain facts emerge with great distinctness:

1. The stories look upon the whole process of Buddhahood as miraculous; the descent of the Bodisat, the conception, the gestation, the birth, the infancy, *et al.*, but all without excluding the agency of the human father. There seems to be no contradiction in the mind of the Buddhists who accepted these stories between natural and supernatural generation.

2. The underlying notion of these stories, as of the folk-tales, is metamorphosis. The Bodisats appear in the birth stories in fifty-two different characters—they disappear only to reappear in another form. They even go to the length of metempsychosis, for twenty-two of these fifty-two forms are animal. The whole tendency of the stories is to make the births as little like births and as much like journeys or transitions as possible. The birth features are reduced to a minimum. One story curiously speaks of the "conception ceremony", as having been performed.[23]

The most careful and elaborate attempt to institute a parallel between Christianity and Buddhism with the idea of suggesting imitation has been made by Mr. Edmunds in his book, *Buddhist and Christian Gospels* (published in Tokyo). Passing over questions concerning date and concerning communication between the Jews and the far East, we propose to take up the central question: Is there a genuine parallel between the two? Mr. Edmunds urges four

[23] *B. B. S.*, Vol. I, p. xxii.

particulars in which he finds a parallel between the Buddhist narratives and the Infancy section of Luke:

1. The theory of a spiritual power overshadowing the mother. This is the doctrine of gandarva mentioned above.

2. The vision of a hermit (shepherds in Luke) of angelic hosts rejoicing.

3. The angelic hymn.

4. Prediction about the career of the Saviour by an aged hermit.

This alleged parallel exhibits as clearly as anything could the blinding influence of an enthusiasm which results in a positive inability to make the simplest distinctions. Mr. Edmunds' argument on this question appears learned and formidable, but when the actual parallel is examined as he sets it forth in the texts, its cogency vanishes completely. Dr. Kellogg, in *The Light of Asia and Light of the World,* handles the alleged parallel between Asito and Simeon with complete success. Even Mr. Edmunds seems to have been somewhat shaken by Dr. Kellogg's attack, though he pluckily stands to his guns. He says:[24] "Kellogg, in *The Light of Asia and Light of the World,* disparages the parallel between Asito and Simeon (Lk. ii.), destroying it detail by detail. But he overlooks the connection of Asito with the angelic heralds. It is this organic connection which establishes the parallel between the Nalaka Sutta and the Second of Luke." But Mr. Edmunds himself seems to overlook the fact that in Luke ii. Simeon has no connection whatever with the angels. In this "parallel" Asito the hermit has to do double duty; he represents or is represented by Simeon, who (so far as we know) was no hermit, and also the shepherds, who are not only plural, but are not hermits. Another objection to this alleged parallel is that in the Buddhish documents Asito and his experience fill the entire space. In Luke's account, the episode of Simeon is incidental to the presentation of Jesus in the temple and is combined with the witness of the shepherds and of Anna.

[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 671.

Moreover, one of Mr. Edmunds' arguments is that the sequence of narrative is the same in the Buddhist infancy story and in Luke. But of four particulars urged in support of this conclusion, the first is from the *Questions of King Milindo*—the other three are from the *Suttas*. There is no evidence, so far as we can discover, that all the statements were even contained in any one continuous narrative—the sequence is therefore purely artificial.

But again, in regard to the first point, we think there is a still more fundamental break in this alleged parallel. We hold that Mr. Edmunds' statement involves a misinterpretation of the doctrine of the gandarva. The original statement of that doctrine is found in the "Middling Collection" (*Dial,* 38):

"Conception takes place, O Monks, by the union of three. In this world the father and mother are united. The mother may be capable but the genius may not be ready. It is by the union of these three, O Monks, that conception takes place."

This statement alleges the presence of three elements as necessary to conception, and one of them is explicitly said to be that of the father. The narrative in Luke alleges two, that of the father being explicitly excluded. But apart from this there is absolutely no similarity between the gandarva in Buddhism and the Holy Spirit in Luke. The gandarva, if it is not as we should suppose from the Chinese text, something material akin to the "heavenly glory" of the Zoroastrians or the "divine ichor" of the Egyptians, is at least a constituent element of personality, inseparably blended with the new-born being, while the Holy Spirit in Luke is a divine personal energy, which, while it imparts life, remains forever distinct and numerically separate from that which it has created. When this clear distinction is recognized, all close and real resemblance between the two documents disappears.

We must now pause and gather up results. The unde-

niable fact that heathen systems contain no analogy to the Virgin-Birth, places the whole discussion upon a different basis. The existence of heathen analogies would not prove the derivation of the Christian statement from them; but the non-existence of such analogies is proof positive that it was not derived from an external heathen source. There is also an inherent improbability in the suggestion of heathen sources for Jewish ideas which can be overcome only by the most positive evidence. In this case, we have not only no positive evidence, but in a multitude of instances a clearly revealed tendency of mind in another direction. We may reasonably consider the case for heathen influence closed. Dr. W. C. Allen, in his recent *Commentary on Matthew,* referring to the crucial passage Isa. vii. 14 says: "There are signs that the view that Isaiah was using current mythological terms, and intended his העלמה to carry with it the sense of supernatural birth, is rightly regaining ground" (p. 10). That the prophet meant his words to intimate a supernatural birth, we are not prepared to deny: that he was using current mythological terms, we hold to be more than questionable. For if he means that the birth of Immanuel was to be supernatural, it can have been only in the old Jewish sense, that is, supernatural with all the human factors present,[25] or else in the New Testament sense of a virgin-birth. If he uses the term in the historic Jewish sense, the heathen inference is unnecessary; if he means a virgin birth, the heathen reference is impossible. Heathenism had no virgin births. "God-begotten" in heathenism means always and everywhere the same thing—the physical offspring of a being capable of assuming human form and performing human functions. "Supernatural birth" in heathenism meant what it did among the Jews—an extraordinary divine activity coincident with the human factors and supplementary to them. When Professor Bacon[26] says that to the contemporary Jewish mind "Joseph might be,

[25] So Mr. Woods in *H. B. D.,* Art. "Virgin".

[26] Hastings, *D. B.,* Vol. I, p. 140a.

not merely the putative or adoptive father of Jesus, but the real father—at the same time that the birth was due solely to the 'power of the Most High' (Lk. i. 35)", he speaks the exact truth. That would be the natural Jewish statement of a supernatural birth. But, when we find a virgin-birth firmly intrenched in authentic documents of unquestionable Jewish origin, we are utterly at a loss to account for them on the basis of presupposition or mental bias. Moreover, Professor Bacon's statement is quite as true of the heathen as of the Jews. We have found in folk-lore, in Egyptian mythology, in Zoroastrianism, that a supernatural birth does not exclude the human factors, but, on the contrary, expressly includes them without a suggestion of incongruity. The Immanuel passage (in the Greek form) does not necessarily imply a supernatural birth in any other than the historic sense, and that the birth which it forecasts was supernatural in a hitherto unknown way must have given the passage an almost startling significance to those who first interpreted it in the light of the fact. Heathen influence either in the original passage or in the Greek translation is not traceable. No current mythological terms either of Isaiah's time or later in the time of the LXX can account for it. Heathenism does not account for the Isaiah passage, and the latter does not account for the New Testament statement. This statement still stands alone.

The one intrenchment of this "influence" hypothesis which we have not yet discussed is the writing of Philo Judaeus, and a few sentences on this subject may not inappropriately close this paper. At first blush, Philo's constant use and wide application of the terms virgin and virginity are startling. It almost seems as if we had reached the source of our New Testament statement, but a closer inspection blights this expectation almost before it has time to bud.

1. Philo does not share the Messianic expectation, and,

therefore, does not supply the connection between the "virgin" idea and Messiah's birth.

2. Philo (and presumably the same is true of his readers) seems not to have had any clearly defined or consistent notion of what he means to convey by the terms virgin and virginity. When he speaks of Sarah, Leah and Tamar as "virgins" and of the "virginity" of the graces, of memory, of numbers and of Moses' hands, we are at a loss to assign any definite and tangible meanings to his use of words. Indeed, one is strongly tempted to believe that they are cant words and do not mean anything upon which common sense can lay hold.

We find (a) that fatherhood in Philonian phraseology is nothing but a general symbolic solution of the difficult and perplexing problem of God's relationship to the people and things which he has created: (b) that begetting is also a symbolic term for God's efficient activity in the realms both of matter and of spirit: (c) that virginity has no connection whatever with what the New Testament means by it, since it is compatible not only with marriage but with unlawful sexual intercourse: (d) that Philo does not speak of any actual historic person as virgin-born in the sense of excluding or denying the human fatherhood. He speaks of the birth in the ordinary way both of Isaac and of Rebekah's children—while at other times he allegorizes them in his regular manner. Philo's peculiar use of terms, his confounding of natural and supernatural, and his extravagant allegorizing may be seen in the following passages taken from *Cherubim:*

"Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and if there be any of like zeal with them, are not represented as knowing their wives . . . for they who live with these men are in name, indeed, wives, but in fact virtues (*Cher.* xii., *cf. Allegories* iii. xxviii. xxix).

"But it is not lawful for Virtues which are the parents of many perfect things to associate with a mortal husband, but, without having received the seed of generation from

any other being, they will never be able by themselves alone to conceive anything. Who then is it who sows good seed in them, except the Father of the Universe, the unbegotten God, he who is the parent of all things?" (*τὰ σύμπαντα γεννῶν*).

"And I will bring forward as a competent witness in proof of what I have said the most holy Moses. For he introduces Sarah as conceiving a son when God beheld her by himself, but to him who was eager to attain unto wisdom, and his name was called Abraham" (*Cher.* xiii).[27]

These statements and many others like them, reduced as far as possible to the form of common sense, mean simply that the sons of promise, ideally considered, come from God. Philo would not have denied—indeed, does not, but on the contrary affirms—that the physical human being known as Isaac was begotten by Abraham and born of Sarah. A scheme of thought which turns a woman into a virtue who brings forth, in a purely idealistic manner, various "perfect things", obviously has no place for the function of a human father whose begetting is literal and physical. The father suffers a change in Philo's thought by which he becomes a contemplative philosopher to whom the various perfect things are presented by the virtue who is known as his wife. The whole scheme is consistent and absolutely unreal. The philosophical father, the allegorical mother and, so to speak, the theosophical child belong together. Philo could not evaporate the mother into an allegory and the child into a principle and leave the father with flesh and bones. It is perfectly clear, however, that no such thing as an actual, historical virgin birth ever came within the range of Philo's thought. He first denudes the mother of reality and then attenuates the rest of the family into harmony therewith, making an abstract philosophy of human beings. We can see absolutely no reason for believing that any man educated enough to read Philo's writings could have understood him to teach a literal virgin birth or

[27] The facts upon which these statements rest have been brought together by Carman, *Am. Jour. of Theol.*, Vol. IV., pp. 491ff.

to mean by the supernatural birth of the sons of promise anything more than their teachers had always meant. Furthermore, if the New Testament statement was due to Philo's influence, there would be in connection with it some evidence of interest in other Philonian ideas, especially in the allegorizing of Scripture which formed the staple of Philo's thinking. The Philonian atmosphere is pervasive and the method full of charm to one who adopts it. But Matthew was a literalist rather than an allegorizer, and both Infancy narratives are pegged to the earth of actuality by matter of fact statements. Mary is no allegorized virtue (albeit assuredly virtuous); her character is too genuinely human, her task too difficult, her life too humble, and her experiences too poignantly real to be imaginary. Whether Philo's thought has influenced John's prologue or not, it has assuredly exercised no influence on the Infancy documents.

We do not feel that it is too much too say that after careful and candid search we have found no external starting point save in the actual occurrence for the New Testament statement concerning the Birth of Christ. Nowhere except here do we find the birth of a Being, normally human, apart from physical generation.

Canandaigua, N. Y. Louis Matthews Sweet.

REVIEWS

RECENT LITERATURE

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE RELIGION OF EVOLUTION. By CARMA. Braintree: C. Joscelyne, Bookseller, High Street. 1906. 8vo., pp. 305. Price 3/6 net.

This pamphlet is an attempt to show not merely that evolution is consistent with Christianity, but that Christianity is demanded by evolution and can be explained only on the basis of it. As such, while not the first or the solitary one of its kind, it is probably the best. Indeed, the discussion is marked by clearness and vigor of expression, by adequate information, by boldness and even originality of conception, and by a grasp of the whole subject, which are as admirable as they are rare in any department of literature, but particularly, perhaps, in that to which this essay belongs.

Who Carma is, we do not know. It is certain, however, that he is a Christian who has become enamoured of the modern theory of evolution rather than an evolutionist who has become interested in Christianity. His motive is more religious than scientific. It is certain, too, that he is a Protestant and an Arminian. It is in Protestant Christianity alone that he finds evolution continuing, and it is the Arminian doctrine of the will that he holds. It is certain also that he is a firm believer in the Bible as "the Word of God". It is the cause and not the result of the evolution of the Hebrew nation; it is from above, not from below; it is of God, not of man. Indeed, Carma's ultimate aim in writing would seem to be to show that the true theory of evolution, instead of supporting and even necessitating that destructive criticism of the Bible which it has undoubtedly inspired, is really fatal to it. To accept it, one must repudiate evolution utterly. For example, "nothing is gained by attempts to postulate a revelation. It is not explained or accounted for, but merely becomes an absurdity. If we attribute the New Testament to the Dark Ages, it is not more really natural or less miraculous, but has become completely irrational and incredible miracle. If we attribute the Law of Moses to the Exile, it becomes totally inexplicable. Possibly the master mind, which perceived that the Tabernacle was invented to explain the Temple, may eventually arrive at the equally reasonable conclusion, that the Old Testament was composed at the Council of Nicea in order to explain and account for Christianity. Theories which place the result before

the cause and the end before the beginning are literally as well as figuratively preposterous."

And yet, admirable as are Carma's spirit and aim, and striking as are many of his exposures of the fallacies of the destructive criticism of the Bible, we cannot escape the conviction that his own argument breaks down at precisely the two most vital points.

1. Evolution as he conceives it is not evolution as it is commonly understood. He admits that it is not Haeckel's theory. That is false because it is so materialistic as to leave no room for a rational evolution. Neither does he espouse Spencer's view. Though it substitutes force for Haeckel's matter, it involves equally the absurdity of "an eternal evolution rendered forever abortive by an eternal dissolution". Nor does even Le Conte please him much better. His theory Carma regards—and probably rightly—as essentially pantheistic. One and all, they find the cause of the progress of nature in nature. This is why their schemes are correctly termed evolutionary, whether it be an evolution of matter or of force or of the immanent God. They all conceive of nature as evolving what is *in* her and because of what is *in* her. But this is just what Carma is at most pains to deny. "The cause of this progress", he says, "cannot be found in nature." "It is impossible for anything to bring forth what it never contained, or to bestow upon something else a higher existence than its own." In a word, it is not evolution that Carma is championing; it is what Dr. W. G. T. Shedd calls development and which he has described so clearly and beautifully in the opening chapter of his *History of Christian Doctrine*. It is, therefore, a view at the very opposite pole from the accepted theory of evolution. It traces the continuity of progress not to forces resident in nature; but to the Supreme Person who is the author of nature and who is independent of it and who is above it. Hence, to write as Carma does is misleading. What he has shown to be consistent with Christianity is not the theory of evolution, but the doctrine of development; yet the impression that he makes on the ordinary reader is that what is essential in what is commonly understood as evolution is consistent with the presuppositions of the Christian religion. This, however, is precisely what he does not believe and what he would deny most vigorously. His discussion, therefore, misses its point utterly. It is as if one were to commend boss-rule when what he meant was the authority of the civil magistrate.

2. Christianity as presented by Carma is not the Christianity of the Bible. Our limits keep us from mentioning all or many of the differences. Chief among them, perhaps, are these:

a. The doctrine of creation. This is best expressed in Carma's own words on p. 5: "Everything necessary for the perfecting of the universe must be included in the act of creation, but we must not suppose that the act was in time or instantaneous and that it is only the effect which is presented to us as a gradual development. It is the eternal act itself which is gradually presented to the finite mind in the evolution of the universe." . . . "Progress is one aspect of creation."

In a word, as evolution presupposes time and, therefore, a divine cause, so this cause operates or creates by means of evolution. That is, evolution is the process of creation. God creates the world by evolving it. Now this is pantheism pure and simple. God must either call the world into being out of nothing by the word of his power or he must evolve it out of himself. Unless the world were eternal, no other course is conceivable; and if the world were eternal, Carma's insistence on creation would be irrational. The Christianity, therefore, which he represents evolution as demanding and as alone explaining is just pantheism. If creation and evolution be but the eternal aspect and the temporal aspect of one and the same thing, this must be so.

b. Carma's position with regard to special creation and divine intervention. This is ruled out. "Since we must think of the process of becoming as a continuous development and a harmonious progress to one great event, it is evident that special creations are excluded. The partial acceptance of the principle is illogical. We cannot make man an exception. He is a part of the universe and must have been created with the universe and developed in due time by evolution" (p. 9). Now setting one side the particular question as to the origin of man, nothing is clearer than that Christianity presupposes special creations and divine interventions. It itself claims to be one. Whether as respects the race or the individual, it affirms itself to have come, not up, out of the creation, by evolution, but down, from heaven, by immemediate creation. It is not that in redemption or in regeneration God acts more really, more personally, than he is conceived to do in evolution. It is that he acts otherwise. He puts out his own hand into the stream of evolution, and thus he brings about what through it alone even he never could have effected. The Christian man is first of all and above all "a new creature", the effect of a special creation, the result of a divine intervention. He who fails to see this misses the very point of the Gospel.

c. Carma's doctrine of man. As might be supposed, this would link man more closely with the creatures below him. Wholly the product of evolution, there must be no break between him and the other animals. Hence, Adam, who is so far removed from them as to give names to them, may not be regarded as the first man. He is the "first parent of civilized man, and his office was the redemption of humanity from barbarism". Nor is it true that man, as no other creature, has been made like God. That he was created" in his image" does not mean this. It means that, as does the whole creation, only more clearly, man "reflects and reveals" God. Hence, there is no suggestion even of a break between him and nature. What is highest in man is not as it were a ray from the glory of the Creator; it is rather the perfection of the glory of the creation. To some this may seem very pretty, but it certainly is not Christianity. This assumes that man differs from the whole creation in that he has been made like God. This is why the creation has been subjected to him. This is why he can know God. This is why it is not wrong for God to give

even his Son for his redemption. In a word, Carma's doctrine of man would make the Gospel, not a mystery, for it is already the mystery into which even the angels desire to look: but an absurdity that men, not to say angels, could not tolerate.

d. Carma's doctrine of Christ. This is distinctly humanitarian. "Christ, who is the embodiment of Christianity, may be described as the Man of Evolution, because he is at once the person in whom man attains perfection and the person in whom he is born again into a new and better existence" (p. 52). That is, our Lord, unique and high though the position is which is assigned to him, is of the earth and of man. Indeed, this is asserted. "Christ is man and is developed out of man" (p. 152). But the New Testament makes him the Son of God and affirms that he came down from heaven.

This, however, is sufficient. Were there space, it would be interesting to show how in other respects, notably the fall and sin, Carma departs widely from the teachings of the New Testament. In a word, if his discussion proves anything, it is that "the religion of evolution must be a gospel quite other than that of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ".

Carma's initial and chief error would seem to be that he would make evolution the *only* mode of divine operation. It must explain everything or nothing (p. 9). That it is *a* mode of God's procedure, we freely admit; but that it is his only mode, we cannot deny too strenuously. God causes evolution. He calls the germ into being out of nothing and sets it evolving. He is immanent in the entire process of evolution, personally sustaining and directing it, bringing out of it by means of resident forces what he himself in the beginning put into it. But beyond all this, God interposes in the course of evolution. At critical epochs he puts into it, as he did when he originated it, something new, something that would never have appeared in the course of evolution but for such interposition, something that does appear because, and only because, he has, not by means of resident forces but by the direct exercise of his own power, himself injected it. To deny such special creation is to repudiate Christianity at the outset, as to identify evolution with creation is to misrepresent evolution.

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE PROBLEM OF FAITH AND FREEDOM IN THE LAST TWO CENTURIES. By JOHN OMAN, M.A., B.D., D.Phil., Author of *Vision and Authority*. 8vo.; pp. xxiv., 443. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West Eighteenth Street. 1906.

We have in this ample volume the sixth series of Kerr Lectures; and however we may differ from some of its conclusions, we must allow that it is not unworthy of its predecessors. Indeed, in grasp of the problem considered and in acquaintance with the literature bearing on it Dr. Oman's discussion will bear comparison with the first series

of Kerr Lectures, "The Christian View of God and the World," by Prof. James Orr; and higher praise could scarcely be given. At the same time, we can not help feeling that the task which our author set himself is impossible within the limits permitted to him. Though he is a master of generalization and of concise and pregnant expression, even he hardly succeeds in so outlining the history of religious thought and effort during the last two centuries as to enlighten on the relation of these to the fundamental problem discussed those not already informed. In a word, though of necessity, too much is presupposed and omitted.

The problem which Dr. Oman considers, and which is "the ultimate problem of at least the last two centuries," is "the relation of Faith and Freedom, the problem of how Faith is to be absolute and Freedom absolute, yet both one." His review and criticism of the successive and various attempts of the last two centuries to solve this problem, as Jesuitism, English Deism, German Rationalism, Romanticism, the High Church movement, the Tübingen School's theory of Development, Ritschl's Theology of Experience—this historical review "emphasizes the significance of freedom." To be more specific, it shows that "the absolute distinctions of freedom are not affected by evolution," the governing conception of the 19th century as gravitation was that of the 18th. Thus the progress of the centuries has only brought out more clearly "the absolute distinction in morals," "absolute lives in history," the "absolute necessity of religion," the "absolute distinction between Christianity and other religions", the "absolute difference between Christ and other men." It suggests, too, "a basis for principles of criticism," it shows " the union of God's power and love," it "assigns its right place to the church," it "promises a philosophy of history." All these are highly desirable results; yet, whether because of the necessity of extreme condensation or not, our author has not convinced us that these are, in every case, actual results. For example, we can not see how the conception of evolution has not even obscured the absoluteness of the distinction between right and wrong. This might not be so, were the evolution only of the recognition of this distinction. It is true that as the slow development of eyes would not affect the light, so the evolution of a moral nature need not affect the right. Right is right, whether or not we see it to be so. But the point of the theory of evolution, at least as it has commonly been held, is that it is the moral ideal as well as moral discernment that is evolved. What constitutes right depends ultimately on our feeling of need as social beings and this feeling of social need has itself been evolved out of mere gregarious instincts. Hence, it does not appear how the absoluteness of the distinction between right and wrong can be maintained. Grant that it does emerge in consciousness like a flash. Grant that as such it does seem to be absolute. In the last analysis it is of a piece with everything else. In a word, the question of origin can not be set to one side. What a thing is is not independent of what it has come from or even of how it has come. The relative can never develop into the

absolute. To be absolute, the moral ideal must lie wholly outside of the process of evolution.

Yet while at this point as well as at several others we should be compelled to except to our author's position, we gladly acknowledge and would most heartily emphasize the nobility of the spirit and goal of his argument. As it seems to us, he does not always see to the centre of difficulties, but he never loses sight of "the glorious liberty of the children of God" as the true meaning of life and the real end of history. Religion *is* more than the church; it *is* more than religious services: and though men were never so ready to recognize this as to-day, no vigorous reaffirmation and clear reillustration of it can be excessive.

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

CHRIST AND BUDDHA. By JOSIAH NELSON CUSHING, D. D., Ph. D., Missionary for Forty Years in Burma, Late President of the Rangoon College. With an Appreciation of the Author by Henry Melville King, Pastor Emeritus of the First Baptist Church in Providence, R. I. 8vo., pp 160. Philadelphia—American Baptist Publication Society—Boston, New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Atlanta, Dallas. 1907.

SERMONS OF A BUDDHIST ABBOT. Addresses on Religious Subjects by The Rt. Rev. Soyen Shaku, Lord Abbot of Engaku—ji and Kencho—ji, Kamakura, Japan. Including the Sutra of Forty-two Chapters. Translated from the Japanese ms. by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki. With portrait of the Author. 8vo.; pp. vii, 220. Chicago. The Open Court Publishing Company. London Agents, Kegen Paul, Trench Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1906.

Two more interesting and illuminating books on Buddhism could scarcely have appeared. The former, by one of the ablest missionaries of the American Baptist Church, gives a singularly clear presentation of this most formidable of the religions of the East and an equally striking comparison of its teachings and results with those of Christianity. This comparison is all the more instructive because of the writer's eminently judicial temper and his evident sympathy with all that is true in the system which he is discussing. We are interested to note, that he regards Buddha, not as an antagonist, but as a quiet reformer of Brahmanism; that he considers the life and character of Buddha, so far as we can get a picture of them, as among the most lovely that have ever blessed the world; that while holding to the historicity of the chief events in his alleged career, he is at pains to point out the immense inferiority in this respect of the story of Buddha to the Gospels; that while he treats Buddhism as a religion on the ground that it is commonly taken to be such, he denies its right to be so considered; that he characterizes it as distinctly atheistic; and that he exposes the inconsistency between its doctrine of the soul and its teaching as to transmigration, and also the absurdity of its practice of prayer. It may be

added that not the least charm of the book is its chaste and elegant style.

The second of these two volumes might well be regarded as written in illustration of the first, were it not that it was published a few months earlier and that it expounds the eastern and, as the author would say, the "more developed" Buddhism. In spite of this, however, and in spite, too, of the fact that he writes to commend his creed to Americans, his sermons set forth fairly enough the more fundamental principles of the western and more orthodox Buddhism which Dr. Cushing presents. The sermons themselves are models of terse and clear exposition and the English into which they have been translated is fascinatingly good.

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGIONS. By EDWARD BIERER. 8vo.; pp. xv, 385. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. The Knickerbocker Press. 1906.

This is a comparative discussion of the different great religious systems of the world, and an argument for a universal religion. It is written from the standpoint of liberal Unitarianism, but not with the grace of many of that school or with the logical force and scholarship of some. Indeed, it is neither convincing in argument nor attractive in style. It will, however, serve one purpose, whether useful or not is another question. It is really a thesaursus of the stock objections to orthodox Christianity, of the frivolous ones quite as much as of the serious.

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE ORIGIN AND PERMANENT VALUE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Litertaure in Yale University. "Ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make you free." New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906. 8vo.; pp. xii, 270. $1.00 net.

OUTLINES FOR THE STUDY OF BIBLICAL HISTORY AND LITERATURE. By FRANK KNIGHT SANDERS, Ph. D., Sometime Dean of the Theological Faculty and Professor of Biblical History and Archæology, Yale University, and HENRY THATCHER FOWLER, Ph. D., Professor of Biblical Literature and History, Brown University. With Maps and Charts. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906. 8vo.; pp. xiv, 233, plates vi. $1.25 net.

These two books from the same publishing house may be reviewed together, since they possess a characteristic feature in common. Professor Kent states that he wrote his treatise on "the origin and permanent value of the Old Testament" "within the all to brief limits of a Christmas vacation". The haste of composition has been pointed to as

incompatible with thoroughness of treatment. The criticism is unfair. The previous studies of Professor Kent in this line, extending over years, and popular lectures upon the theme had furnished him with the material. It only remained to give form and coherence to matter already at his disposal. And, doubtless, the discourse is more flowing because the pen sped so rapidly. At any rate, the literary charm of the book is great. And beyond this attractiveness, the manner in which the author states his doctrine is winsome, and his teaching is so phrased that it may often be interpreted up to the loftiest and purest conception of the subject which the Christian church has ever entertained. The book embodies much that agrees with the best modern thinking on these themes.

Of a different character, but adapted to its purpose, is the other work, from the pen of Dr. Sanders in collaboration with Professor Fowler. It is not intended for continuous reading, but is offered simply as a guide to students. It is mainly occupied with a chronological arrangement of the Scriptures and a series of questions on these writings. The authors generally refrain from stating their own views. Their aim is rather to present the literature of the Old and New Testaments, together with some uncanonical writings, in the true chronological order, as they conceive of it, to suggest matters for investigation by the student of these documents, to furnish him with suitable guidance in the study of these problems by directing his attention to the relevant printed discussions, and then to leave him to himself to form and formulate his own conclusions. The number of reference books cited in the text is properly limited, while a much fuller bibliography is given in an appendix.

In our judgment neither of these works will long endure, despite the scholarly labor that has been expended upon them; for they rest on a foundation that appears to be crumbling. They are based on the theories of the Wellhausian school concerning the origin of the Israelites, the course of their religious development, and the growth of the Old Testament. But it has become quite evident that the fundamental positions of this school were assumed with inadequate appreciation of the fact that law and literature, religious doctrine and ritual, had already reached a high state of development when Moses began his work for the advancement of his people. He undertook his labors under great advantages, in an environment of attainment. This fact, which is steadily gaining the recognition of biblical scholars, is seen by increasing numbers to be fatal to the particular scheme of development in Israel which is assumed by the Wellhausian hypothesis.

Princeton. JOHN D. DAVIS.

ISRAEL'S GOLDEN AGE. The Story of the United Kingdom. By J. DICK FLEMING, B. D., Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics, Manitoba College, Winnipeg. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1907. 8vo.; pp. 160. Price 45 cents. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

This little book belongs to the series of "Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students edited by Professor Marcus Dods, D.D.,

and Rev. Alexander Whyte, D. D." It goes somewhat beyond its title and covers not only "Israel's Golden Age," but also the conquest of Canaan and "Israel's Iron Age." The author seeks to penetrate beneath the events into their causes and relations, and into the motives of the actors in them. He writes well; and to those members of Bible classes who are already thoroughly familiar with the particulars of the biblical history, this survey from a philosophical standpoint will prove attractive and illuminating.

The work is marred by low views of Israel's religious teachers and teaching, and by a vacillating adherence to current subjective criticism.

Princeton. JOHN D. DAVIS.

DANIEL AND HIS PROPHECIES. By the Rev. CHARLES H. H. WRIGHT, D.D., Trin. Coll., Dub.; M.A., Exeter Coll., Oxon; Ph.D. of the University of Leipzig; Donnellan Lecturer in the University of Dublin (1880-1); Bampton Lecturer (1878); Grinfield Lecturer on the Septuagint (1893-7); and Public Examiner in Semitic Languages in the Honours School, University of Oxford (1894, 1895). London: Williams and Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden. 1906. 16mo.; pp. xxii., 334. Imported by Little, Brown & Co., Boston. $2.50 net.

The author of this book is widely known for his compact "Introduction to the Old Testament" and his elaborate exposition of the prophecies of Zechariah. His work displays competent knowledge of the literature on Daniel; and it is marked by fulness and frankness of discussion, calmness of tone, courtesy towards critics and exegetes of opposite views, an easy style, sober restraint in interpretation, and a close adherence to the substantial matters.

The salient points of this treatise, and the conclusions that determine the place and value one must assign to the Book of Daniel, are, that the prophet Daniel was known to Ezekiel; that the book is authenticated as true prophecy by the endorsement of Christ; that the fourth kingdom is the Roman empire; and that the seventy weeks begin in the year 457 B. C., when the decree of Artaxerxes was issued to Ezra. The author's peculiar views that affect the general argument are: 1. His theory of an Aramaic original for the entire Book of Daniel. From it chapters ii-vii were taken bodily as copies. 2. His theory that chapters xi and xii do not contain the prophecy in the form in which it was penned by the prophet, but are a paraphrase by an interpreter of Daniel. The question of the text, which this theory implies, is extremely important. The additions to Daniel which are included in the Apocrypha, the form of the book partly in Aramaic and partly in Hebrew, the obscurities of the text and the variations in the versions, unite in warning the investigator, that many problems remain unsolved: that he is dealing with a book that has had its vicissitudes; and that the text before him must be received with peculiar caution. Nevertheless, because of the present limited critical apparatus, these chapters must be

accepted in their present form by the exegete and the critic as the basis of their work; and yet to many there is always the haunting fear that the prophecy in these two chapters particularly does not lie before us in its original form, but is a paraphrase, as Dr. Wright believes, or at least contains a marginal gloss or two imbedded in it. The entire fabric of the exegesis and criticism of the Book of Daniel rests primarily on these two chapters. The slightest possible modification of the text would necessitate a wholly different interpretation of this particular prophecy from the minute exposition that, notwithstanding all the obstacles which lie in its way, is yet the most favored one at present, and would require a reconstruction of the arguments for the date and character of the book.

Chapters iii and iv of Dr. Wright's book, constituting about one-eighth of the work and treating of the references in the Book of Daniel to the secular history of Babylonia, are not wholly satisfactory. In fact, the archæology seems to have been obtained at second hand, and not to have been thoroughly mastered at that. For example, Dr. Wright has failed to notice the simple and satisfactory explanation of the chronological divergence between Dan. 1: 1 and Jer. 25: 1. It is coming to be recognized that the two statements give the same date, and owe their diversity to the difference that existed between the scribes of Palestine and Babylonia in the method of reckoning regnal years. It is strange to read, remembering the views of the author, that the writer of Daniel "seems to have been well acquainted with the Books of the Kings and the Chronicles" "and Ezra" (pp. 113, 134). And it is stranger still to be told that in the year 539 B. C. "there was still a Jewish monarch living in retirement in Babylon" (p. 132). Why does Dr. Wright say that "according to Winckler" Neriglissor married a daughter of Nebuchadnezzar? (p. 123). There is a greater authority for this fact, none less than Berosus.

Princeton. JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE LORD OF GLORY. A study of the Designations of our Lord in the New Testament, with especial reference to His Deity. By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, Professor in Princeton Theological Seminary. New York: American Tract Society; London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1907. 8vo., pp. 332.

What is attempted in this book is primarily a survey of the designations which the New Testament writers apply to our Lord, with a view to acquiring a sense of the attitude, intellectual and emotional, sustained by them to the Lord's person. But a secondary purpose is intertwined with this. This is to exhibit, by this example, the clearness and strength of the testimony of the New Testament to our Lord's essential divinity. The book is thus fundamentally an exposition, and actually an argument. It will attain its end only if it both conveys to the reader a plain general account of the whole body of designations applied to our Lord in the New Testament, and fixes in his mind a

clear conviction that to our Lord's first followers as a whole, and to Himself as well, He was nothing other than God manifest in the flesh. The starting point of both the exposition and the argument is taken from the Synoptic Gospels; and the material offered by them is dealt with more fully than that supplied by the rest of the New Testament, which is adduced rather as corroborative than as original evidence. The disposition of the matter will be readily understood from the headings of the successive sections: Introductory; the Designations of our Lord in Matthew; Matthew's Conception of our Lord; the Designations of our Lord in Luke and their Implications; the Jesus of the Synoptists; the Jesus of the Synoptists, the Primitive Jesus; the Designations of our Lord in John and their Significance; the Designations of our Lord in Acts and their Significance; the Corroboration of the Epistles of Paul; the Witness of the Epistle to the Hebrews; the Witness of the Apocalypse; the Issue of the Investigation.

Any value the book may have is very greatly increased by the full and accurate index of the passages of Scripture cited, which has been prepared by the Rev. Dr. John H. Kerr, Secretary of the American Tract Society, to whom also is wholly due any accuracy which may have been attained in printing the book. The great pains which Dr. Kerr has taken in verifying the numerous references with his own hands and otherwise watching over the actual printing of the book, have made the printed volume almost as much his as the author's; and the author takes this opportunity of acknowledging them and returning his thanks for them. There are two other indexes, one of which gives a list of the designations our Lord employed in the New Testament, while the other notes the authors cited.

Princeton. B. B. Warfield.

St. Paul The Man and His Work. By H. Weinel, Professor Extraordinary of Theology in the University of Jena. Translated by the Rev. G. A. Bienemann, M. A., and edited by the Rev. W. D. Morrison, L.L. D. London: Williams and Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. 8vo. pp. xiv, 399.

Professor Weinel's vivid portrait of Paul, as seen through the spectacles of the modern critical school, has already been before the public for some time in its German form. It appeared first, in large part, in a series of papers which attracted wide attention, printed in successive numbers of the radical journal, the *Christliche Welt*. Then in its completeness, in book form. The English translation now before us reproduces the brilliant German work only in its contents; the charming form of the original has largely evaporated in the process of its transfusion into a new language. Nevertheless, the reader of the volume will obtain from it what it primarily contains—Professor Weinel's portrait of the Apostle Paul.

This portrait is injured somewhat by the narrowness of the founda-

tion on which it is built. For Professor Weinel accepts as from Paul only the four major Epistles—Romans, Corinthians, Galatians—together with Philippians and I. Thessalonians, and knows no other primary source of information concerning the Apostle except the so-called "Travel-document" incorporated in Acts. It is far more injured, however, by certain peculiarities of interpretation, by which Professor Weinel, standing over his victim, forces upon him a series of opinions and points of view, which his language will hardly endure, but which Prof. Weinel thinks must be what he intends to say because he finds them in the Pharisaic literature of late Judaism—and was it not from the circle of the Pharisees that Paul sprung? It is most of all injured, however, by the double purpose which informs Prof. Weinel's sketch. It is not merely to paint as true and vivid a picture of Paul as possible that he writes: but to validate a new view of Paul and his place in the development of "Christianity", and above all to commend a new view of "Christianity" to our generation. "Our task", he says, "is to understand a character of the first century, in and for this our twentieth century, to represent the everlasting questions that assail the human heart in the Apostle's features of human weakness and human greatness, and guided by this, its 'second founder', to obtain some preliminary grasp of the fundamental problems of Christianity" (p. 12). Since his ultimate purpose is, thus, by means of Paul, to commend a new view of Christianity to the world, Prof. Weinel cannot complain if we find his work more useful as an exposition of this new Christianity than as a portrait of the Apostle—full as it may be of useful "broken lights" thrown back on the life of Paul.

The new view of Christianity which Professor Weinel wishes to further by this sketch of one of the early heroes of the Christian religion, is that it consists so utterly in an attitude of soul to God, conceived as Father, that it is entirely independent of all those questions of dogma with which it has been unfortunately identified through the ages. It was Paul above all others who entangled Christianity with conceptions of a Fall, of Original Sin, of an incarnated Heavenly Being, of an Atonement bought in blood, of a Sacramental system, of a limited Ethical outlook. But these things were but the husk of his religion, brought with him from his Pharisaic training; and represent neither the heart of the man nor the essence of the Christian religion. Penetrating beneath this hard shell of Pharisaic dogma, the nineteenth century has discovered the real Paul, and it is time now, as the twentieth century opens, that the whole world should know him, that they may admire and love him as he deserves, instead of being repelled by him as they now are—witness Lagarde and Nietzsche. And so doing it has not only discovered Paul but also saved the Christian religion. For nothing is more certain than that Christianity cannot survive in this our modern world if it is to be weighed down with all these outworn dogmas, which, to speak shortly, no longer correspond with our conception of the universe or of God. While it must be admitted, then, that Paul is fundamentally the author

of this dogmatic "Christianity", it must also be allowed that this dogmatical Christianity was accidental to his religion, and that in its essence it is the simple faith in God as Father, which Jesus taught, which along with Jesus Paul commends to us. "Wherever fire is, there are dross and ashes too," and we are to preserve not the dross and ashes but the pure flame. Paul was, no doubt, the first to develop those ideas by which "the religion of the divine Fatherhood was changed into the faith in the divine nature of the man Jesus" (p. 140). But we are not "to call every man a heretic who cannot accept Paul's mysticism or repeat the Shibboleth of 'the living Christ', because his modern outlook on the universe forbids him to do so" (p. 148): or who refuses to make of the dogma of the atonement, instead of a holy life, the narrow gate which leads to the kingdom of heaven (p. 169). It is not what Paul brought with him from Judaism but what he found in Christianity which concerns us. And in him as in Jesus "the living core and center of all religion is joy in the Divine Sonship": and this abides, though we can no longer find ourselves at home in his doctrinal system. Thus eloquently, Professor Weinel pleads, through his picture of Paul, for an undogmatic Christianity or rather for a Christianity whose dogmas—dogmas of unpropitiated forgiveness of unexpiated sin to all who will look to God for it—are quite different from the dogmas by which Christianity has thus far conquered the world to itself.

It is quite natural that Paul the dogmatist suffers a little at the hands of Prof. Weinel the non-dogmatist. The whole dogmatic system of the great theologian is looked somewhat pityingly upon as a soiled and ragged suit of old clothes not yet put off. The weaknesses of the man are thrown into high lights to explain his failure more purely to realize the high call of the Christian spirit. But the greatness of the man, the thinker, the organizer, the Christian, is seen too clearly to be quite obscured even by this envelope of weaknesses. And it is just here that Prof. Weinel's book becomes valuable. Its lesson is that we may reject the whole mass of Paul's teaching, and yet be forced to discover that Paul was too great a man to be neglected and too noble a man not to be admired and loved. The query is whether so great and so noble and so true a man can be so admired and loved as Prof. Weinel bids us admire and love him, and yet so disregarded or even despised in his teaching and in his testimony to the divine origin and authority and value of that teaching: whether we must not ultimately take our place by Nietzsche and curse him, or else with the whole Christian world and bless him? Is Prof. Weinel's attitude of a somewhat supercilious patronage quite tenable with respect to a man like Paul? And beyond that lies another question of some importance. Can "Christianity" after all be interpreted as consisting of the philosophical faith of the nineteenth century, baptized with the bare name of Christ, or must it not be held to be what has been taught us by Christ and His apostles? When we have "exchanged the thought of a special revelation of God to His people, for that of the great history of

religion throughout all humanity"—what warrant remains for calling this universal, natural religion by the specific name of "Christianity"—a name which, up to to-day, has been reserved not for universal natural religion, but for a very specific form of revealed religion indeed? We used to speak of this universal natural religion as the "higher heathenism". Is its character altered by the modern insistence that it should rather be called "Christianity"? "Christianity as Old as Creation" is the title of an old Deistic volume. "Christianity as broad as the universe"—the affinity is express. Perhaps Christianity is no longer tenable: but we shall gain nothing by calling what we think tenable "Christianity".

Princeton, Midsummer, 1906. B. B. Warfield.

Jesus. By W. Bousset, Professor of Theology at the University of Göttingen. Translated by Janet Penrose Trevelyan; edited by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. London: Williams & Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. Crown 8vo.; pp. vi., 211.

Professor Bousset's *Jesus* and his *Was wissen wir von Jesus* ought, of course, to be read together. The latter booklet stands related to the former something like prolegomena to performance: in it Professor Bousset vindicates his right to attempt a portrait of Jesus and indicates the basis upon which he attempts it. The occasion of this vindication was supplied by two of Kalthoff's astonishing books, the *Das Christusproblem* and the *Die Entstehung des Christentums*. In these Kalthoff contended that modern criticism of the origins of Christianity not only had bankrupted itself, and left itself no materials for forming a residual conception of Jesus—a position which is frankly taken to-day by many highly esteemed critics such, *e. g.*, as Pfleiderer—but had actually obliterated the figure of Jesus from history and left us without ground for assuming even the existence of such a person,—a position in which he ranges himself with certain Dutch critics of a generation ago (Pierson, Naber, Loman) and is supported only by a free-lance here and there like, for example, our American, W. B. Smith, who, however, while sharing Kalthoff's negative conclusions, vigorously repudiates his "crudities" and especially his positive conception of Jesus as "merely a social-ethical Ideal". It is exceedingly pleasant to a "conservative" or an "apologist", accustomed as such to bear the scorn of the "critics", to see a critic like Professor Bousset sitting in the seat of the "conservative" and standing in the place of the "apologist". And this pleasure is greatly enhanced by the reappearance in Professor Bousset, as "conservative" and "apologist", of all those points of view and methods of argumentation we have been accustomed to see flouted when occupied and employed by other "conservatives" and "apologists". We are greatly inclined to whisper wonderingly to ourselves, Is Professor Bousset also among the prophets? and, sitting at his feet, to learn over again many things we knew perfectly well before, but had no reason to believe Professor Bousset and his fellow-critics had yet learned.

We learn here afresh, for example, that historical investigation cannot be dominated by theories of orderly development, and that the methods of physical science cannot safely be carried over into this sphere—in fact, that those who shall bury this "new method" have long been standing before the door (p. 10). We learn also here afresh that profane history itself assures us that Christians already existed in the Roman Empire in numbers sufficient to attract the attention of the governing body at a period only some ten or twenty years removed from the traditional date of the death of our Lord, and that this fact by itself renders the assumption that the Person of the Founder is only a figment of the imagination exceedingly difficult (p. 17). We learn here also afresh that the testimony which Paul bears to Jesus, a testimony not to be set aside by a theory of pseudepigraphy more facile than reasonable (p. 20), and not to be weakened by a systematic blindness to the facts (p. 25), puts wholly beyond dispute not only the existence of Jesus, but the main outlines of His life (p. 25: and Weinel, *Saint Paul, the Man and His Work*, could have taught Bousset to go much further here). We learn also here afresh that our Evangelical literature, which is quite independent of Paul and yet presents precisely the same portrait of Jesus which he draws, carries us back well into the first generation after the death of Jesus (pp. 34, 40), and presents to us the testimony of the earliest Palestinian community of Christians. And we also learn here afresh even that it is mere hyper-criticism to decline to derive historical facts even from John's Gospel (p. 76, note 29). In a word, in his capacity as "conservative" and "apologist" Professor Bousset fairly establishes a firm basis on which a trustworthy portrait of the historical Jesus can be erected. And in this we rejoice; yea, and shall rejoice.

The trouble is that Professor Bousset is unaccustomed to wear the garb of "conservative" and "apologist", and, flinging it off as soon as his fear of Kalthoff permits him to do so, forthwith proceeds to minimize the gains he has registered when acting "in that capacity", and to unbuild as far as possible what he had built up. Here we have, for example, the testimony of Paul and of the Evangelical tradition, each taking us back to within a very few years of the death of Jesus, representing between them the witness of the whole Christian community of the first generation after Christ. Their testimony is absolutely consentient. They agree not only in their testimony to the general course of Jesus' life in the world,—that He was born of the seed of David, that He preached the gospel of the kingdom, that He went about doing good and attested His claims by works of power, that He established a sacrament in His broken body and shed blood, and died on the cross as a ransom for sinners, and that He rose again from the dead, was seen by many and ascended on high the Lord of all, from whence He is to be expected again to consummate His Kingdom—but also in their testimony to who and what Jesus was, what He came to do, what was the significance of His life and death, and what His relation is to those who trust in Him as their Saviour and Lord. Professor Bousset explicitly allows that Paul and the Evangelists

are at one in these things. "Already for Mark Jesus is not only the Messiah of the Jewish people, but the miraculous Son of God whose glory shone in this world; and it has been rightly emphasized that in this respect our three first gospels are distinguished from the Fourth only in degree." "For the faith of the community, which is shared already by our oldest evangelist, Jesus is the miraculous Son of God, on whom faith lays hold, and who is exalted quite to God's side." "For Mark already, as in the Gospel of Paul, the chief thing in Jesus' life is his suffering and death." And yet Professor Bousset refuses to accept this testimony! It was the universal earnest conviction of the entire Christian community at least within ten or twenty years of Jesus' death that this was not only what Jesus was and did, but what He represented Himself as being and doing. This community contained in itself personal attendants of Jesus who had companied with Him throughout His public career. Paul, for example, had associated with the "first disciples" of Jesus and learned of them; he had even developed differences on matters of serious moment with them and had withstood them to the face; but these differences never touched on the matters of Jesus' essential claims and teachings, what He was, and what He came into the world to do, and how He compassed it in His life and death. The combined testimony of Paul and the Evangelists amounts thus to the most remarkable body of first-hand witness to the career and teachings of the founder of a religion the world has ever seen. And yet Professor Bousset, after validating it in his capacity as "conservative" and "apologist" for the fact of Jesus' personal existence, sets it all lightly aside at the precise point where it pleases him no longer to play this rôle! And when we ask after the grounds of this remarkable proceeding we get really nothing but a platitude about "faith being the foe of history",—and the impossibility of one seeing clearly who believes and honors!

It is not faith only, however, which can blind the eyes of the historian. Professor Bousset has had occasion to observe that in the case of Kalthoff. It is equally visible in his own case. For his refusal to follow the witness of Paul and the Evangelists in their testimony to the manner of man Jesus was and the nature and bearing of His teaching is every whit as arbitrary as Kalthoff's refusal to follow them in their testimony to His objective existence and influence as a person in this world of ours. Of course, Professor Bousset has his "reasons" for his refusal to follow this witness and exhibits great skill in presenting these reasons. Has not Kalthoff also his reasons? and does not he also know how to set them forth persuasively? And are the one set of reasons any less wire-drawn than the other? Professor Bousset feels sure that he can penetrate beneath the tradition of Jesus embodied in the Gospels to the real Jesus—that to the keen eye of the careful prospector in this field, ever and anon through the soil of tradition the granite of historical truth peeps through. When one addressed Jesus with the title "Good Master", did He not respond that none but God was good? When miracles were demanded of Him

did He not refuse to work them? Did He not in the Parable of the Prodigal Son picture God as forgiving without propitiation? Did He not always point His hearers directly to God and keep Himself always in the background? But does Professor Bousset forget that he owes what knowledge he has of all these incidents to the very Evangelists who teach Him that Jesus was precisely the contrary to what He would fain imagine Him to be? And does it not occur to him that possibly these Evangelists—and the whole Christian community of the first age—may have better interpreted them than he is doing, when he makes them contradict in principle the whole conception of the person and work of the Master to illustrate which they record them? It certainly is a very odd way to write history to proceed from the beginning on the assumption that the whole body of first-hand witnesses are wrong in the essential features of the presentation they give and that only that is trustworthy in their report which can be twisted by skillful manipulation into a contradiction of their point of view.

Halting thus abruptly in his "conservative" career, Professor Bousset rescues from Kalthoff's skepticism *a* "historical Jesus", but refuses in his own skepticism to accept *the* "historical Jesus". His difference from Kalthoff is, then, at best, only one of degree. Both agree that the "Christianity" which now exists and which has existed since at least the second generation was not the creation of Jesus; and that the Jesus which has been believed in at least since Paul and the Evangelists depicted Him for us is the creation of "Christianity". They differ only as to whether behind the whole movement which we call "Christianity" we need to assume any person called Jesus at all. Kalthoff thinks not: he is sure that to everyone imbued with the principles of modern historical science it will seem absurd to think of Christianity, as a particular culture-phenomenon and a development-form of communal life, as the work of an individual founder of religion and therefore as finding its essense and origin in a historical Jesus. Bousset responds that "Christianity"as it came to be, certainly cannot be traced back to Jesus (p. 16), but that, though it transformed itself so grossly, so rapidly, nevertheless, "the decisive impulse to the whole movement" must be assigned "to a specific point" and must have had its "center in the personalities of Jesus and Paul" (p. 13). If this "historical Jesus" is, however, thus, not the "historical Jesus" of the Christian tradition, the question becomes pressing what kind of a historical Jesus He was. The book now before us is an answer to this question. And its real significance lies precisely in this—that it makes known in detail for us how Professor Bousset and his fellow scholars really conceive of that Jesus whose real existence they wring from the hands of the Kalthoffs and Smiths of our modern world.

It has already become superabundantly clear that the "historical Jesus" which Professor Bousset rescues from the destroying hand is not at all the Divine Jesus, the Redeemer of the World, of our New Testament records. Professor Bousset is modest enough in disclaiming full knowledge of this personality. But one of the things he is quite

sure of is that He was in no sense a heavenly being, as Paul and the Evangelists depict Him. He not only never claimed preëxistence; He expressly distinguished Himself from God and consistently presented Himself as but God's servant. True, He called Himself the "Son of Man"—though, of course, not with the persistency with which He is represented in the Gospels as doing this, and only late in His life and only in moments of deepest emotion,—and only (shall we not say it?) in a somewhat Pickwickian sense! The reason of His employment of this Messianic title of Himself was that, though feeling Himself to be the Messiah, he shrank from the most current Messianic title of Son of David, because of its popular implications of a temporal rule at Jerusalem. Therefore He adopted this one instead,—although it bore, from its origin in Daniel's great vision, the implication of heavenly origin and preëxistence—which He by no means meant to adopt with it,—the truth being that "to Him the idea of the Son of Man meant only one thing—His return in glory" (p. 194)! He permitted Himself, then, to use a title of Himself, the implications of which He repudiated, as we must believe—because "it is inconceivable that Jesus who stamped the fear of that almighty God who had power to damn body and soul together, upon the hearts of his disciples with such marvelous energy, and who could speak of that fear because he shared it to the bottom of his soul, should now have arrogated to himself the Judgeship of the world in the place of God" (p. 203). Which, being interpreted, seems to us to mean merely that Professor Bousset is in straits here. He cannot deny that Jesus used the title of "Son of Man" of Himself; he cannot deny that this carried with it an assertion of heavenly preexistence and of Divine prerogatives: and yet he cannot bring himself to allow that Jesus made these assertions of Himself. Hence he is in straits and (like Biographers, who impute themselves to their victims) he extricates himself by putting Jesus in straits instead. The Evangelists' way is better: they represent Jesus as calling Himself the Son of Man because He wished to claim for Himself all that name imports.

This instance may stand as a sample. The Jesus whom Professor Bousset presents to us as the real "historical Jesus", is a sadly lowered Jesus from that which the entire body of the testimony gives us: a Jesus who was a mere man and merely a man of His times, imbued with the points of view of His day and race and situation,—filled no doubt with a pure vision of God and of His Fatherly goodness to man and with a burning compassion for man, but limited also by His training or lack of training, by His opportunities or lack of opportunities, and by His one-sided enthusiasms. He did no miracles, but only wrought such wonders as might be psychologically mediated. He foresaw no future, but only walked steadfastly along the road that lay before him, learning much as He went—or else, when a rush of enthusiasm seized Him, predicting an establishment of a kingdom and a coming back in glory to do it, which never happened! He taught no new moral system—nor indeed any moral system at all: and the separate items of morality He taught

were onesided and dictated by His peculiar situation and outlook, and often cannot be accepted by us. Also he wrought no redemption. He did not even conceive a redemption necessary. His message to us is summed up in the parable of the Lost Son, which means that God needs no propitiating. He simply lived and died, and in living and dying left a deep impression on His followers, which is not yet obliterated. Like the great artists of the past, whose lives and works are the inspiration of all time, so this great man of religion works still on the hearts of men. He belongs thus not to the past but to the present. When we turn our contemplation to Him we feel ourselves in the stream of life. We do not know much about Him—but we know all that is necessary for us to know; and we claim Him as the leader of our souls and cry to Him—"Thou art the way, the truth, and the life."

This is all eloquently said. But what is thus eloquently said is just the baldest Socinianism; and we must not permit ourselves to be blinded by its eloquent saying to that sad fact. The simple fact is that the modern critical reconstruction of the Gospels has led straightforwardly to the destruction of the Gospel. On the assumption that the Christian tradition—in Paul and the Evangelists—cannot be trusted, it offers us another tradition; and in the nature of the case a contradictory tradition. Faith is the foe of history, we are told; therefore no more faith. Let us answer that unbelief is much more the foe of history. If it is *à priori* conceivable that the Evangelists writing in the first generation of Christians and in the presence of men who had known our Lord, may have transformed the true tradition to meet the demands of their glowing faith; it is *à posteriori* certain that our modern critics, writing two thousand years later, and in the presence of prevailing unbelief—unbelief in the supernatural and all that the supernatural stands for—and out of an ignorance created by the rejection of all authentic records,—have transformed the true tradition to meet the demands of modern scepticism. Take the Gospel of Mark and place by the side of it the Gospel of Bousset, and even on internal grounds we shall not hesitate to chose the former and reject the latter. And if we ask for external evidence it is merely a conflict between abounding testimony and pure subjectivity.

Princeton, June 1906. B. B. Warfield.

Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments, neu übersetzt und für die Gegenwart erklärt von Prof. D. O. Baumgarten, Prof. D. W. Bousset, Prof. D. H. Gunkel, Privatdozent Lic. W. Heitmüller, Pastor Lic. Dr. G. Hollmann, Prof. D. A. Jülicher. Prof. Lic. R. Knopf. Pastor Franz Koehler, Pastor Lic. W. Lueken, Prof. D. Johs. Weiss. Herausgegeben von Professor D. Johannes Weiss in Marburg. Zweite, verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1906 and 1907, Band I, Lieferungen 1-6. pp. 704. Band II, Lieferungen 7-8, pp. 256.

The demand for commentaries on the New Testament is not diminishing. A circular of the publishers accompanying the second edition

of this new commentary, edited by Prof. D. Johannes Weiss, of Marburg, announces the sale by subscription of the entire first edition a half year before its completion as well as a large subscription to the second edition. The extremely cheap prices at which the work is issued; its popular-scientific character, written as it is to meet the needs of those who know something of the critical work that has been done on the New Testament and who, without critical scholarship of their own, wish to have the results of this work placed before them in a readable form; written also by men who are recognized and efficient leaders in one school or another of critical scholarship and who are yet sufficiently alike in point of view and method to present a homogeneous piece of constructive work;—all these elements enter in to make for this commentary the place it has already won in its home-land.

The plan and point of view of the work are set forth by the editor in the *Begleitwort zur ersten Auflage.* 'The work attempts to open to the intelligent and thoughtful reader, interested in the problems of our religion, a vivid, historical understanding of the oldest documentary sources of Christianity. The different contributors are to be free from regard for theological schools or parties; and they are so to approach the New Testament that it may work upon them uninfluenced by presuppositions (*ganz ohne Voreingenommenheit*) to the end that they may show to the reader the thing itself as it is.' After due warning to those for whom the work is not intended—such as still retain their childhood's regard for the Bible—the editor admonishes those for whom the work is intended against judgments of detail. He would have the work as a whole produce its effect. To judge of details would constitute an injustice to the contributors since they all represent a common point of view (*Gesammtanschauung*) in which one part depends on another and can only be understood in its connections with all the others. Hence it is asked that final judgment be reserved until the completed work has had an opportunity to produce its effect.

The first *Lieferung* begins with an able sketch by Dr. Jülicher on the History of the New Testament, in which the origin of the New Testament, or more particularly, the history of the New Testament canon, the history of New Testament interpretation, and the history of the transmitted text of the New Testament are discussed. Dr. Jülicher's results are well known from his *Einleitung,* of which there is an English translation. In his concluding paragraph Dr. Jülicher expresses his appreciation of the New Testament canon for what it contains,— i. e. the character of its contents—but more especially in its original form; but he also confesses a sad disillusionment in regard to the Church's shortcomings in its care of the New Testament text and in its exegetical labors. In his review of the history of New Testament interpretation, closing with a well deserved tribute to Calvin, a just appreciation of Luther's strength and weakness in this field, and a brief reference to the contributions of Pietism, the failure to give information about modern exegetical work constitutes a lack which is not adequately supplied by the short account of the course of modern

critical work on the New Testament from Grotius and Simon to Weizsäcker and H. J. Holtzmann.

The editor, Dr. Johannes Weiss, contributes the introductory and exegetical work on the Synoptic Gospels. The arrangement of the matter is admirable. After the introduction to the first three Gospels there follows the exegesis of the separate Gospels prefaced by a short introduction to each. The divisions into main- and sub-sections are given in heavy faced type as are also the more important notes. In the commentary on Mt. and Lk. the sources are conveniently indicated by marginal letters, M (Markus), Q (Logia-Quelle), and S (Sonder-Quelle).

Dr. J. Weiss adopts and builds upon the results of the two-document theory of the Synoptic problem. He admits that this theory has not solved all the elements of the problem; but, in spite of a group of scholars who still defend the priority of Matthew, he thinks that this theory, which is now accepted by the majority of competent scholars, is sufficiently secured to serve as a basis for his exegetical work. The problem of ascertaining the sources of the Synoptic Gospels is primarily a literary problem, but its solution may have very important historical bearings on their trustworthiness. At the outset Dr. Weiss raises the questions:—Does the witness of the Gosepls to the life of Jesus rest on fact? Are the Gospels trustworthy historical sources? The modern spirit, imbued with a strong sense of reality and trained by scientific historical investigation, rebels against accepting the Gospel narratives as records of what actually happened. We must therefore inquire, How did these narratives come into being and how far may they be trusted?

A comparison of the Synoptic Gospels with the Fourth Gospel tends to commend the objectivity of the former. These contain some, though much less, of the halo of heavenly glory that surrounds the head of the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel. The same result follows from a comparison of the Johannine discourses with the Synoptic sayings of Jesus. Finally a comparison of the Synoptic Gospels in the matter of language, ordering of their material, etc., leads to the conclusion that Mark, the oldest Gospel, written shortly before the year 70, constitutes one of the two principal sources used by Matthew and Luke, the other being a discourse source (Q), of which Luke has preserved the original form better than Matthew whereas Matthew has kept the wording better than Luke. Besides these two sources other special sources were used. In Luke's case, however, this special source, including probably the Infancy-narrative, may have been simply an enlarged and worked over form of "Q". Matthew's special source diverges widely from Luke's, especially in the Infancy-narrative. It contained also a number of miraculous incidents which come probably from a popular tradition in which Peter played an important role.

Having set forth in general his view of the sources of the Synoptic Gospels, Dr. J. Weiss seeks to determine their different strata. This course is justified, he thinks, by the fact that the authors of the Gospels

were not the first to write Gospel history but had had predecessors. The material embodied in the Gospels had already passed through various stages, both oral and written. The whole of the Markan material was for forty years unwritten until Mark, shortly before the destruction of Jerusalem, gave it the fixed form of a Gospel. The discourse source (Q) was probably written earlier, certainly before 70. The only means of determining the historical value or trustworthiness of such material and of silencing the painful doubts that must arise in regard to the faithfulness of memories stretching over a period of forty years is not by ignoring the facts or by a pious belief that God would not permit damage to the report about Jesus, but simply by thorough historical investigation and criticism. The masters whom Dr. J. Weiss here follow are Strauss and Weizsäcker. In general he admits mythical elements in the Gospels but holds that the main features of the portraiture of Jesus and a large number of His words have been preserved faithfully. The process of separation required by the admission of mythical elements in the Gospels must take its starting point, according to Dr. J. Weiss, in the origin and development of the Gospel traditions up to the composition of our Gospels; for the history of the faith of early Christianity during the first fifty years of its existence is reflected in the Gospels.

The narrative element in the Gospels is determined, Dr. J. Weiss thinks, by the passion idea, the Gospels being primarily an exhibition of how the Son of God came to suffer and die. And, although this is presented mainly in the form of popular tradition of incidents or groups of incidents, its historical value is greatly increased by the fact that what is characteristic both of John the Baptist and of Jesus has been preserved. Moreover, a careful examination of this tradition reveals the Petrine origin of much that is contained in Mark and also to some extent in Matthew and Luke, where however much legendary matter has crept in—a characteristic which is true also of matter from other sources, much of which was motived unconsciously by Old Testament prophecy.

In connection with the discussion of demon possession Dr. J. Weiss states his attitude toward the miraculous elements in the Gospels. 'Even in Mark, but more so in the later Gospels, and most of all in John, we read the crassest and most inconceivable miracles of omnipotence; He (Jesus) walks on the water, multiplies loaves of bread, changes water into wine, and all without the slightest display of effort, as if (in His case) it could not have been otherwise. . . . We must either accept these with the naive faith of the early Church as miracles of omnipotence, or we must admit that the faith of the early Christians has falsely attributed (*angedichtet*) such extravagant (*überschwängliche*) things to a Saviour of whom they believed everything. This was done, however, not with the intention to deceive but in the unconscious play of popular fancy. Moreover, the piety of the ancient world saw miracles where we of to-day behold only nature's conformity to law; it counted on miracle—a really divine person must act by means

of miracle—whereas we find one of the highest revelations of God in just the eternal, unchangeable course of the world-order. This principle illumines the belief of the early Christians in the resurrection (and manifestly also of some modern scholars). The effect of this belief on the Gospels may be seen not only in the resurrection-narratives; like Old Testament prophecy it furnished the motive for the creation of Gospel material, in this case, the resurrections attributed to Jesus. Another motive operative in a similar manner was the Messianic theology, the effects of which may be seen in the temptation, the Davidic sonship of Jesus, the birth in Bethlehem, etc. (No mention is made however in this connection of Jensen's Gilgamesh motive): all of which leads to the conclusion, said to be painful, that our Gospels contain only in part clear and incontestible recollections of actual occurrences; in other respects they must be read not as historical sources but as witnesses to the faith and religious fancy of the early Church, of which they are so largely the production.

The following sections of the Introduction deal with the words of Jesus. The early Christians had little besides memory and hope. They were Jews and, even though not trained in the Rabbinical schools, they must have had retentive memories. Moreover, the teaching of Jesus was in such a form that it could readily be reproduced. The artistic completeness of the parables, the rhythm, the parallelism, the matter of His sayings must have lived in the memory of those who heard Him. There are indications, moreover, that the discourse source (Q) was committed to writing before the year 70. But what of Jesus' originality? Many of His sayings have parallels in Jewish literature. Jesus Himself shared the views of His time about the inspiration of the Old Testament, which He knew and used. Others drew from the same source and where there is similarity Jesus' originality does not suffer by the loss of priority. The report of Jesus' sayings, however, may have suffered not only by redactional alterations but also by additions from Jewish apocalyptic and prophetic writings such as Enoch, Ezra, etc., for these writings were held in high esteem by the early Christians along with the Old Testament and the words of Jesus. Additions of this kind to the words of Jesus are not easily detected because Jesus also attached Himself closely to the ancient prophecy. Consequently, a word attributed to Jesus need not necessarily be regarded as a later addition because of its connection with an Old Testament passage (p. 59) [although some such words are set aside by Dr. J. Weiss chiefly on this ground (p. 47)]. Thus the tradition of Jesus' words in the early Church was not only reproductive but also transforming and creative, reflecting in many instances the ideas of the Church and the conditions of her life (Mt xix. 17 cf. Mk x. 18), or the terms of Roman law (Mk. x. 12), or a spirit other than that of Jesus (Mt v. 21). Such a mixture may not be altogether pleasing to us; in fact, it may be very painful, but it has arisen, Dr. J. Weiss informs us, as an unavoidable accompanyment of God's plan to give His revelation to man not in bald objectivity, graven on tables of stone,

but through the living activity of a historical personality to simple and modest men.

After speaking of the artistic, poetical form of Jesus' teaching, especially in the parables, Dr. J. Weiss asks the question: Who is it that speaks thus? In answering this question Dr. J. Weiss calls attention to the fact that there are words attributed to Jesus which reveal His consciousness of a secret mission and of a peculiar relation to God. As the end draws near Jesus confesses in ever clearer manner that He feels Himself to be the fulfiller of His people's hopes, the Messiah, the Son of God. The secret character of these revelations produces the impression that the speaker is certain of His calling but that the manner in which this calling shall be accomplished is a secret even to Him; He can only do preparatory work, believe, hope and leave the future to God. The man who spoke thus must have existed, for who could have created such an ideal figure? Certainly not the spirit of the Church. Some moving, quickening power must be posited and the simplest hypothesis is that which sees back of these words a personality whose inner life is reflected in them in simple grandeur.

It will not be possible in this notice to give an account in detail of the exegetical work of this commentary. The review of the Introduction will have made sufficiently plain its principles and its point of view. Upon the adequacy of these its permanent value will depend; for however much the several authors may have endeavored to reproduce "without presuppositions" the effect produced on them by the New Testament, the effect as presented manifestly represents and is controlled by a definite point of view, a *Gesamtanschauung,* embodying certain principles of historical criticism by which both the matter and the form of the New Testament have been judged.

Lic. Rudolf Knopf writes on Acts and his work concludes the first volume. Of the second volume two *Lieferungen* have appeared. Dr. J. Weiss contributes the Introduction to the Pauline Epistles; Pastor Lic. Wilhelm Lueken writes on the Thessalonian Epistles; Dr. Wilhelm Bousset on Galatians and the Corinthian Epistles; and Dr. Adolf Jülicher on Romans (i-v).

Princeton. WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

PAUL THE APOSTLE, AS VIEWED BY A LAYMAN. By EDWARD H. HALL. Boston. 1906. Pp. 203.

One who believes heartily in the historicity of the New Testament may possibly be pardoned for suggesting that, from his point of view, a more appropriate title for this book would be *Paul the Impossible as Viewed by a Sceptic.* The chief purpose of the author seems to be the discrediting of the Acts and the Epistles. These documents are the sources from which he proposes to derive his information in relation to the Apostle; but he continually characterizes them as "untrustworthy", "mythical", "unedifying", "full of inconsistencies" and "startling contradictions", "fragmentary" and abounding in "palpable discrepancies".

With such worthless historical material at hand the writer is properly at liberty to construct a Paul of his own imagining: and it is just here that we are disappointed, for it would have been more to the writer's credit had he created for us something other than the pitiful, weak, illogical, vacillating, shadowy, character who is introduced to us as "The Missionary", "The Mystic", "The Theologian". It is rather too severe a strain upon the imagination of the reader to suppose that such an impossible Paul could have accomplished the work assigned to him in history. For most men it will be more simple to suppose that the author is mistaken and that the Bible contains at least a fair measure of truth.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

DER ZEUGNISZWECK DES EVANGELISTEN JOHANNES nach seinen eigenen Angaben dargestellt von LIC. THEOL. KONRAD MEYER. Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1906. pp. vi., 110.

In seeking to determine the purpose of the Fourth Gospel, Meyer has chosen a fruitful method of investigation, which, though obvious and simple enough, has too often been neglected. Instead of setting out from the contents of the Gospel as a whole, in order to determine from the character of the finished product the purpose that must have inspired its production, he carefully investigates first the direct information that the author gives as to his own plan, in order then to interpret the whole in the light of the information thus secured. This information is contained, Meyer believes, in a series of "specially Johannine" bits, inserted by the author of the whole Gospel at various points in the course of the narrative, which are somewhat different in language and thought from the rest of the Gospel, and with the First Epistle of John display a unity which permits of regarding their testimony as whole. The special insertions are i. 1-18; ii. 21ff.; iii. 16ff; (vii. 39); xi. 51f.; xii. 37-43; xix. 35-37; xx. 30f. These passages, then, with the important addition of the First Epistle, are regarded by Meyer as forming the source of direct information as to the purpose of the evangelist. "In these passages the author claims to make report as an eye-witness of the life and death of Jesus Christ, for the furtherance of faith." That the author claims to be an eye-witness is proved (1) by the distinction made in Jn. xix. 35 and 1 Jn. i. 3 between the writer and his readers, (2) by the fact that the right of "witnessing" about Christ is in the thought of the evangelist conditioned upon a personal experience of his human life (See especially Jn. xv. 27), (3) by the occurrence of ἐθεασάμεθα in Jn. i. 14, which verb in John is used only of literal, bodily sight, (4) by the absolutely unmistakable passage 1. Jn. i. 1-3. Since the writer of the Epistle is clearly identical with the writer of the Gospel, no interpretation of Jn. xix. 35 should be adopted which would separate the eye-witness there mentioned from the evangelist himself; for then one eye-witness would be found to appeal to another. Of course, it might be objected against Meyer that this

would not be quite an impossible proceeding; yet after all, if the evangelist is himself an eye-witness, there is no sufficient reason for finding a second eye-witness in xix. 35. This remains true whether or no Meyer is right in referring the ἐκεῖνος of xix. 35 to the glorified Christ. The second main division deals with the subject and occasion of the witnessing. The subject is Jesus "the Christ, the Son of God"; the occasion is the prevalence of false teaching which emanated from Judaism and from docetism. In the Gospel, the former source of error is more prominent; in the Epistle, the latter; but both forms of error are combatted in either writing. The Jewish and docetic errors as combatted in the Gospel, though not united in the same party, as at the time of the Ignatian epistles, are not so entirely separate as at first sight appears. Between faith in the man Jesus who through the Elias-baptism received the power of the Christ and faith in the man Jesus with whom in the baptism the Christ was united, the difference is formal rather than material; the transition would be a transition from pure Jewish to gnostic ideas (see p. 48). In the case of either form of error, the importance of the baptism is evident; hence the effort of the evangelist to correct an exaggerated idea of the importance of the Baptist may be explained without reference to any distinct sect of disciples of John. The third section describes the carrying out of the witness in the Gospel, under the familiar heads of the witness of the "signs", of Jesus Himself, of the Baptist, of Moses and the Scriptures, and of the Spirit. In the fourth section, which deals with "strengthening of faith as the purpose of the witnessing", the author takes occasion to distinguish his own view sharply from those of Baldensperg, Wrede and Wernle by emphasizing the subordinate character of the apologetic interests in the Gospel as over against the general purpose of witnessing. (See p. 92). The Gospel was intended for Christians; "it may, it is true, be called a writing 'born of the conflct', but it is a proclamation to the general's own camp, not a challenge to the enemy"; though such a proclamation does contain a defiance of the enemy (p. 103). In a short appendix, Meyer expresses the view that Chap. xxi. is a later addition written mainly for the purpose of exhibiting Peter as reinstated in his position of authority. Either the chapter is not to be attributed to the evangelist at all or at least vv. 1-23 were written under widely different circumstances from those which prevailed at the time the Gospel was composed.

In some of the details of his work Meyer has ventured upon very doubtful ground, yet he is suggestive and instructive even where he is not convincing. The progress of the argument is sometimes obscure, but the wealth of fruitful suggestions which the booklet affords will repay careful study. The general conclusion as to the purpose of the evangelist is thoroughly sane and reasonable, but has evidently been attained not by mere appropriation of the results of others but by independent thinking. Meyer has in a modest way made a genuine contribution to the discussion of the Johannine problem.

Princeton. J. Gresham Machen.

Des Paulus Brief an die Römer für höhere Schulen ausgelegt von Rudolf Niemann, Gymnasialprofessor in Waren i. M. Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1905. pp. iv., 127.

Des Paulus Epistel an die Römer. Abdruck der revidierten Übersetzung Luthers und Auslegung für Gymnasialprima von Rudolf Niemann, Gymnasialprofessor in Waren. (Schülerheft.) Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1905. pp. 51.

These two little books are addressed to the special needs of the higher classes in the German schools, but they might well attain a wider sphere of influence. Unfortunately, the Epistle to the Romans finds no regular place in the curriculum of our colleges; but careful teachers of Bible classes, either in college or elsewhere, might well receive useful suggestions, both for their own exegesis and for their pedagogical method, from the former of Niemann's commentaries. The "Schülerheft" seems too condensed; it is not quite clear why the fuller commentary could not be placed in the hands of students as well as of teachers.

Princeton. J. Gresham Machen.

Der vorchristliche Jesus, nebst weiteren Vorstudien zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Urchristentums. Mit einem Vorworte von P. W. Schmiedel. William Benjamin Smith. Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann (vormals J. Rickers Verlag). 1906. Pp. xix, 243.

This book is certainly unique in the circumstances of its origin. A professor of mathematics in Louisiana, who tells us that he was brought up as an orthodox Christian of the strictest sort, having entered the field of New Testament criticism, has published, in Germany and in the German language, with an introduction by a well-known German scholar, a book entitled *The Pre-Christian Jesus.*

The Introduction itself is somewhat remarkable. Professor Schmiedel intimates that he rejects the views of Smith *in toto,* and that, sooner or later, he shall seek to refute all his main positions (p. xi), and yet he regards it as the duty of every scientific theologian to read the book and to balance accounts with it (p. viii). For two reasons: first, because its theory is put forward again and again in varying forms (*e. g.,* Loman, Kalthoff, Robertson), and second, because of its "scientific method" (p. ix). The latter point he emphasises. But it is just here that the Introduction strikes one as remarkable—the conclusions of the book are not to be trusted, and yet its method is scientific! If a method is truly scientific throughout, scientific in its treatment of the sources whence data are derived as well as in the treatment of the data themselves, ought not the result to be worthy of confidence? If it is scientific merely in its handling of data, but unscientific in its gathering of the same, then surely it is unscientific in that which is most important. Assuming that Professor Schmiedel's view is correct, and that the results of our author's study are not to be trusted, then it strikes one that as a model of scientific discipline it is not to be recom-

mended to theologians. It is better to study scientific method in models that are truly scientific than in those which are only seemingly so.

I have dwelt on this point in the Introduction because it appears to me to be the most significant thing in the book. Grant its truth, and there are few persons who will think it worth while to study the "bold combinations" of the author. "Bold combinations" which have not had a good foundation have indeed brought fame to many a theologian, but they have not edified the Church.

But we will now dismiss the Introduction, and give the author himself a chance.

He tells us in his Preface that in the year 1904 the traces of a pre-Christian cult of Jesus which he had discovered had so increased that he decided to collect and arrange them. Again, that the essence of primitive Christianity is to be found in the combination "Jesus Christ". Each of these titles, he says, originally denoted a deity, not an earthly being. "Christ" was pre-eminently Jewish; "Jesus", at least half foreign, originated in the Dispersion. "Out of the marriage of the Semitic and Hellenic spirit, this grafting of the wild olive into the good, the giant form of primitive Christianity sprang."

Coming now to the book itself. It consists of five essays with extensive notes. The first of these essays—*The Pre-Christian Jesus*—gives its name to the volume.

The author's starting-point is the four-times repeated phrase "the things concerning Jesus" (Mk. v. 27; Lk. xxiv. 19; Acts xviii. 25; xxviii. 31). This phrase as found in Luke is said to be "extraordinarily strange". It is accordingly conjectured that Luke's source did not have it. Likewise in Mark it is thought to be an addition of the reviser. In Acts xxviii. 30-31 it is said to be plain that the phrase denotes a doctrine concerning Jesus, and in Acts xviii. 24-28, the most important passage of all, this meaning is "clear as the sun".

Apollos of Alexandria, for it is he of whom this passage speaks, taught "the things concerning Jesus", and yet knew only the baptism of John. "Therefore", says Professor Smith, "he had heard nothing of Jesus as a historical character. He knew nothing of the teacher, of his message, his career, his personality, his life, his death, his resurrection and ascension. For if he had known anything of it, he would have known all. These things form a unity in the Gospel; and if he had known but the least item of them, it could never have been said of him that he had known only the baptism of John." The "unavoidable conclusion" from these things is that the phrase originally denoted a doctrine concerning Jesus, a doctrine sufficiently definite and inspiring to be made the ground of zealous and extensive activity, a doctrine which apparently preceded the gospel history of the life and death of Jesus.

Having arrived at this "astounding and significant" inference the author asks whether it is confirmed by other data, and finds that it is. It is confirmed by the story of the twelve men whom Paul baptized in Ephesus. They occupied the standpoint of the Baptist. What Paul

added to their faith was not that "the coming one" had already come, but that "the coming one" was Jesus. More striking confirmation is then found in the story of Simon Magus. "It is incredible and impossible", says the author, "that so powerful a magician accepted Christian teaching and baptism unless there was a deep and mysterious relation between the faith of Philip and that of Simon. The natural, yea unavoidable, supposition is that the sermon of Philip marked an advance on that of Simon, which advance the latter magnanimously and even enthusiastically recognized in that he joined himself to Philip as a devoted follower."

A third incident in Acts which is supposed to confirm the author's inference in regard to a definite and inspiring pre-Christian doctrine concerning Jesus is the story of Elymas. His name "Bar-Jesus" was probably an appellative, and denoted the circle of men to which Elymas belonged. It probably marks him as "a promoter of the Jesus-cult" This probability becomes a certainty when it is considered that he is called a "false prophet"; for according to New Testament usage a false prophet is ever a proclaimer of Christianity, though he may be regarded as heterodox and perhaps as self-deceived.

A fourth confirmatory passage is the story of the seven sons of Sceva who exorcised demons. Suspicion is awakened by the number seven, and it is thought that these men were representatives of a pre-Christian form of faith, half friendly and half hostile to Paul.

Again, the "we"-passages of Acts, according to Professor Smith, concern missionaries who were quite independent of Paul, and only incidentally connected with him.

Then, further, it appears from Acts itself that its author knew nothing of the Christian propaganda; and since he was "a more or less careful comparative student" and had at hand a considerable amount of documentary sources, it appears that nothing of significance was then accessible.

Having thus established the ignorance of Luke and his times in regard to the origin of the Christian propaganda, the author says it is confirmatory of his hypothesis that the teaching of Jesus was pre-Christian, a cult of the Jews and especially the Hellenists, more or less secret.

In his concluding thoughts there are two points which are supposed to support his view. It appears from Hippolytus that the Naassenes, a Gnostic sect, celebrated Jesus as a divine being, and the hymn in which this celebration of Jesus is found goes back to "the remotest antiquity". And finally, the oldest preaching of the Gospel, as reported in Acts, shows that the name of Jesus was used as a charm, and that even before the crucifixion it had the magic powers of the divine name. "How was that possible unless the name and so the idea of Jesus had had a long history?"

Such, briefly, but I hope not indistinctly, is the course of Professor Smith's argument. To point out in detail the weakness of the supposed evidence would quite transcend our limits. While recognizing the remarkable cleverness of the argument, I am unable to discover a single

link in it which has any historical and demonstrative value whatever. Consider for a moment the passage which the author regards as most important of all, viz., the story of Apollos. He taught the things concerning Jesus, and yet knew only the baptism of John. It is inferred from this with the utmost confidence that he knew nothing of Jesus as a historical character. If he had been at all acquainted with his career, says our author, it could never have been said of him that he knew only the baptism of John. I doubt whether one careful reader out of a hundred will admit that this inference is justifiable. What does it mean that Apollos knew "only the baptism of John"? Professor Smith does not enlighten us on this point. But it is plain what the author of Acts meant by it; he meant the baptism of repentance in contrast to the baptism with the Spirit (see Acts xix. 1-7). Now it is perfectly evident that one might know about the life and teaching of Jesus and yet not know of this baptism, for such baptism is not mentioned in His teaching.

The statement that a powerful magician like Simon would not have accepted Christianity had there not been a deep mysterious kinship between it and his own faith is simply a begging of the question. The idea that the name "Bar-Jesus" probably marks Elymas as a "promoter of the Jesus-cult" reminds one of the sovereign manner in which Philo deduced from the etymology of proper names whatsoever he pleased. Granted that the number "seven" in the story of the Ephesian exorcists is suspicious, it surely gives no color to the view that they were representatives of a pre-Christian form of faith. To regard the Diary of Acts as belonging to missionaries quite independent of Paul—missionaries of the pre-Christian doctrine of Jesus—is to cut loose from that which has at least the appearance of historical credibility and to embark on a sea of conjectures whose sole merit is their novelty. The proof that Luke knew nothing of the origin of the Christian movement amounts at last to this, that because some things in his writings are not historical, therefore nothing in them is historical. For the statement that the Naassene hymn given in Hippolytus contains pre-Christian thought no shred of evidence has been adduced. The reference to Harnack in this connection is quite misleading; for there is nothing in his statement to suggest that he regards the hymn or its essential thought as pre-Christian. The declaration that the oldest preaching of the Gospel proves the pre-Christian existence of the Jesus-cult because in that preaching much prominence is given to the *name* of Jesus forms an appropriate culmination of the author's argument. Even if it were granted that the name was used as a charm—which is not made probable by the author—it would by no means follow that it must have been thus used in pre-Christian times.

In conclusion, I revert to Professor Schmiedel's Introduction. One is not surprised that he intimates a complete rejection of the hypothesis, but it will be a matter of surprise if he asks theologians to follow him in any very elaborate refutation of it. We may well emulate Professor Smith's zeal in seeking light on all problems connected with the origin of our Christian faith. We need not fear hypotheses, but conclusions

of transcendent importance must be preceded by premises of unquestionable validity.

Northampton, Mass. GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT.

A GRAMMAR OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. By JAMES HOPE MOULTON. Vol. I., Prolegomena. Second Edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1906. Pp. xx., 284. (First Edition, December 1905.)

It is not often a book marks a new departure in both form and contents at the same time, yet such seems to be the achievement of Dr. Moulton in his new grammar of New Testament Greek. The subject is a notoriously dry and musty one, yet these adjectives can no longer apply to a work which is written in a most attractive narrative style, and whose pages are now and then enlivened by a quiet but fascinating humor. "Maid of all work" is surely a very unconventional but expressive characterization for an over-used preposition (p. 103), and "I suppose you haven't got . . . on you, have you?" (p. 170) to say the least a suggestive illustration, while the quiet thrust at Professor Schmiedel is not less telling because couched in humorous form. He is referred to as having been "unfortunately called away from grammar by the *b'ne Jerahmeel* to perform a postmortem examination upon the Gospel history" (p. xii, cf. also p. 48)!

But we do not go to a book such as Dr. Moulton's for humor and rhetoric, welcome though they may be. Our quest is the hard facts of the science of grammar, and we are not disappointed. The material is as noteworthy as its treatment and form, and we need not hesitate a moment to call the work epoch-making.

Few men have been fitted for their task as has Doctor Moulton. Chosen from boyhood by his father, Rev. W. F. Moulton, D.D., the English translator and editor of Winer's *Grammar of the New Testament,* to be his successor and reviser, he first made a specialty of the study and teaching of the classics and comparative philology, as Fellow of King's College and as Senior Classical Master in the Leys School at Cambridge. He was also author of an *Introduction to the Study of New Testament Greek* (London, 1895), and *Two Lectures on the Science of Language* (Cambridge, 1903). More recently he has been Tutor in New Testament Language and Literature in Didsbury Theological College, Manchester, and with the New Testament idiom constantly in mind has made a minute and extended study of the Papyri and other remains of later Greek.

Some of the results of his investigations have been published in the *Classical Review* (xv, pp. 31ff., 434ff.; xviii 106ff., 151ff.) and in the *Expositor* (Series VI, Vols vii to x). In the present volume, however, we have a fuller and more organized presentation of the data he has gathered, as well as a summary of the results reached by other investigators in this till recently sorely neglected field of contemporary and later Greek—notably of Professor Albert Thumb of Marburg. Accurately speaking, this book is but the prolegomena to a still more organ-

ized and exhaustive second volume, which is to provide "a succinct and systematic grammar of Hellenistic Greek" (p. x of preface to the first Edn.).

A few representative examples of his results, and their significance for the study of the New Testament cannot fail to be of interest to every student of that volume.

i. In the whole conception of the character of *the language of the New Testament* itself we have a most striking departure from the views of the older grammarians. Even the most recent author of a New Testament grammar, the late Professor Friedrich Blass of Halle, who to a degree shared the older views, comes in for some sharp criticism in this regard (pp. 73, 75, 81, 94, 209). Doctor Moulton believes Hellenistic Greek can no longer be regarded as "Jewish-Greek". "The Papyri have finally destroyed the figment of a New Testament Greek which in any material respect differed from that spoken by ordinary people in daily life throughout the Roman world" (p. 18). Thus the view of the pioneer in this field of investigation, Professor Adolf Deissmann of Heidelberg (*Bibelstudien,* Marburg, 1895 and 1897, etc., and especially *New Light on the New Testament,* Edinburgh, 1907, and "The Philology of the Greek Bible: Its Present and Future", in the *Expositor* for Oct. and Nov. 1907) is vigorously defended and in our opinion amply established. Protests against this position, however, are not lacking from reliable authorities, as for example: F. C. Conybeare and St. G. Stock (*Selections from the LXX,* p. 22, Boston, 1905), Eberhard Nestle (*Zeitschrift für Nt. Wissenschaft,* pp. 297f., 1906), and quite emphatically Professor H. B. Swete (*The Apocalypse of St. John,* p. cxx, London, 1906).

ii. Much new light is thrown upon the field of *Textual Criticism,* Dr. Moulton shows, by a study of the grammar of later Greek as represented by the Papyri, etc.

(1) It is most significant, for example, that for the scribes of even our earliest manuscript, the pronunciation of αι and ε, ει (ῃ) and ι, οι and ι, ο and ω was identical (p. 34f). "Therefore we cannot regard our best Mss. as decisive on such questions" (p. 35).

(2) The orthographic peculiarities in the New Testament uncials, it is shown, may be of the greatest value in fixing the provenance of the Mss., and thus supply criteria for localizing the various textual types (pp. 41 and 244).

(3) Striking confirmation of the text of the great uncials is presented through testing them as to whether or not their scribes conformed the text to the popular grammatical style of their day (Chapter iii). We might also inquire further in this connection whether such a study of the grammatical peculiarities of the ℵ B Text might not throw light on the problem as to whether it is itself a revision of the Western Text.

iii. In recent years the argument from language when based on vocabulary, hapax-legomena, etc., has come to be everywhere looked upon with considerable suspicion in Literary Criticism. More signifi-

cance has been accorded perhaps to the "form-words" (the particles, etc.), which, it is claimed, betray the real author. But now Prof. Thumb, and here Dr. Moulton shows that the grammar of a writing is a still more trustworthy test of authorship and of locality of origin.

(1) For example, the use ἐμός instead of μου in the Fourth Gospel points toward Asia Minor (*Th. Literaturzeitung,* 1903, p. 421), though other linguistic evidence is contradictory (Moulton, p. 40).

(2) The grammatical peculiarities of Revelation point to an author of limited culture and education. If its date was 95 A. D. the same author cannot have written the Fourth Gospel only a short time thereafter. Either we must take the earlier date for Revelation, and suppose some one mended the author's grammar throughout the Gospel, or we must deny the unity of their authorship (pp. 9f., 90).

(3) The marked uniformity in the use of τοῦ with the infinitive in the "we" document, the Gospel of Luke and the remainder of Acts points strongly toward their all being by the same author (p. 217, cf. p. 48 and Harnack's argument in *Lukas der Arzt,* chapter ii, Leipzig, 1906).

(4) Contributions are also made toward the solution of the Synoptic problem—*e. g.* the treatment of Mark by Matthew and Luke (pp. 104, 124, 159, 191).

iv. Any detailed exhibition of the results of Dr. Moulton's investigations for *exegesis proper* would require the reprinting of his entire book. Probably the most far-reaching result which has come from a study of the Papyri, etc., however, is an evident blurring of many of the finer distinctions characteristic of classical Greek. This principle (which of course must be carefully guarded in application) effectually disposes of many refinements in exegesis which have served to bolster up more than one favorite doctrine or literary hypothesis. Among the many examples which might be cited we may notice:

(1) A weakening of the distinction between εἰς and ἐν. How much controversy over the mode of baptism has turned on this distinction? And Professor Moulton says "It is impossible to see in John 1: 18 (ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον) the combination . . . of rest and motion, of a continuous relation with a realization of it", as Westcott held (p. 234, cf. pp. 63 and 66). Similarly, between περί and ὑπέρ (p. 105).

(2) A laying to rest—we trust forever—notwithstanding Dr. E. A. Abbott's *Johannine Grammar,* of Meyer's objections to ἵνα ἐκβατικόν. The modern Greek να' with the subjunctive = the old infinitive, has settled the question (pp. 205ff., 249). Similarly as to τοῦ, πρὸς τό and εἰς τό with the infinitive (pp. 217ff.).

(3) Dr. Moulton claims it is impossible to assert in places outside of the free Greek of Paul that οὐ μή bears any special emphasis (p. 189, cf. *Am. Jour. Phil.* xviii, pp. 453ff.).

(4) He somewhat sarcastically points out the impossibility of differentiating documents on the basis of such heteroclisis as Λύστραν and Λύστροις in Acts 14: 6 and 8, as Clemen and Jüngst maintain (p. 48).

Any detailed criticism of Dr. Moulton's book would be inappropriate. The volume before us is not intended to be a detailed and exhaustive grammar, but a *prolegomena*, though its admirable indices make it already a most useful, indeed indispensable, work in this very capacity. Nevertheless, we think that perhaps Dr. Moulton would have more completely surveyed the field in these preliminary remarks—and it may be also in the detailed presentation of his results—if he had included also (*e. g.* p. 23) among the materials for present day study of the Greek of the New Testament those additional ones indicated and summarized by Professor Thumb in his reviews "Die Forschungen über die hellenistische Sprache in den Jahren 1896-1901; 1902-4," in the *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* II, 396ff., and III 443ff., viz.:

(1) Greek elements preserved in the Latin, Gothic and Oriental languages. Numerous contributions to this field are at hand. For example Krauss, *Griechische und lateinische Lehnwörter im Talmud,* etc., Berlin, 1898-99; Schlatter, *Verkanntes Griechisch,* Gütersloh, 1900; von Lemm, *Kleine koptische Studien,* St. Petersburg, 1900; Thumb, "Die griechischen Elemente des Armenischen", *Bzz. Zschr.* ix. (1900), 388f., etc.

(2) The Atticising Grammarians. It is true Schmid's *Atticismus, u. s. w.* is utilized, but considerable has been done on the individual atticising writers, *e. g.* in the monographs of Chabert, Fritz, Fritsch, Galante, etc.

(3) Graeco-Latin grammatical manuals or Hermeneumata (cf. Thumb, *Indogermanische Forschungen,* vi. pp. 231f., *Archiv. für papyrus Forschung,* ii. pp. 404f.).

We cannot help also hazarding just one query regarding a matter of detail. Is it true that no perfective compound of δύνω is found in the New Testament, as stated on p. 117? Surely ἀπεκδυσάμενοι (Col. iii. 9) is perfective, and means "having put off *utterly*". Col. ii. 15 may be similar but is not so clear.

In conclusion we can, perhaps, commend the work no more highly than by quoting the words of Professor Thumb himself, who said to a pupil on the appearance of the first edition, "We have nothing to equal it in German". That from the greatest German authority is significant.

McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago. SAMUEL DICKEY.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

DE LEER VAN DEN PERSOON EN HET WERK VAN CHRISTUS BIJ TERTULLIANUS. Academisch proefschrift ter verkrijging van den graad van Doctor in de H. Godgeleerdheid aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, op gazag van den Rector-Magnificus Dr. F. L. Rutgers, Hoogleeraar in de Faculteit der Godgeleerdheid, in het openbaar te verdedigen op Vrijdag 15 Juni, 1906, des mamiddags te 2 uur,

in het Gebouw van de Maatschappij voor den Werkenden Stand, door JOHANNES J. JANSEN, geboren te Longerhou, dienaar des Woorde bij de Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk te Whitinsville, Mass., U. S. of A. Kampen: J. H. Kok. 1906. 8vo., pp. 173.

The subject which Dr. Jansen deals with in this dissertation is one of very great interest, and he treats it with prudence and care. After a brief but excellently worked out Introduction (pp. 1-19), in which he gives some account of Tertullian himself, he surveys in four chapters the arguments of the chief writings of Tertullian in which he has given expression to his views of the person and work of Christ (pp. 20-106); and then in two concluding chapters sums up the results of the survey (pp. 107-165).

On the most mooted point in Tertullian's Christology—the eternity of the personal distinctness of the Logos—Dr. Jansen takes his stand with those who think Tertullian remained bound in the prolation-theology of the Logos-speculation. He writes (p. 132): "It is plain that Tertullian places the Son beneath God. He makes the Son subject to the Father. His birth and His creation make the Son less than God, who begot and created Him. The purpose for which Wisdom, that is, the Son, was created, was the creation of the world. . . . He did not know how clearly enough to distinguish and to hold apart the ontological and the cosmological in the Trinity. The Son was with him a sort of intermediate being. God, of course, but yet standing below God. As much below as one who is born and created stands below Him who is not born and not created. It is in Athanasius that the mixture of the ontological and cosmological is first of all excluded. The trinity with him is an eternal one. And Augustine goes further than Athanasius." Again (p. 138): "Still connected with this there remained in Tertullian subordinationism or inferiorism. The description of the origin of the Word, the second Person in the Holy Trinity, throws into clearness what Tertullian elsewhere says in so many words: *fuit tempus cum filius non fuit* (Herm. 3). And Tertullian does not merely speak of the Son as created and brought into being by the Father, and thus as not from eternity; in still another aspect he works out and emphasises that the Father is greater than the Son. Jesus Himself said once, 'The Father is greater than I' (Jno. 14. 28). Father and Son are distinguished in this respect,—that the Father is invisible and the Son visible. The Son has appeared, has revealed Himself—the Father, not. . . . "

The work of the Mediator as conceived by Tertullian Dr. Jansen presents under the scheme of the three-fold office. "The work of Christ, in Tertullian", he remarks, "appears as a three-fold task: law-giving, offering, and ruling: this threefold activity corresponds to the three-fold office of prophet, priest and king: Tertullian calls Christ *novae legis lator, sacrificiorum aeternum antistes, regni aeterni aeternus dominator* (adv. Jud. 6)" (p. 148). It can scarcely be contended, however, that Tertullian's thought of the work of Christ organized itself con-

sciously to him in this *schema*. And this leads us to indicate the chief fault we have to find with Dr. Jansen's dissertation. It is somewhat lacking in perspective. Tertullian's views are very carefully drawn out, but they are set out by themselves and not in their historical relations. We look at them as we look at a mosaic, in the flat: and in a mosaic of Dr. Jansen's making. We do not see them as a stage in a historical development, but only as they are in themselves. And we do not see them in the connection in which they stood in Tertullian's own mind, but as isolated entities contemplated by the expounder. We learn from them therefore only certain items of Tertullian's opinions; we do not learn Tertullian's mind.

Princeton, August, 1906. B. B. Warfield.

Bouwstoffen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederduitsch-Gereformeerde Kerken in Zuid Afrika, door C. Spoelstra V.D.M. Deel I, Afdeeling I. Brieven van de Kaapsche Kerken, hoofdzakelyk aan de Classis Amsterdam. (1655-1804). Amsterdam en Kaapstad. Hollandsch-Afrikaansche-Uitgevers-Maatschappy v/h Jacques Dusseau & Co. 1906. Large 8vo., pp. 631.

This large volume is a unique departure from ordinary attempts at writing Church-history, in a special sense. No history can be satisfactorily written without a thorough and extensive study of the sources. But ordinarily the historian keeps these sources from the view of his readers or merely indicates them in his bibliography or in his notes. The author of this volume, however, was compelled by his specific aim, as indicated in the introduction, to carry his workshop in the open and to allow his readers to verify and control his statements of fact, by the sources themselves.

Years of patient and unremitting toil, both in Holland and in S. Africa, were devoted to patient research and collection. Many of the priceless documents, he found, were poorly guarded or so completely buried under other materials that humanly speaking no other man would be able to find his way in the labyrinth, which he had traversed, with such endless trouble. The task grew as it proceeded and he finally decided to publish all his sources, before he came to his real task, the writing of the history of the S. African Church. And for this every lover of Church-history will heartily thank him. For his patient research has unearthed a mass of material, of the existence of which no one dreamed and which henceforth will be accessible to every investigator. Had the author limited himself to the publication of these documents, his work would have been a great one. If he succeeds in writing a truly readable history of the Church of S. Africa, he will greatly add to our debt of obligation. And the flashes of originality and lucid statement, which appear here and there, in the present volume give us assurance in our expectation.

The volume before us, of more than 600 great octavo pages, confines itself to the publication of the "Letters of the Cape-Churches, princi-

pally to the Classis of Amsterdam". For the churches, founded by the E. and W. Indian Companies, were under the care of this Classis (Presbytery) and continually reported on the state and progress of things. Originally the Cape-churches did not keep copy of their letters; this practice was only inaugurated in 1708, but from that time till June 2, 1795, it was persistently followed. As the original documents were in some instances lost, these copies were of material assistance to our author. Moreover, the "Deputati ad res Indicas" carefully excerpted the letters they received, so that even in case of the loss of both original and copy, traces of the correspondence still remain. These extracts are separately published by the author. In the lengthy introduction, the author's aims are defined and the publication of all these documents is justified by a description of the *importance of his researches, their progress* and *results*. Here also we are informed, in a very full bibliography, what efforts have been made in the direction of writing on the history of the Indian Churches, E. and W.

The researches of Rev. Spoelstra extended from May 1896 practically till the date of publication of this volume and have been costly, tiresome and painstaking. The result is the present work, which will be followed by a similar volume, containing the letters of the Classis of Amsterdam to the Cape-churches and various other documents. Then as a third volume the history proper will appear.

The letters of this first volume are singularly interesting, full of surprises, of glimpses of real human life, with its light and shadow, in the Dutch colonies; and these letters cast a singular light on many things, which seemed incomprehensible to us before, in the genetic history of the Cape-churches. Our author, of course, writes in Dutch and the documents published are almost altogether in that language, thus barring out many who, in England and America, would like to study the history of the South-African Church.

Louisville, Ky. HENRY E. DOSKER.

THE LIFE OF SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS. By J. E. HODDER WILLIAMS. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York City. Crown Octavo. Illustrated. 356 pages. $1.25 net.

This fascinating volume tells how a farmer boy from the Lorna Doone country, gifted with "Exmoor toughness", with untiring energy and Christian faith, became the organizer of one of the mightiest movements of the modern world: "How he became a great Merchant Knight" and how through his eighty-four years he remained "Young in spirit and mighty in power". This biography of the founder of the Young Men's Christian Association, written by his grand-son, is the "life of a man who was always young, written by a young man for young men", yet it will be read with profit and interest not only by young men or by those interested in young men, but by all who enjoy a romance in real life, and especially by those who would have an intelligent acquaintance with the religious history of the past century or who are concerned with the developing agencies of the Christian church.

To those engaged in Christian work, the book will naturally be of chiefest interest, and it will reveal the fact that Sir George Williams was not merely the founder of the Young Men's Christian Association, but through all his life the inspiring genius. "He was no mere figure-head, but a force whose influence was felt throughout all the ramifications of the work." Nor was this due to the accident of circumstances, but to an intelligent act of definite dedication on the part of one who at the age of twenty-six solemnly "determined to give his life for the prosperity of the Association", which had originated three years before in a prayer meeting, held in his own room; and when the fifty years of its growth were celebrated by a jubilee gathering, it was the largest delegated religious convention ever held in the British Isles, and the occasion partook of the nature of an ovation to the man to whom the development of the work was in largest measure due. The movement then represented five thousand associations and one-half million of members, and its influence was felt among all classes and in all countries of the world.

Yet this book is not intended to be a full or formal history of the Young Men's Christian Association. It is the life story of a man rather than of an institution, and the work is mentioned only as it was influenced by the central figure. Here is the picture of the "Ideal Christian Layman of his generation"; a merchant who had amassed a fortune by industry and integrity: a philanthropist whose benefactions amounted to much more than half his income: a Christian who devoted his life to the spiritual welfare of young men. It is not strange, that knighthood was conferred upon him by the queen; that the freedom of the city was presented to him by the London council; and that at last his body was given a resting place in the Cathedral of St. Paul. Nor will it be more than natural that his influence and memory, already assured by the work he established, will be broadened and brightened by this biography, the literary excellence and permanent value of which entitle it to a high place among the memoirs of Christian heroes.

Princeton. CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE ANCESTRY OF OUR ENGLISH BIBLE. By IRA MAURICE PRICE, Ph.D., Professor of the Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago. Pp. xxiv., 330. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. 1907. $1.50 net.

A telling title is half the battle, so some bookmen maintain. If they be right then for this book the battle for popular recognition is half won, and without the reading of a line of its contents. *"The Ancestry* of Our English Bible." How much better this than "The History" or "The Story of the English Bible" or than any one of the other familiar titles by which similar volumes are known. This title goes straight to the heart of the subject in hand. It emphasizes the all important fact that the Bible, even in our translation, is a *living* book, and being a *living* book must have sprung from both Divine and human parentage. It asserts that our Bible is the very Word of God committed to writing

by holy men who wrote as they were inspired of God. Unless this title means this it means nothing when used in these associations. Unless this title means this it is a misnomer. Such being the case the author might well have begun his preface with a sentence or two refering to the ancestry of our Bible on the Divine side before speaking as he does of its ancestry on the human side. He could thus have justified the use of the title without entering upon any discussion of Inspiration and would have introduced his readers to the subject to be considered with fuller knowledge on their part and better grace on his part.

The favorable impression made by the title of this book is fully supported by its contents. A page of the American Standard Revised Version is placed before the reader and attention is called to the marginal readings. These are classified and each class illustrated by numerous examples. The immediate and natural question of the reader is, "why and whence these variant readings"? The answer is given in the succeeding chapters, which discuss first for the Old Testament, and then for the New, the sources of the text upon which our latest translation is based, and how the manuscripts and versions are used to eliminate scribal errors and obtain "almost the polished shaft of the original." These sources are presented in connection with the various versions. Some portion of each chapter descriptive of a version is devoted to a description of its principal manuscripts, while a statement of the historical background is given where it will add vividness and stimulate interest. The volume closes with accounts of the principal English versions of the Bible in which particular attention is given to the historical significance and connections of these monumental works. Over forty well selected illustrations inserted at suitable places add to the value of the book, and the introduction of photographs of some of the great translators and textual critics is worthy of note. A comprehensive bibliography and valuable chronological table and two excellent indexes, one topical and one scriptural, complete the volume.

This book is a clear, concise and comprehensive compendium. Except for advanced students, it will be of more service as a reference book than as a text book. Every teacher, however, who expects to present in a popular form the subjects contained in it will find it invaluable as a companion volume to some smaller work for class room use. And every student who has studied a smaller treatise will find his field of vision and his fund of fact greatly enlarged by consulting this well written and well printed book.

Princeton LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE DIVINER IMMANENCE. By FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1906. 12mo., pp. 159.

This is a book, if not exactly for, yet certainly out of the times. The author appears to be passing his intellectual life in a circle the shibboleth of which is "the divine immanence". He has been plagued with the application of this formula to every sphere of thought, and that in its pantheising sense. The sense, that is, in which God is conceived as so completely in all things that all things are just God,—a system of God's present working. So that nature in each of its spheres—physical, mental, moral—and in all its phases is but an actual and immediate deed of God, and we may see God in all that occurs manifested in one or another aspect of His (to us) multiform Being. Against this pantheistic obliteration of distinctions, the author healthily revolts, and writes this book from the standpoint of a convinced disciple of the philosophy of the "divine immanence", indeed, but with a view to rescuing the obvious distinctions observable in the phases of nature and life. His purpose thus becomes to vindicate the compatibility of the doctrine of the divine immanence with a belief in a diviner immanence still,—with a belief in higher kinds of nearness than the physical immanence postulated by this philosophy, and even in varying degrees of this nearness. At bottom the book is thus a defence of the theistic conception of the universe and of the personality of God and his personal, that is purposive, modes of action; while in form it is an attempt to defend the validity of certain Christian conceptions, rooted in this theistic view of the world, and thus to justify believers in "the divine immanence" in remaining distinctively Christian in their thought.

To one imbued with the formative ideas of the Reformed theology, the whole recent movement to validate the conception of the "divine immanence", with the accompanying attempts (like Mr. McConnell's) to curb it within reasonable bounds, has its deep and not unpathetic interest. It can but seem to him an effort, more or less imperfectly informed, to recover the Reformed doctrine of *concursus;* and all that is good in it appears to him to be better expressed and better guarded in the Reformed doctrine of *concursus.* Nothing could be more startling to him than to hear its protagonists proclaiming, as they ceaselessly do, that the conceptions of God in His relations to His universe, current before, and outside, their movement, were stained with, or sunk in, Deistic modes of thought. It has not been so in the circles with which he is familiar; and he cannot help wondering if even so simple a task as the reading of some good old seventeenth century Reformed divine,—say Voetius or even Turrettine,—or even of any of their spiritual successors of the nineteenth century, would not have saved these thinkers not only from such assertions but from much of the crudities of their suggestions. What Mr. McConnell will appear to a Reformed thinker to be striving after will inevitably be the recovery of the Reformed doctrine of *concursus* as over against the pantheising tendencies which have accompanied the preaching of "the immanence" of God. Mr. McConnell seems, indeed, half to suspect this himself when (p. 143) he thinks of "the old doctrine of predestination" while he is discussing the doctrine of providence, and, admitting that there was "much good in

that old doctrine" (though it was "intolerable in its total effect"), claims all that was good in it for himself. "Predestination," however, is not at this point in question: he that believes in "providence" will necessarily believe in "predestination", as indeed Mr. McConnell in the immediate context acknowledges, when he asserts that "anything which happens to us is intended". The point in question is whether God is concerned in these "happenings", and how He is concerned in them: and Mr. McConnell will find the great fact for which he here enters the lists that "all God's dealings with men" are "special providences", that "God sends everything that happens to us",—yes, that God as the *causa causarum* is active in all that occurs,—fully and warily worked out in the Reformed doctrine of *concursus,* with careful guarding of the rights of both God and man.

There are some things in his own construction, no doubt,—even some things which he makes of primary importance—which Mr. McConnell will not find in the Reformed doctrine of *concursus;* though he may find something like them in the form given to the general doctrine of *concursus* by thinkers of another type, say, for instance, by Thomas Aquinas. We refer particularly to the portentous emphasis which Mr. McConnell (doubtless out of his Arminian inheritances) throws on the limitations of God, especially His limitation by the freedom of man. He will find nothing of limitations in or of God in the Reformed doctrine. That doctrine knows how to conceive God as without responsibility for human guilt and yet as not subject to human domination—and it would be well for Mr. McConnell to learn of it that he may avoid speaking of God as standing helpless before man and acting only when and as He may be permitted by man to act. Having so learned, such phrases as that God "cannot move until we move" will appear as offensive to him as they do to us: and the whole construction will fall away by which he holds God responsible for human sin to the extent at least that because of His implication with it He owes man redemption. "God has bestowed upon man the unsolicited boon of freedom—an awful gift—and He is thereby under moral necessity to go to extremes to warn men from the evil which thus becomes almost inevitable" (p. 96). "God has sent forth men into a terrible universe without consulting them and has thrust into their hands the awful boon of freedom. He is thus under enormous moral obligation. He need not have created men, but having created them He cannot discharge His moral bonds to them and to Himself short of Calvary. . . . It is hard to see how a moral Creator could have peace of conscience without sharing the death made necessary by the moral imperfection flowing from the unsolicited gift of freedom" (p. 110). "The cross shows us a Father under moral obligation to exert every moral influence for the moral salvation of His children" (p. 111). If such deliverances are to be taken seriously, they mean that sin is rooted in freedom by an "almost inevitable" necessity: and that God in making man free obligated Himself thereby by the most tremendous obligation to save man from the results of his freedom. Nevertheless, we are taught that God did not save man from this misuse of His freedom, nor could He;

and that God has not rescued man as man from the results of this misuse of his freedom, nor indeed can He; but that He must rather wait at every step on the initiative of that very human freedom before He can act at all! "It may be that God has conditioned Himself by our freedom. It may be that He can do what He desires for us only as we remove the limitation upon Him by our own attitude" (p. 151 and often to the same effect). If Mr. McConnell can find a theodicy in that pathway, he is welcome to it. For ourselves we prefer to believe in a God who can, rather than in one who can not: and we comfort ourselves with Mr. McConnell's own words: "We must not forget that plan covers the entire expanse, and that too short a view is sure to keep us from seeing the truth as God sees it" (p. 73). If plan covers "the entire expanse", it embraces the freedom of man and all its issues, and will reach its end by means of that freedom and its issues: and if we must avoid "too short a view", we can not consent to embrace less than eternity in this plan.

We have no intention, however, of entering into the details of Mr. McConnell's theology. It is Arminian, but it is a new Arminianism, deeply colored by the conceptions derived from the doctrine of the divine immanence. Perhaps the Christology is the most interesting portion of it here outlined. He has no sympathy whatever with the old orthodoxy "which made Christ a sort of masked God"—"acting a farce". Some sympathy moves him for "the splendid conception" of the new pantheism, which conceives that in Jesus God has "taken a human organism and filled it with His own thought": but he rejects this view too. For himself he believes that God from all eternity must have contemplated over against Himself a personal Other, and that in time He gave this Other, by an impoverishment wrought "by withholding from Him His accustomed powers, through Incarnation" for the redemption of men. This strong Kenotism works back with him, however, to God Himself: and it is in this impoverishment of the Father that we are especially interested. In it God the Father Himself comes to us in His Son, suffering for the sake of men. Thus God, on the Cross, satisfies His own conscience, "His own self-respect"—His obligations to men; reveals His righteousness in exerting "every moral influence for the moral salvation of His children"; expresses His love. The exposition is too brief to be complete: and we do not press, therefore, the omissions—of any clear relating of the cross to human guilt, of the sacrifice to the expiation of sin and the propitiation of God. But there seems to be no clear consciousness of these things—the primary things in the Scriptural representation—underlying what exposition we have. And Mr. McConnell does not write as if he were unable to suggest his full meaning.

Princeton, June, 1906. B. B. Warfield.

On Life after Death. From the German of Gustav Theodor Fechner. By Dr. Hugo Wernekke, Head Master of Weimar Realgymnasium. A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1906. 16mo.; pp. 134.

THE REDEEMED LIFE AFTER DEATH. By CHARLES CUTHBERT HALL. New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. [1905.] 16mo., pp. 58.

Here are two devout speculations as to life after death, one by a philosophical thinker of real though erratic power, the other by a highly placed Christian teacher. Both base upon the Christian tradition, but neither finds its real authority in the Christian Scriptures. Each leaves us with no further assurance of the life after death than may be derived from the common thought of men reinforced by the expressed conviction of the writer.

Fechner's little book has won to itself a certain fame, not undeserved by the richness of its fancy and the concinnity of its development of a thesis in itself bizarre enough. It witnesses at least to the strength of the author's conviction of human immortality and to the nobility of his anticipations for the future for the human spirit. It is filled also with finely conceived remarks, the fruit of Fechner's profound studies in psychophysics and allied topics. One would, for example, read a much longer treatise than this, to light upon such a remark as the following: "What does the anatomist see in a man's brain? It is to him a labyrinth of whitish filaments, the meaning of which he cannot read. And what does the brain see in itself? A world of light, and sound, and thoughts, asociations, fancies, emotions of love and hatred" (p. 93). The whole refutation of materialism is latent in those few words.

Dr. Hall's meditation is much less ambitious than Fechner's and much less suggestive. A single passage of it recalls Fechner's manner: "The present life is the eternal life, seen for the time being through the mode of the physical. Death is the suspension of relations with the physical universe. Life, which was eternal here, goes on, undeterred and undissolved by the suspension of these physical relations. This is the power of an endless, an indissoluble life—a life that cannot be dissolved. The mode of existence may change; relations may be suspended; mourners may go about the streets; the dust may return to the earth as it was; but the spirit which came out from God, which is akin to God, returns to God, Who gave it: lives with God." That might almost have been found in Fechner. Ordinarily, however, Dr. Hall does not let his plummet down so deep. We are a little puzzled to know what he means when he remarks that if belief in the continuation of life after death were peculiar to Christianity, "its authority . . . might be much less than it is" (p. 11). What is the seat of authority in Christianity? Again we are puzzled when we read the list of debated topics concerning the future life "upon which it is beyond the power of man to pronounce a final decision". This list includes not merely "the fate of the ignorant, the destiny of religious souls outside of Christendom", but also "the salvation of infants" and even "the doom of those who never repent", and the "judgment of mankind" (p. 22). Surely Dr. Hall does not hold *all* these to be insoluble problems. One is reassured to learn that there are "glorious articles

of belief coming down to us unbroken from Christ" which Dr. Hall commends to us, apparently on that ground, as assured, viz., these three: "the continuance of personal identity; the progress of the soul; the resurrection of the body" (p. 45). The line of division drawn between the two classes of topics seems arbitrary: but we are thankful the class of verities still has a content.

Princeton, May, 1906. B. B. Warfield.

The New Theology. By R. J. Campbell, M.A., Minister of the City Temple, London. The MacMillan Co., New York, 1907. Pp. 258.

Mr. Campbell's recent book, under the above title, is a crude and unphilosophical attempt to state the metaphysical tenets of idealistic monism, and to draw from these the resulting religious ideas, labelling them with the terminology of Christian theology. It is not pretended that the Bible is authoritative even in the Ritschlian sense. The doctrinal statement of Christian truth made by the Church of God under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, is also repudiated in language that might almost be termed violent. It is not, of course, denied that these doctrines stand for philosophical principles; the form, however, to which we are accustomed to attach the adjective Christian, is said to be "incredible," while the truth for which these doctrines stand, being simply a tenet of idealistic monism, is said to be so necessary an idea that no thinker can escape from it. It is not at all surprising, therefore, indeed it is the necessary consequence of this method of procedure, to be told by Mr. Campbell that, although Prof. Haeckel would probably not admit it, nevertheless he believes in the Trinity because he begins by assuming an infinite space filled with matter, and then proceeds to divide the latter as if it were finite. This, Mr. Campbell says, gives us two terms of the Trinity, and we get the third as soon as Haeckel explains the cosmic process by taking for granted that "the infinite is pressing in and up through the finite", etc., *i. e.,* the infinite, the finite, and the activity of the former in the latter—this is Mr. Campbell's idea of the Trinity. We would sympathize with Prof. Haeckel, if he should object to being told that he believes in *the* Trinity, by which he would no doubt understand the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It is needless to add that while Mr. Campbell's terms are, as he says, a trinity in unity, they are, of course, not *the* Trinity; nor is his doctrine of the Trinity the Christian doctrine. Mr. Campbell would no doubt acknowledge this in this instance; but, as this is a fair illustration of his method, he should go on to acknowledge that his "New Theology" cannot be called Christian in any legitimate sense of the term. It is, as we said, idealistic monism. Being equals consciousness. The infinite is the All. Every kind of distinction must be not only comprehended but also transcended within the infinite. These are Mr. Campbell's assumptions. God is the "Mysterious Power which is finding expression in the universe." He is the All-consciousness. In order to manifest "even to Himself," the possibilities of His being,

God must limit His being. In this way we get two "modes" of God—the infinite, perfect, and unconditioned; and the finite, imperfect, and conditioned. "And yet these two are one." (pp. 22, 23). Mr. Campbell says that he starts with "the *assumption* (italics mine) that the universe is God's thought about Himself, and that in so far as I am able to think it along with Him, I and my Father (even metaphysically speaking) are one." (p. 26). The words in brackets are Mr. Campbell's. Man is a mode of the Infinite. His true self is a "subliminal consciousness", or rather unconsciousness, while man's ordinary "surface consciousness" is "somewhat illusory," and to the "higher self," i. e., to the subliminal consciousness, no dividing line exists between it and the surface consciousness, or between it and God. Mr. Campbell seems fully confident of this. For although this subliminal consciousness is below the threshold of consciousness, *i. e.*, in a state of unconsciousness, and although we have never been able to look at things from this point of view, and presume that Mr. Campbell never has—for if he had, this subliminal consciousness would thereby cease to be subliminal and so become just ordinary, deceptive, illusory, surface consciousness—yet, we repeat, he is sure that from this higher standpoint—to which *ex hypothesi* no one has ever attained while conscious—all demarcations vanish and the Infinite all-consciousness becomes, as it really is, all in all. This metaphysic he distinguishes from pantheism which he identifies with materialistic monism (p. 35).

But what of Christ and Christianity? In order to understand Christ, Mr. Campbell says, we must distinguish three terms—Deity which is "the all-controlling consciousness" of the universe; divinity which is the moral nature of God as finite or limited i. e. love; humanity which is the human aspect or mode of God's being in our human consciousness. To use Mr. Campbell's words, there must be one side or aspect of God which is human, and "Jesus is the fullest expression of that eternal divine Man on the field of human history." The essence of this human side of God is love. "Jesus was divine simply and solely because His life was never governed by any other principle." (pp. 73-76). But let Mr. Campbell speak for himself. He sums up his conception of Jesus as follows (p. 92): "Jesus was God, but so are we. He was God because His life was the expression of divine love; we too are one with God in so far as our lives express the same thing. Jesus was not God in the sense that He possessed an infinite consciousness; no more are we. Jesus expressed fully and completely, in so far as a finite consciousness ever could, that aspect of the nature of God which we have called the eternal Son or Christ, or ideal Man who is the soul of the universe," etc. In this human side of God, Mr. Campbell says, we are all one. He tells us that the "average Westerner cannot grasp this", but assures us, nevertheless, that it is the absolute truth. Sin which is described as a "quest after God," is defined as selfishness, and of course any idea of guilt is eliminated altogether. As selfishness it is conceived as something positive, although evil, which is the genus of which sin is the species, is held to be non being and mere negation.

The Atonement is the realization of the unity of the individual with the race, and of the race with God. It has essentially and originally no relation to sin, but of course can only be realized by the giving up of selfishness.

Salvation, judgment, heaven and hell, are all terms descriptive of inner states of consciousness. This in barest outline is the New Theology of Mr. Campbell.

We have not space to criticise it in detail. Several general considerations should be noticed. To begin with, it is not Christian theology. From first to last it is simply an exposition of the ideas of monistic idealism or idealistic monism. But when one has explicity abandoned the great facts of Christianity and their authoritative interpretation in the New Testament, finding in the New Testament teaching, just as in that of Prof. Haeckel, only the faulty expression of the doctrines of a certain philosophy, it is without any kind of warrant whatsoever that the claim can be made that it is Christianity or Christian theology which is being set forth. Christianity is a historical religion and not the product of human speculation; and what Mr. Campbell has given us is simply his private metaphysics. To be sure he claims to find a great deal of idealistic monism in the New Testament. Thus in the statements in the Gospel of John where Jesus claims identity with God, Mr. Campbell holds that what is meant is simply the identity of God and man; and if it is urged that the language used is evidently meant to apply only to Jesus, Mr. Campbell reveals his amazing lack of exegetical insight by replying: "I think that the exceedingly able writer of the fourth Gospel knew better,"—his argument apparently being that the author of the fourth Gospel being so exceedingly able a thinker, must have meant to teach idealistic monism. More often, however, Mr. Campbell thinks that the New Testament writers do not attain to this great truth. Thus, for example, he thinks that although at times the Apostle Paul attained the heights of idealistic monism, a great deal of what the Apostle taught is "just nonsense." Thus it is abundantly evident that what Mr. Campbell has set forth in this book is just the tenets of idealistic monism, and he frankly says that his teaching leads back through Hegelianism to Greek thought, and back of that to the wise men of the East who lived long before Jesus was born. When we are told, that the idea that Jesus is God in any other sense than we men are; that "the New Testament language about the Atonement, especially the language of Paul, has been, and still is, the prolific source of most of the mischievous interpretations of it which exist in the religious mind"; that sin is the necessary result of our failure to realize our identity with God; that every man is not only divine in the same sense which Jesus was, but also becomes a Saviour when he lives for the "higher self"—when we are told all this, I repeat, it surely is not too much to say that whatever this theology may be, it is not Christian.

Nor is this monistic idealism and its solvent of Christianity set forth with philosophical insight or argumentative force. It has been so set

forth frequently, notably in the writings of the late Prof. T. H. Green of Oxford (cf. Green's *Miscell. Works,* iii. pp. 160-185, 230-276, for his treatment of Christianity). In Mr. Campbell's treatment of the subject there is no argument at all. The oneness of God and man is simply assumed, and the consequences deduced. But can this philosophy be so lightly assumed when the pluralists, personal idealists, pragmatists, and agnostics are almost swamping us with arguments for their metaphysical opinions? In some isolated instances where argument is attempted, it is either absurd or else contains so many "ambiguous middles" and *petitiones principii* as to be logically worthless. As an example of the former kind, the proof for the metaphysical identity of all humanity may be cited (p. 33). "Common sense", we are told, "assumes that I and thou are eternally distinct", but we are learning otherwise. The argument for this is as follows: "You are about to make an observation at table, and some member of your family makes it before you; you are thinking of a certain tune and someone begins to hum it; you have a certain purpose in mind and, lo, the same thought finds expression in someone else despite all probabilities." And if anyone objects that this is only "thought transference," the answer is—"precisely, but what are you except your thought"? The inference from this is, somehow, the metaphysical identity of all the members of the human race. This has the advantage of being an absolutely unanswerable argument, but labors under the disadvantage of not meriting an answer. As an example of Mr. Campbell's logic, the argument on p. 40 may be cited. He is using an *argumentum ad hominem*—is it objected that in affirming the identity of man and God, contradictory and opposite things must be affirmed of human persons, I would reply, says Mr. Campbell, that my critics, the orthodox, are affirming precisely the same divine and human qualities of the man Jesus. Quite so, but does Mr. Campbell forget or does he not know that these theologians held also the doctrine of the *gemina mens* in Jesus, and that hence, apart from the question of whether that doctrine be true, his *argumentum ad hominem* is absolutely without force. But enough of Mr. Campbell's arguments; in the main, the book is a series of assumptions and assertions, and is quite devoid of argument.

Another noticeable thing about the book is its inconsistency in regard to some of its fundamental and underlying ideas. First of all, notice how Mr. Campbell (p. 126) in criticising evangelical doctrines, distinguishes between the intellectual form which is regarded only as a symbol, the husk of the "emotional content", and "spiritual experience" which is the truth and essence of religion. This distinction, he says, enables us to understand how we can appreciate the value of even "archaic" doctrinal formularies. Just as a landscape or piece of music will awaken in one mind what they are incapable of arousing in another, so the forms of religious truth are nothing in themselves; the reality is the emotion which they excite. Of course, the logic of this is to make all the various forms of religious truth simply exciting causes or vehicles of religious sentiment, and religion is reduced to mere relig-

ious feeling. Mr. Campbell himself draws the only possible conclusion when he says that this should help us to realize "that truth is one under apparently contradictory forms of statement", *i. e.* there is no intellectual content essential to religion; it is bare undifferentiated religious emotion. But what, then, becomes of idealistic monism? This is no more the product of natural feeling than is Christianity. If it begets returning love in the plain sinner to be told that his heavenly Father loves him and has sent His Son to be the propitiation for his sin, it also excites religious sentiment in Mr. Campbell to be told that we are all potential Saviours and identical with God. From this point of view Christianity and idealistic monism would be fundamentally on the same footing, except that evangelical Christianity would appeal more to the plain non-metaphysical sinner. In other words, Mr. Campbell never seems to realize that in making the essential truth of religion to consist in mere religious sentiment, he has undermined the basis of that intellectualistic construction known as idealistic monism.

Another fundamental contradiction is involved in his doctrine of authority. He repudiates the idea of any external authority in religious knowledge, and holds that the seat of authority is an inner one, viz., the religious consciousness. But if the standpoint of the subliminal consciousness is *ex hypothesi* forever closed, and if, as Mr. Campbell holds, the "surface consciousness" is "illusory", it would seem as if we were in a bad way. If the light that is in us be "illusory," how great must be the illusion!

One more fundamental contradiction should be noticed. If the infinite consciousness or the All, or the Absolute of this monism not only "comprehends" but "transcends", *i. e.*, really, according to Mr. Campbell, swallows up and makes unreal, all distinctions such as that between me and thee, between God and man, and between love, justice, and holiness in God; if, in a word, every distinction is a negation or limitation, how can the Personality of the Absolute be retained? Why must we not give up the Personality of God? Why must we not even cease to speak of the Absolute as conscious, since consciouness involves distinctions. Logic will drive us to the undifferentiated Experience of Mr. Bradley or the Unknowable of Mr. Spencer. And then what is to become of freedom, or the duty of self-sacrifice, and of all the ethical clothing with which Mr. Campbell has draped the bare bones of his metaphysics? The ethical warmth of the book is in direct conflict with its metaphysical basis.

Another point which calls for special mention is Mr. Campbell's apparently utter ignorance of the theology which he is attacking. For example, on p. 39 we read—"According to the received theology, Jesus was God, and yet did not possess the all-controlling consciousness of the universe"? We are under the impression that the kenotic theory is pretty well exploded, and are amazed that Mr. Campbell should designate it as the "received theology." We suspect, however, that what he really intended by the "received theology" was the Chalcedonian Christology, in which case his confusion of it with the

kenotic theory betrays an appalling theological ignorance. Then again, to cite but one more instance, Mr. Campbell says (p. 19)—"The God of the ordinary church-goer, and of the man who is supposed to teach him from study and pulpit, is an antiquated Theologian who has made His universe so badly that it went wrong in spite of Him, and has remained wrong ever since." He is a God who is "spiteful" and "silly." Entirely aside from the coarse and vulgar satire directed against a straw man of his own creation; entirely apart from the question why even such a God should be characterized as an antiquated theologian, since this God could not help himself, whereas the theologians, according to Mr. Campbell, are wilfully doing harm; apart from such minor questions,—is Mr. Campbell so ignorant of the history of theology as to suppose that this is anything but a wanton carricature? That there has been much theological thought which would place the occurrence of sin in the universe outside the divine decree and control, we are not at all concerned to deny; but should Calvin and all the other Reformed theologians be all jumbled together with their opponents, and all alike come in for scathing sarcasm and ignorant misrepresentation?

And what, finally, shall we say of the tone and spirit of Mr. Campbell's polemic when he is attacked? Here is an instance. Robertson Nicoll in *The British Weekly* had made certain criticisms of previous statements of Mr. Campbell concerning sin. Mr. Campbell accused Dr. Nicholl of having wilfully misrepresented him, and referred to Dr. Nicoll's quotation of his words as "a good illustration of the sinfulness of sin." Dr. Nicoll in *The British Weekly* of March 21, 1907, says with considerable justification that some persons when criticised write in a temper which savors strongly of the declaration of Ali, the zealous Vizier of Mohammed—"Whoever rises against thee, I will dash out his teeth, tear out his eyes, break his legs, rip up his belly."

Dr. Fairbairn has characterized Mr. Campbell's "New Theology" as a "farrago of nonsense," thus applying to it the same term which Mr. Campbell applied to some of the teaching of the Apostle Paul, when he called it "just nonsense". We are not sure that this term will describe accurately the entire contents of the book; certainly we can think of no other category under which very much of its contents could more accurately be subsumed. Perhaps it might be fairer to describe the book as a somewhat feeble attempt to expound idealistic monism, and a coarse and bitter attack upon evangelical Christianity.

Princeton. C. W. Hodge.

Der Christliche Glaube (Dogmatik), dargestellt von D. Th. Haering, Professor in Tübingen: Calw und Stuttgart; Verlag der Vereinsbuchhandlung. 1906. Pp. 616.

We have in this volume a complete system of doctrine from the general stand point of the "right wing" of the Ritschlian School. There have not as yet appeared very many complete systematic treatises from

the general standpoint which may be somewhat loosely termed Ritschlian. Kaftan's *Dogmatik* was published in 1897 and the third and fourth edition in 1901; also his supplementary Articles in the *Zeitschr. f. Th. u. K.* in 1903 entitled "Zur Dogmatik" have been published separately. Then there is the *Christliche Glaubenslehre in Leitsätzen,* by the late Prof. Reischle; and in 1905 Prof. Kirn published his *Grundriss der evangelischen Dogmatik,* which was reviewed by the writer of this notice in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October 1905. The year 1906 saw the publication of two complete systematic treatises on Dogmatics—this volume of Prof. Haering, and Teil I of Prof. H. H. Wendt's *System der Christlichen Lehre,* the second part of which has just been published in 1907. In 1888 Prof. Haering had written a brochure in criticism of Ritschl's doctrine of the Atonement—*Zus Ritschl's Versöhnungslehre,* and in reply to criticisms by Ritschl made just before his death, and by others, in 1893 Prof. Haering published his monograph of about one hundred pages, entitled *Zur Versöhnungslehre,* in which he discussed the doctrine of the Atonement, and pointed out wherein his doctrine differed from that of Grotius. Prof. Haering has also written a monograph on subjects connected with Ritschl's theory of knowledge.

In the present volume, after a very full and quite suggestive treatment of the subjects of theological prolegomena covering 198 pages, the author sets forth his system of doctrine. He occupies, as was said, the standpoint of the Ritschlian right wing. Although, in general, Ritschlian in his conception of the nature of religious knowledge and its distinction from theoretic knowledge, he seeks to avoid the extremes of Ritschl's position, and also endeavors to take a more positive attitude toward questions such as that of Christ's pre-existence and relation to God (though his remarks on this subject are neither clear nor satisfactory, (p. 443-453), the nature of sin and the value of the Atonement in relation to God, etc.

The book on the whole is an able presentation of theology from the author's point of view already described. It is not so clear as the above mentioned work of Prof. H. H. Wendt, which has also just been published. All references to theological literature are wanting, and the reader is referred to Luthardt's *Compendium* and Kaftan's *Dogmatik.* In this respect also, the somewhat full bibliographical references in Prof. Wendt's book render it more serviceable to the student.

Princeton. C. W. HODGE.

THE SPIRIT WORLD. By JOSEPH HAMILTON, author of *"Our Own and Other Worlds", "The Starry Hosts".* Introduction by Rev. W. H. Withrow, D.D., F.R.S.C. Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. xii., 274.

For a book that treats of this mysterious and occult subject, this volume is entitled to be regarded as reverent, sane and evangelical. The author names and rebukes some of the present tendencies toward

materialism. There are, in addition to the natural "disposition of the unrenewed heart to rest in material things", the discoveries of physical science, the varied applications of those discoveries, the accumulations of large fortunes and the grinding struggle incident to poverty. The author holds, without hesitation or qualification, to the sueprnatural and to miracles. His conceptions of the nature of mind and of matter make it easier, he believes, to hold to the scripture narratives of the miraculous than to reject them. He believes in Trichotomy and that the soul is the Spiritual body. He treads upon the dubious domain of speculation but he does not dogmatize therein. Angels are spirits equipped with spiritual bodies; indeed, he doubts whether there is such a creature as an absolutely bodiless spirit. This view is supported by Scripture upon which the author contiually draws for proof. Many Scripture miracles are held to be only instances of special transformation from the material body to the spiritual, as, *e. g.,* Moses on the Mount, or *vice versa* as e. g. angelic appearances, Moses and Elias at the transfiguration, and our Lord often during the time between his resurrection and his ascension. Caesar said he would gladly give all his victories for a glimpse of the sources of the Nile and the curious mind of man would fain peer into the secrets of the Lord our God. We believe this book has much that is sound inference from Scripture and much more that is well worth intelligent consideration. It is good devotional reading to the discriminating believer and we lay it down with the feeling that the author has done no small service, in spite of some obvious shortcomings, in answering the questions and comforting the hearts and confirming the hopes of weak and wavering pilgrims on the way.

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE MEANING AND MESSAGE OF THE CROSS. By HENRY C. MABIE, Corresponding Secretary American Baptist Missionary Union. F. H. Revell Co., New York. 1906. Pp. 259. $1.25 net.

The author has been so well known as a preacher of a pure Gospel, and so prominent as a leader of world-wide missionary activity, that a cordial reception and a helpful influence were assured for this volume, which aims to show that only the Cross of Christ can furnish a true motive and an effective instrument for missionary effort. In the first five chapters, it is demonstrated that "the cross" denotes much more than the mere tragedy of the crucifixion viewed as an act of violence or the death of a martyr; it indicates an actual objective achievement wrought in the moral universe, a death endured in behalf of others. Having thus shown the "meaning of "the cross", the writer devotes the remainder of his book to an explanation of its "Message," concerning personal salvation, the development of spiritual life, the redemption of the body and the evangelization of the world.

While some might not accept the view of atonement so clearly set

forth by the writer, or might differ from him in certain of the implications of his argument, it seems difficult to suppose that any one who truly appreciates the significance of the death of Christ, could fail to appreciate the main contention of the writer when he declares that "the charter of missions is not to be found so much in the mere command of Christ as "in the character and work of Him who hung upon the tree."

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE CHURCH AND THE CHANGING ORDER. By Shailer Mathews, Professor of Historical and Comparative Theology in the University of Chicago; Author of "The Social Teaching of Jesus," "The Messianic Hope in the New Testament"; editor of "The World To-day". 8vo.; pp. viii, 255. New York: The MacMillan Company. London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd. 1907.

The aim of this interesting and sprightly volume is to point out the changes which must be made in the policy, the teachings, and the methods, of the Church, if she is to continue to be the great power for good in her radically new environment that she has been in the past. Our author, consequently, considers the relation of the church to modern scholarship, to the prevalent objection to the Gospel of the resurrection, to "the Gospel of brotherhood," to the widely spread "social discontent", to the social movement so characteristic of our day, to the well nigh universal materialism of our times; and he concludes with a chapter entitled "The Sword of the Christ," in which he sounds the resulting call to heroic and self-sacrificing struggle.

The discussion is usually well balanced and illuminating, and often most appropriate to present conditions. Specially so are the chapters on "The Church and the Gospel of the Risen Christ" and "The Church and Materialism." We can never emphasize too strongly, and least of all now, that the Gospel or Christianity is far from being identical with religion; that while "religion as a form of human experience may be independent of specific facts in history," Christianity or the Gospel" as a means of inducing and regulating that experience certainly contains historical elements"; that, consequently, the facts as to Christ, particularly as to His resurrection and ascension, are vital; that in the destruction of the historic fact of the resurrection of Jesus as Paul conceived it the Gospel as a basis for a new type of religion would disappear and with it the new and particular form of religion as well; and that, hence, the Gospel ought always to be preached with primitive insistence upon its historic element. That is fundamental and indispensable.

So, too, no lesson is so much needed to-day as that "materialism is the greatest enemy of the church; nor could our author be more effective

than he is when he shows how many and how subtle are the forms of its manifestation, such as, the passion for wealth, the devotion of the home to income earning, excessive athleticism, sensual theatrical exhibitions, the craze for gambling, etc. Of course, as Prof. Matthews strenuously maintains, the cure for all this is insistence on the reality of religion. We are not so sure, however, that, as he implies, the reality of religion is emphasized in proportion as the doctrines of religion are minimized, the fact of Christianity is made real in so far as its truths are kept in the background. On the contrary, we are sure that if the worth of Christianity is inseparable from its historic basis, so it is its doctrines which give worth to that basis. It is precisely the doctrine that Christ "died for our sins and was raised again for our justification" that makes his death and resurrection the most precious of all facts for us. Were this doctrine not true, our preaching would be as vain as Paul says that it would be if Christ had not risen. While our Lord's supernaturalness would be evinced, he would not be revealed as *our Saviour*. In a word, the doctrinal element which our author thinks now stands in the way of the progress of Christianity needs to be made as prominent as the historical element. It is partly because the former is being so generally ignored that the latter is coming to be denied. It is in the meaning of a fact that we feel its reasonableness.

Hence, we must take issue again with Prof. Matthews in his estimate of the importance of the distinction between the supernatural and the natural. We cannot agree with him that if the distinction is real, then God is not so active in the operations of nature as in his supernatural works; or that if this be not so, then "the distinction between natural and supernatural is one for a debating society." Of course, 'when something exceptional happens, we may be sure that in bringing it to pass God does not throw the universe into anarchy. He violates law when he acts supernaturally no more than when he acts naturally. But it is just as true that he has not imposed any such laws on the universe as prevent him from interposing in its affairs when and where and as he pleases, and it is precisely the fact that in Christianity we have such a supernatural interposition which gives to it its supreme worth. If God cannot supernaturally put out His own hand in nature and work through processes *above* those of nature, how can even He save a world "dead through trespasses and sins"? According to His own processes in nature, the inevitable issue in the case of such a world can be only increasing corruption. Consequently, so far from this distinction between the supernatural and the natural being one for a debating society merely, it is on the reality of this distinction that the hope of the world rests, and it is also in the reality of this distinction that we see most clearly the reasonableness of the fundamental facts of Christianity. If for example, the resurrection of our Lord were not supernatural, how could we receive it as a fact? It is clearly outside of and above all that reason has taught us as to nature. In a word, it is precisely its supernaturalness which makes it reasonable as a fact.

We may not close this notice without calling attention to the change

that such positions as those of this volume call for in the education of the ministry. So long as the Bible be regarded as a distinctly supernatural book, a message from God Himself, inspired and, consequently, infallible even as to its words, it will be indispensable that the Christian minister should understand the language in which it is written. How else can he be a "preacher of the Word"; and unless he be a "preacher of the Word," how can he be an "ambassador of Christ"? Is not the first requirement of an ambassador that he shall present and so that he shall be able to read and interpret for himself the proclamation of his king? Hence, whatever else the theological student may omit or elect, he must qualify himself in the languages of holy Scripture; and that there are many who fail to do this even when the curriculum aims to secure it,—this only proves that many go into the ministry unprepared and that few, if any, of our seminaries are what they ought to be. On the other hand, however, if the distinction between natural and supernatural be one for a debating society only; if the Bible, instead of being the very Word of God Himself, be merely the expression of the developing religious nature of man, it follows, of course, that the candidate for the ministry would better be left to pick and choose his own studies. His religious nature must be at liberty to expand freely. Indeed, it may well be that even in his whims and fancies we shall have a higher revelation of God than we could possibly have in the visions and reasonings of prophets and apostles of a primitive and far less privileged age. Hence, the folly of insisting that the student for the ministry shall study the language that Isaiah spoke and the tongue in which Paul wrote. Were there no other objection, it is to divert him from those sociological speculations and experiments to which the church may most hopefully look for the development of the Gospel demanded by "the changing order."

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF JESUS. By REV. G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS, M.A., cloth, 12mo. 124 pp. Fleming H. Revell Co., price 75 cents net.

These brief chapters are the evident product of a well disciplined mind, a catholic spirit and a reverent faith. The philosophic and speculative inclination of the writer seems to be suggested by his characterization of Jesus as "The Conscious Over-Soul and Spiritual Guide of Universal Mankind," the "Abiding Center of the Life of the Universal Man," the "Over-Soul of the Universal Human Spirit." The purpose of the book, however, is "Not to pursue an intellectual interest but to serve a religious need." The discussion concerns the relation in which Jesus stands to the human race, which is "Only a part of the question of the place of Christ in the cosmic process." Jesus is set forth as "The representative Man in whom the Idea of the species is incarnated." His character is declared to be free from the usual limitations suggested by sex or race or time or social rank. He is the "Universal Human Norm." He is the "Sole instance of the Catholic Man." The

writer establishes this view of "the Universality of Jesus" by a series of studies in the memoirs of His life. He summons the Witness of Christ's Environment, of his Origin, Baptism, Temptation, Transfiguration, Teaching, Prayers, Death, Resurrection, and of the event of Pentecost. Even when it is not possible to agree with certain interpretations of the "Representative fragments of the Records" which the writer passes in review, the main point is in every case clearly illustrated and evidence is given of careful and original thought. For instance in connection with the Baptism of Jesus, while it may seem that more is included in the terms "Lamb of God" and "Baptism with the Spirit" than the writer sets forth, he does establish the fact that "The note of Universality is struck at the threshold of Christ's career. Or again, while it may seem fanciful in the writer to insist that the temptation of Christ to cast himself from the pinnacle of the temple is to be interpreted as meaning that Christ thought of becoming a high priest and "setting himself upon a hierarchical eminence", nevertheless, in his whole treatment of the Temptation the writer shows that the "Moral core of the Experience is Generic". So, too, while it may be questioned whether the meaning of the Transfiguration scene was a great "renunciation," and whether the essence of Pentecost is suggested by "Universality", it is strikingly demonstrated that in all these experiences of Christ there is set forth the catholicity of his person and work. So, too, in referring to the book as a whole, while one may doubt the possible universalistic implications of some of the terms employed, we are enabled to see in clear light the Representative Ideal Man; and we are certain to agree with the practical conclusions of the writer which are as follows:

First, that such a picture is a suggestion of the inspiration of the Gospels; and *secondly*, that the revelation of such a character inspires us to seek to attain His likeness: and *thirdly*, that the ideal of Christian character is to be found in the world-embracing love; and *finally* that the catholicity of Jesus assures us of His future universal sway.

These chapters are full of stimulating thought and reveal to us a writer filled with loving trust in the "Catholic Christ" Who by His living spirit is still moving in the hearts of men for the fulfillment of the designs of God.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE PRAYERS OF THE BIBLE. By PROFESSOR JOHN EDGAR MCFADYEN, M.A. New York. A. C. Armstrong and Son. Pp. 388.

The writer declares the purpose of the book to be both scientific and practical. "It is an attempt to understand Biblical prayer by an examination of the prayers and allusions to prayer, and it seeks to gather up the results of this examination and to apply them to the public and private devotions of to-day."

Of the four parts of the book the first and third are more directly concerned with the scientific, the second and fourth with the practical

aim. Part I is an interesting discussion of Biblical prayer, including such topics as "The themes of prayer," "The inward and outward conditions", "The teachings and practice of Jesus", "The prayers of Paul."

In Part II the author applies to "Modern Prayer", the principles which have been discovered in his review of the prayers of the Bible; and in three brief, thoughtful, and helpful chapters treats of "The Nature and Content of Prayer," "The Form of Prayer," Free and Liturgical Prayer."

We are reminded by Part III of the large amount of Scripture which is included under the title of prayer, and we are also enabled to test the conclusions of the writer, and are aided in further study of his suggestive theme; for we are here given a comprehensive collection of the prayers of the Old and New Testaments under the classification of "petition", "intercession", "thanksgiving", confession", "praise", "vows", "complaints", "benedictions and doxologies".

In Part IV selections are made, from these various classes, of "Biblical prayers for modern use." The volume, as a whole, cannot fail to stimulate one to a more careful consideration of the subject suggested, nor, if thoughtfully read, to aid in the exercise of private and public devotion.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE SOCIAL MESSAGE OF THE MODERN PULPIT. By CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN, First Congregational Church, Oakland, California. The Lyman Beecher Lectures 1905-6. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 293, $1.25 net.

The author makes a convincing and stimulating appeal for expository preaching; yet there is reason for suggesting that in his treatment of the Book of Exodus, he has not given us an encouraging example of Biblical exposition. In reviewing the history as "The Story of an Ancient Labor Movement," the deep significance of the narrative is not set forth, nor is new light thrown upon modern social problems. The familiar metaphor is merely expanded into the compass of chapters which speak of " industrial and social bondage," of the need of "an industrial deliverer," of " the promised land" of "a new social order." We are, however, indebted to the writer for discussing seriously a problem which confronts the modern pulpit, for reminding us anew of distressing social conditions to which we dare not be indifferent, and for certain practical suggestions for the guidance of the Christian minister. Among the latter may be mentioned the advice to avoid all that flavors of partisanship, to exalt material above spiritual values, to emphasize the peril of self-interest, to insist upon the recognition of the will of God in the organized life of men. While insisting upon moral obligation, there seems to be lacking, in the discussion, a clear statement of its sanctions; and while recognizing the need of character and self sacrifices in order to the establishment of an ideal social order, one misses the Christian motives of constraining love to Him "who

died for all, that they who live, should no longer live unto themselves, but unto Him, who, for their sakes, died and rose again." The social message of which Christ is not the substance will not be adequate for the modern pulpit.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

PREACHER PROBLEMS OR THE TWENTIETH CENTURY PREACHER AT HIS WORK. By WILLIAM THOMAS MOORE, LL.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 387. $1.50 net.

In thirty-six brief chapters, originally prepared as lectures for ministerial students, the writer endeavors to aid in the solution of "The problems growing out of the preacher's personal relation to his work", "The problems growing out of the modern view of the world," "The problems growing out of ways and means." The first of these three classes of problems includes the problem of "the call," of "character," of the "library," of the sermon, of visiting, of literary work, of vacation, of worries. The second class suggests the ethical, scientific, theological, and Biblical problems. The third presents such problems as social life, the prayer-meeting, the Sunday-School, church music, evangelism: and endeavors to show "how the practical duties of the preacher's position can be met".

The treatment throughout is informal, unconventional, conservative, sane and sensible. The large number of subjects treated necessitate a discussion of each so brief as to border at times on the superficial; but each chapter is helpful and is evidently the product, not of mere theorizing, but of practical experience. The book is to be heartily commended to pastors and especially to theological students.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LIFE AND TEACHINGS OF JESUS. By JEREMIAH W. JENKS, Ph.D., LL.D. New York: The International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations. 1906. Pp. 168.

In spite of the writer's reverent spirit and careful treatment, this series of brief studies, intended for the instruction and inspiration of young men, is a striking example of how certainly the teachings of Jesus lose their significance when separated from His Divine Person and atoning work. In endeavoring to avoid all Christian "doctrines," the author leaves no true support or sanction for the teachings which remain. He is able, of course, to suggest that the life and words of Jesus embody principles which, if applied, would result in the regeneration of society, and he wisely insists that a "regenerated social order" can only result from "the perfecting of individuals". But how can individuals be regenerated and perfected? This is the crux of the social question, and the writer nowhere intimates the true and simple

answer which the Gospels so plainly proclaim. It is interesting to note how powerless a system is the Christianity which has been robbed of the redeeming and divine Christ.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

JESUS AND NICODEMUS. A study in spiritual life. By the REVEREND JOHN REID, M.A. Inverness. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 288. Price $1.75 net.

This treatment of a most fascinating and important passage in the Gospel according to John, is from every point of view admirable and satisfying. The writer proposes to interpret afresh this familiar narrative and to "see its meaning in the light of the time, and read out its lesson for the individual, the Church, and the world." It is sufficient praise to suggest that the author has already achieved his aim, and has given us a discussion as lucid as it is illuminating. The concise chapters of this volume contain not merely an exposition, but also an impressive application of truth, and will be found of value and spiritual help to all by whom they may be read.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

FOR THE WORK OF THE MINISTRY. By J. HARWOOD PATTISON. Elaborated by his son, Harold Pattison. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1907. Pp. 558. Price $1.50 net.

We here find a son admirably completing the literary work and continuing the helpful influence of his honored father. The substance of this book consists in the lectures delivered in the Rochester Theological Seminary by the late Dr. T. Harwood Pattison, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology. These lectures were left in the form of notes which have been so revised, arranged and enlarged, by the Rev. Harold Pattison, that they form a series of chapters which will prove of value to all who are interested in the work of the Christian Ministry. While the author disclaims the purpose of teaching pastoral theology the practical suggestions which are made, and the principles which are enunciated, cannot fail to aid in the solution of the problems which confront those who are engaged in the pastoral office. The book is primarily designed for the use of those who are to be in the ministry of the Baptist Church, but is well adapted to serve those of other communions.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

ATTI DELLA R. ACCADEMIA DEI LINCEI ANNO CCCI. 1904. Serie Quinta. Notizie degli Scavi di Antichita. Vol. I. Roma. Tipografia della R. Accademia dei Lincei. 1904. 4to, pp. 468.

THE SAME.. Vols II and III. 1905, 1906. Pp. 467 and 488.

We have here the "Acts" of the most venerable Academy of the Lincei, now in its 304th year, for the years 1904, 1905 and 1906, being the first three volumes of the 5th series. They are printed very handsomely with numerous illustrations, and cover recent archaeological researches in Italy, including Sicily and Sardinia, and contain much valuable material for the student of Italian antiquity. Vol. I is concerned with discoveries in Sardinia and Sicily, for the most part, but also includes others in Rome, Norba and Pistoia. Vol. II describes the discoveries in Rome, Pompeii and Venice, chiefly, and has notes of archaeological interest from many other Italian towns. Vol. III devotes most of its pages to Etruria, Latium and the Campania, Pompeii, Rome and its suburbs, Samnium and Sabina, and Venice.

The Review has also received the Rendiconti of the above Academy for the section of the moral, historical and philological sciences, vol. XIV of the fifth series, fasc. 9-12, 1905, and vol. XV, fasc. 1-4, 7-12, 1906. These contain papers presented at the sessions of the Academy and the proceedings of the same.

Princeton. JOSEPH H. DULLES.